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ABSTRACT

States implement many o f the environmental laws enacted during the last thirty
years. A key policy issue is the effect o f differences in state institutions and environmental
policies on the location o f livestock agriculture. There is widespread belief that the
stringency o f state environmental regulations, known as regulatory climate, is an important
factor influencing the location, growth and expansion decisions o f livestock agriculture.
Existing regulatory climate measures are not tailored to agriculture, and their use has given
mixed results.
Conceptual and empirical models were developed for the U.S. aquaculture industry,
based on elements o f public choice and firm location theories within an institutional
economic framework.

Because state regulatory climate is not directly observable, a

summated scale measure o f regulatory climate was designed, with four property rights
conditions as underlying dimensions. Exploratory factor analysis and structural equations
modeling were used to determine the scale's structure, which consisted o f nine items in
three subscales, representing the ownership, specification and transferability property' rights
conditions. The enforcement condition was subsumed within the other three subscales.
The results demonstrated that property rights conditions can be useful as analytical tools
in empirical analysis.
Two alternative forms o f the regulatory clim ate scale were devised, a continuous
0-18 scale and a five-category ordinal scale. They served as the dependent variables in
two-limit truncated regression and ordered probit analyses.

Key state institutional

xvii
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characteristics served as explanatory variables. Primary data were obtained from two
national surveys o f state aquaculture contacts and coordinators.
Estimation results suggest that establishing a formal state aquaculture developm ent
plan and transferring regulatory enforcement authority to state departm ents o f agriculture
will have significant, negative effects on regulatory stringency. Joint adm inistration or
enforcement adds a bureaucratic layer and increases regulatory' stringency.
The regulatory climate scale was also used to com pare states’ regulatory climate
toward aquaculture, by fish category. In the future, the scale can be used to evaluate the
effect o f institutional changes over time. The items in the scale appear to be applicable to
other forms o f alternative livestock, and may form the basis for a m ore general property
rights based regulatory climate scale with broad applications.

xviii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The system o f property rights within a com m unity is the institutional instrument
which describes the set o f economic and social relations defining the position o f each
individual with respect to the utilization o f scarce resources. The traditional neoclassical
economic model assum es an unspecified, yet ideal property rights structure, resulting in
efficient trade in resources. Alternative property rights structures and changes in property
rights can alter econom ic outcomes.
Attenuations in property rights typically result from action by the state, especially
when the state is called upon to manage nonexclusive natural resources. Government
regulation, including environmental regulation, can be viewed as one form o f property
rights attenuation, with the growth o f government regulation weakening private property
rights. All regulations raise the cost o f production and change the allocation o f economic
surplus between producers and consumers and am ong producer groups (Batie. 1990).
Indirect effects also occur as conventional inputs and production processes are changed
(Barbera and M cConnell, 1990). Industry innovation can be discouraged and small firms
can be driven out o f business (Ashford, Ayers and Stone, 1985; Pashigian, 1984).
Business location decisions may also be significantly affected by the stringency o f
state regulations, known as regulator}7 climate. There is widespread belief that state
environmental protection regulations and enforcement activities can present a significant
influence on the location o f economic activity, especially for highly polluting and heavily

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

regulated industries (Bartik, 1988; Feiock and Rowland, 1990; Jaffe, etal., 1995; Stafford
1985).
Livestock agriculture is among the most heavily regulated sectors in most developed
countries. The nature o f modem agricultural environmental externalities, especially water
pollution, is viewed by the public as justifying strong government intervention.
Environmental regulation has become an issue o f major concern for livestock
agribusinesses.

The stringency o f state environmental quality regulations and their

enforcement have been cited as an important factor influencing the location, growth and
expansion decisions o f livestock farms and related agribusinesses (Abdalla, Lanyon. and
Hallberg, 1995; Mo and Abdalla, 1997).
Aquaculture, the aquatic counterpart o f livestock agriculture, has expanded rapidly
over the last two decades, and is now the fastest growing component o f U.S. agriculture
(Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture. 1993). In response to the rapid growth o f the
aquaculture industry, state development agencies have been formulating aquaculture
industry' development plans to foster industry' growth. Rapid industry growth has also
heightened concern over its potential negative environmental impacts, and resulted in
increased levels o f environmental regulation and enforcement activities by state regulatory
institutions.

The current regulatory environment, especially the diversity o f agencies

administering state regulatory efforts, is perceived to be a major constraint to aquaculture
industry development (DeVoe and Mount, 1989; McCoy, 1996; Wypyszinski et ah, 1994).
The functioning o f existing state aquaculture development and regulatory
institutions is predicated on a particular set o f industry' conditions. Existing regulatory
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institutions, developed when the aquaculture industry was in its infancy, were designed to
protect wild fish resources from overexploitation by commercial and recreational fisherm en
and to protect natural water supplies from overpollution by large industrial and municipal
water users. The inadequacy o f the existing institutions to reconcile the expanding
aquaculture industry's needs with changing social and environmental protection goals has
been the source o f serious conflicts between the aquaculture industry and state regulatory
institutions (DeVoe and Mount, 1989). Over the last decade, there has been a recognized
need to adjust the structure o f institutional arrangements to facilitate the aquaculture
industry's rapid expansion. The resulting demand for institutional change has meant, in
some cases, major changes in the states' approaches to the aquaculture industry. In other
cases, new institutions have evolved which, by their nature, ensure attention to changing
needs.
The wide variation in state regulatory policies toward the aquaculture industry have
resulted in significant interstate differences in regulatory climate, and may affect where fish
are grown. The purpose o f this research is to develop an objective measure o f states'
regulator}' climate toward fish culture. The measure will be used to examine the
significance and economic impacts o f key state institutional characteristics on regulatory
climate and develop recommendations for state institutional changes which will improve
the regulatory climate toward the aquaculture industry.
Research Problem
U.S. environmental regulatory programs and permit requirements vary from state
to state. In many states it is difficult, costly, and time consuming to secure permits to
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establish new operations. Variability in state institutional characteristics and regulatory
climate may affect the rate and intensity o f industry development.
As the aquaculture industry has expanded into almost every state in the U.S., state
agricultural developm ent officials have formulated appealing development plans to attract
the aquaculture industry. M eanwhile, state regulatory agencies have been re-w riting and
re-interpreting environmental laws and regulations to protect important water and w ildlife
resources from potential negative environmental consequences. During this process, no
information has been available to states regarding the economic impacts or significance o f
various state developm ent and regulatory strategies on aquaculture industry developm ent.
New and expanding aquaculture operations have also sought objective methods to compare
states’ institutional characteristics, in order to facilitate business location and species
selection decisions. Currently, there is little information and no objective method available
to allow farmers to compare states on the basis o f regulatory climate toward the aquaculture
industry.
Justification
A property rights based approach to resource control and use problems allows
economic analysis to directly address theoretical and policy issues concerning institutional
constraints. Dales (1992) suggested that analysis based on property rights provides a way
o f looking at pollution and other social problems. The clear relationship between property
rights and government regulation provides an opportunity to develop the first objective
measure o f regulatory climate based on the nature o f the regulations.

4
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This research will provide a method for aquaculturists and state officials to directly
compare states on the basis o f regulatory' climate toward the aquaculture industry for the
various classifications o f fmfish raised in aquaculture operations, thus facilitating location,
species selection, and production decisions. Use o f the measure o f regulatory climate as
the dependent variable in empirical analysis will provide necessary information on the
economic significance and impacts o f key state aquaculture institutions (both
developmental and regulatory) and various institutional designs on regulatory climate and
aquaculture industry development. The measure will also provide the basis for
recommending actions for states to improve regulatory climate, and provide a means for
evaluation o f changes in state institutional characteristics and regulatory climate overtim e.
Finally, this process o f developing a scale o f regulatory climate, although aquaculturespecific, can lead to a more general property-rights based scale o f regulatory climate with
broad applications, especially for evaluating alternative livestock industries.
An Institutional Economic Framework
The social system contains three major components: the natural environment
including the physical capital created to utilize raw materials, the structure o f social
conventions and rules that control humans' dealings with each other, and the superstructure
containing the belief system and values. The structural component provides society’s
working rules, and includes institutions (Bromley, 1982).
Institutions are ordered relationships, including rules, norms, custom s and their
enforcement characteristics, among people which define their rights, privileges and
behavioral responsibilities in economic transactions.

Economic institutions are social
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decision systems which provide decision rules for the allocation o f scarce resources among
competing uses and for the distribution o f income from resource use. One important
purpose o f institutions is to ensure that individuals’ behavior is consistent with society’s
goals for resource allocation. Institutions provide stability to the economic system and are
part o f the core o f the economy. The economic system is stable because people follow
institutional norms for the public good, even though doing so is not always in their rational
interest (Buchholz, 1990; Colander, 1996; Roy, 1995).
Institutional resource management decision systems are often hierarchical in nature.
Norris, Carriker and Danielson (1994), for example, summarized a three-level hierarchy
o f decision systems: individual resource users, legislatures and government agencies, and
the U. S. constitutional organization. The first level, individual resource users, relates to
control o f resources as inputs into production processes. Resource users are constrained
by the provisions o f civil and criminal law, which constitutes the institutional framework
within which first level decisions are made. The evolution o f resource-related law in each
state reflects the states’ reactions to conflicts over resource use, changes in the definitions
o f acceptable resource quality, and competing interests in addressing these issues.
Decisions to change legal constraints are made at the second level, through state agencies
created to enforce and implement legislative mandates.
Given the hierarchical nature o f institutional decision systems for resource
allocation, people will pursue their own self-interest. However, some will violate the
existing institutional norms or attempt to change the rules for their own benefit. There are
always winners and losers from any change in resource allocation laws or rules. Pressures
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for institutional change exist whenever sufficient numbers o f influential people are unhappy
over the outcomes o f first-level decision making. The system, w hich is always on the edge
o f chaos, thus imposes a cost that is borne by everyone, requiring the establishment o f a
new set o f stability-creating norms. The end result is a continual evolution o f institutions
(Colander, 1996).

Therefore, the capacity o f an institution to evolve and adjust as

conditions change over time is an important consideration in institutional design. Earp
(1996) noted that since modifying institutions requires a complex political and cognitive
game, institutions can exist even when they are o f no use or w hen they are suboptimal for
all.
The Institutional Approach to Economic Policy Analysis
The fundamental principle o f institutional economics is a holistic methodological
and philosophical approach to the discipline o f economics. Institutional economists view
the economy as a complex system, tacitly accepting a master m odel which encompasses the
movement of the whole social system. The dynamics o f the social system are determined
by a circular causation among all the endogenous conditions. This implies interdependence
within the whole social process. There is no one basic causal factor; everything causes
everything else. If one condition changes, others will change in response, and there is
generally no equilibrium in sight (Colander, 1996; Elliott, 1978; M yrdal, 1978).
Institutionalism differs from mainstream neoclassical econom ics, both in terms o f
the scope and content o f its subject matter and its methods or m odes o f approaching its
substantive concerns. Neoclassical economics assumes the econom y to be mechanistic,
following simple laws, with the underlying interrelationships expressible in simple
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functional forms.

Deductive hypotheses are constructed concerning the behavior o f

selected economic variables from underlying assumptions. Nonmonetary factors are placed
in the black box o f assumptions called ceteris paribus, with these assumptions, typically
pertaining to technology, institutions, and social attitudes and m otivations, perceived as
non- or extraeconomic in character. They are 'given,' not in the sense that they do not
change or cannot be altered (for example, the substitution o f the oligopoly assumption for
pure competition), but in the sense that they are typically regarded as beyond the
explanatory scope o f economic theory (Buchholz, 1990; Elliott, 1978).
Institutional economists criticize ordinary economics as w orking with narrowly
closed models, and with analysis limited to too few conditions, o r econom ic factors, which
are readily quantifiable. In the view o f institutionalists, neoclassical m odels do not even
closely correspond to observed reality. The underlying interrelationships are too complex
to be represented by simple solvable equations. The seemingly greater precision offered by
conventional economic analysis is only attained by ignoring a whole world of relevant
factors, and as a result, almost the entire social system is kept out o f sight (Elliott. 1978;
M yrdal. 1978).
Institutional analysis focuses upon the broad political character ot economic life,
including society’s laws, ethos, and institutions. Institutional econom ists recognize the
need to take into account the entire social system, including everything else o f importance
to what happens in the economic field. Foremost are institutions and attitudes, including
the distribution o f power in society and, more generally, econom ic, social, and political
stratification. The strategic starting point for an analysis o f any institutional change is a
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shift into variables o f the data compounded in the ceteris paribus assum ptions o f
neoclassical economic theory. In institutional theory, these kinds o f data become variables
for which hypotheses are to be constructed. Induced policy measures are added as an
exogenous set o f factors, applied with the purpose o f changing one or several o f these
endogenous factors. Thus, institutional economists include noneconomic factors, selected
according to their relevance to what happens, in their analyses o f econom ic problems
(Bartlett, 1994; Elliott, 1978; Myrdal, 1978).

The Role of Property Rights
Embedded within the structural component of the social system are property
relations, the subset o f conventions and rules that define individuals in terms o f objects of
value and their associated income stream (Bromley, 1982). Property rights institutions
include the social norms and customs, in addition to formal laws and regulations and the
level o f their enforcement, which help an individual form reasonable expectations in
dealing with others. Thus, rights only have meaning in a social context which defines
individuals' access to. and use of. resources. Access rights constitute authority to refuse
use to others, while use rights constitute authority to determine what will be done with the
resources. For every right an individual holds, rules exist that authorize or require specific
actions in exercising that property right, in addition to formal laws and regulations and the
level o f their enforcement (Eggertsson, 1990; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Santopietro
and Shabman, 1992).
Traditional neoclassical economic market models assume an ideal, well-defined
private property rights structure. In these models, consumers own all o f the resources o f
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the economy, known as the total endowment. The initial endowments o f consumers do not
intersect and sum to the total endowment, so that individual ownership o f resources is
exclusive and complete. Institutional constraints are eliminated from consideration by
assuming that all resources are fully allocated, and voluntarily exchanged in efficiently
operating markets with no information or transaction costs. Under these conditions, rights
to resources are priced at their opportunity cost and, according to C oase's Theorem,
resources flow to their highest-valued uses (Buchholz, 1990;Coase, 1960; De Alessi, 1980;
Eggertsson, 1990; Spulber, 1989).

Property Rights Conditions
Randall (1987) identified four conditions necessary for an adequate set of
nonattenuated private property rights, the prerequisite for efficient trade in resources: (1)
ownership, (2) specification, (3) transferability, and (4) enforcement. Ownership, the most
fundamental pre-condition to trade, is the legal mechanism which assigns the right to use
a resource. Exclusive ownership, required for private property rights, imparts exclusive
authority to choose how the resource will be used, to change its form and substance, to set
the terms under which others m ay use the resource, and to receive the income generated
from the use o f the resource (Dales, 1992; De Alessi, 1980; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972).
Specification of rights o f ownership is required if trade is to be effective in
allocating resources and resolving conflicts. Even when an ownership right is exclusive,
ownership is not an unrestricted right.

Ownership is limited by restrictions that are

explicitly stated in the law. These limitations may also separate rights from the title holder
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o f record, so that a resource may serve more than a single use at one tim e (Furubotn and
Pejovich, 1972; Randall, 1987; Ward, 1982).
Transferability o f rights is the authority to exchange property rights with those o f
other individuals at mutually agreeable prices. Transferability depends upon the method
used to allocate the right. Some rights are not directly transferable, especially those granted
by government licenses, which often incorporate rules preventing transfer.

W hen the

transfer o f a resource to alternative uses is not allowed, the owner will not consider the full
opportunity costs o f other uses. The value o f the alternative uses will be ignored, even if
higher than the existing use value, resulting in inefficiency (Anderson, 1982; De Alessi,
1980; Rolph, 1983).
Rights enforcement, the ability to exclude other users, will determ ine the likelihood
that an owner can enjoy the benefits o f ownership. Enforcement includes the discovery o f
violations, the apprehension o f violators, and the imposition o f appropriate penalties. A
system o f rights has to be enforceable and enforced. If enforcement is im perfect, the
expected value o f penalties (the am ount o f the penalty multiplied by the probability that it
will be imposed) must exceed any possible gains a violator could hope to obtain (Anderson.
1982; Randall, 1987).

Property Rights to Natural Resources
Property rights may not be clearly defined for natural resources, since the natural
environment is often not divisible in a manner suitable for private ownership. Instead, the
government has been viewed as the owner or manager o f environm ental resources.
Allocation o f natural resources in the United States has traditionally been based on the prior
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appropriation doctrine, a rights system which places a higher value on those resource uses
that cam e first. This doctrine, with its supporting laws and institutions, has primarily
protected the economic interests o f private property rights to natural resources for a century
(MeEl fish, Jr., Warburg and Pendergrass, 1996; Spulber, 1989).
The natural resource allocation institutional system has been slowly undergoing
changes as policy makers developed the public trust doctrine, a parallel, and equal means
o f meeting society’s nonmarket resource needs. The public trust doctrine, an ancient
English com m on law doctrine, recognizes two types o f ownership in lands, theju s privatum
(private property title) and the ju s publicum (title held on behalf o f all people). The ju s
privatum component can be transferred into private ownership, but the ju s publicum
com ponent is inalienable.
As adopted in the United States, the public trust doctrine specifies that each state
manage tidal shorelands, navigable streams, and the lands underlying them for the benefit
o f the people of the state. Inalienable public rights along seashores and rivers include
navigation, transportation, and fishing. This obligation continues as land is transferred into
private ownership. Thus, subsequent private uses cannot obstruct public rights protected
under the public trust doctrine (M cElfish.Jr., Warburg and Pendergrass, 1996: Whittlesey
and Huffaker, 1995).
The dynamic potential o f the public trust doctrine was recognized in 1970. when
Sax suggested that the public trust doctrine could be a useful tool for controlling
governm ent actions that benefitted private interests over the interests o f the public.
Currently, there is no established single version o f the public trust doctrine. Since 1970.
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the U.S. Supreme Court and each state court system have formulated versions o f the scope
o f the doctrine, including identification o f the lands and waters covered under the trust and
the public activities that must be protected. Public trust obligations have been extended to
a variety o f lands and waters, including rural parklands, wetlands associated with navigable
water bodies, nonnavigable tributaries, groundwater, and all waters usable for recreation
purposes. Public trust uses have also been expanded to cover a broad range o f activities,
including hunting, boating, bathing, skating and other recreation, and aesthetic beauty.
Private resource uses previously considered vested property rights have been required to
give way to the new understanding o f the public trust (M cElfish,Jr., W arburg and
Pendergrass, 1996; Whittlesey and Huffaker, 1995).
The degree o f interaction between the prior appropriation and public trust doctrines,
and the extent to which the public trust will limit appropriative rights, varies significantly
from state to state, and has been the source o f natural resource use and access conflicts
between environmental interest groups and private industry interest groups. A common
theme in these conflicts is fundamental disagreement over the rights that each side claims
as its starting point for negotiations. Environmental groups insist that these resources are
owned by the public, while private industry groups want a system that allocates private
rights to natural resources. These conflicts over public versus private ownership, which
extend across the entire range o f natural resources, often become intractable because each
side uses a different reference point in arguing over fairness (Colby, 1995; W hittlesey and
Huffaker, 1995; Willey, 1982).
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Property Rights Structures and Changes
The structure o f property rights can be categorized by using the rules o f resource
access and use as differentiating characteristics. The result is a spectrum o f potential rights,
with private property and open access at the extremes o f the rights spectrum. Any
movement away from private property is a move toward open access. The term "common
property” refers to all those property rights structures between the extremes. In common
property rights structures, there is some sharing o f access and use rights, based upon either
law or tradition (Santopietro and Shabman, 1992).
Social values and policies are always in transition, so property rights are in a
perpetual state o f flux. As a result, change is the norm, not the exception for property
rights. Alternative property rights structures and changes in property rights present decision
makers with different structures o f costs and rewards, which will system atically affect
choices, and thus, can alter the structure o f contracts and affect economic outcomes (Colby,
1995: Eggertsson, 1990).
Quiggin (1988) identified two types o f change in property rights. The first is
voluntary exchange between individuals, within a given structure. This market exchange
process has been the subject o f orthodox economic analysis. The second type o f property
rights change involves changes in the structure of the rights. Changes in the structure o f
property rights can include the creation o f new rights, the abrogation or limiting o f existing
rights, and changes from common to private property rights or vice versa. These structural
changes have been analyzed by property rights theorists as either the attenuation or the
development of rights, depending upon one’s theoretical perspective. In the analysis o f a
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particular property right, the concept o f attenuation, which is any lim itation on the way in
which property rights may be utilized, is norm ally used to describe rights changes. The
attenuation o f private property rights to a resource affects the ow ner’s expectations about
the uses to which he can put the resource, the value o f the resource to the ow ner and others,
and the terms o f trade. Attenuation o f property rights is, in general, view ed as undesirable
(Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Quiggin, 1988).

The Property Rights - Regulation Institutional Relationship
Property rights attenuations typically result from actions by the state, including
courts and statutory authorities which use the state’s coercive powers to define and enforce
property rights. Property rights and governm ent regulations are generally interdependent,
since the government often uses regulations as the device for allocating property rights in
order to limit a production or consum ption activity that imposes undue costs on a user
group or the community. The governm ent’s allocative objective is to reduce exploitation
o f the resource and distribute costs o f the reduction among the users. Thus, government
regulations, including environmental regulations, can be viewed as private property rights
attenuations, with the growth o f governm ent regulation weakening private property rights
(De Alessi, 1980; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Quiggin, 1988; Rolph. 1983).

Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Climate
Environmental regulations, w hich are designed to protect the integrity o f natural
resources, have increased significantly in the United States since 1970. Environmental
laws operate by identifying resources to be protected and then placing restrictions on those
activities which negatively affect the resource (Hamilton, 1992; Jaffe, et al., 1995). Private
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business bears the brunt o f the cost o f environmental regulations. There are four different
classes o f costs attributable to government regulation: administrative costs, compliance
costs, transfers, and inefficiency.

Expenses vary over time and between states and can

influence the interstate allocation o f developmental resources (Feiock and Rowland, 1990).
Business location decisions may be significantly affected by state environmental regulations
(Bartik, 1988). Regulatory climate, defined as the stringency o f environmental regulations
(i.e., the number and intensity o f regulations), was identified in the relocation decisions by
a majority o f polluting industry CEOs and is the factor least likely to be regarded as
unimportant (Davis, 1992). For plant location decisions where environmental regulations
are o f some significance, uncertainties about required permits and permit processing time
are more important than are spatial variations in the direct costs o f providing the necessary
pollution control equipment (Stafford, 1985).
Attempts to measure regulatory climate have met with only limited success.
Researchers have developed state-specific or industry-specific proxy measures, usuallybased upon estimates o f state enforcement efforts or industry compliance costs (Jaffe, et al.,
1995; Tannenwald. 1997). Direct measures o f regulatory climate include several established
qualitative indices, such as the Conservation Foundation Index (Duerksen, 1983) and the
Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991). Development o f qualitative indices has, unfortunately,
been limited to ad hoc indicator summation procedures.

No attempts to statistically

examine correlations between indicators or mathematically validate indicator importance,
or weights, were reported for any established qualitative index.
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Efforts to measure regulatory climate for agriculture or natural resource based
industries have been limited. None o f the established indices o f regulatory climate or
stringency are tailored to agriculture regulatory efforts, and efforts to use these indices to
measure the stringency of state environmental regulations toward agriculture industries
have met with mixed results (Mo and Abdalla, 1997).

The U.S. Aquaculture Industry: Growth and Constraints to Pevelonment
The U.S. aquaculture industry, ranked 10th in the world in value o f its products
(nearly a billion dollars), is the fastest growing component o f U.S. agriculture, accounting
for nearly 300,000 jobs and having direct and indirect economic impacts o f $8 billion. In
terms o f economic importance, the aquaculture industry is comparable in value to the sheep
industry and equivalent to 30 percent o f the turkey industry (USDA/APHIS/VS. 1995).
However, to meet projected worldwide seafood demand, aquaculture production will have
to increase seven-fold by the year 2025 (USDA/CSRS, 1994).
The diversity o f environmental conditions within the U.S. allows for the culture o f
a wide variety o f warmwater, coolwater, and coldwater fish and aquatic animals. There are
five principal cultured foodfish species in the U.S. (catfish, trout, salmon, tilapia. hybrid
striped bass) and two categories o f non-food fish production (baitfish and ornamentals).
Other species with limited production include walleye, perch, sunfish and largemouth bass
(USDA/APHIS/VS. 1995).
Aquaculture can be environmentally destructive, causing productivity declines and
reduced biodiversity (Pillay, 1992; Tisdell, 1995; Wirth and Luzar, 1997).

The

development o f aquaculture and recognition o f its potentially negative environmental
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impacts has resulted in increased levels o f environmental regulation. The implementation
o f legal, regulatory, promotional, educational and other programs affecting the aquaculture
industry are administered at the state level in the U.S. As a result, regulatory programs and
permit requirements vary from state to state. Legal and regulatory obstacles are commonly
cited as the major impediments to aquaculture growth and developm ent. For example, in
many states it is difficult, costly, and time consuming to secure permits to establish
aquaculture operations (Wypyszinski et al.. 1994).
Heggelund (1993) suggested that the lack o f property rights which can be efficiently
exchanged in the formal market economic system is the ch ief institutional obstacle to
development o f the fish farming industry. Aquaculture operates in an informal market, best
described in terms o f its “extreme inefficiencies caused by prohibitive regulations and
inconsistent state laws" (Heggelund, 1993. p. 3).

The major constraints to aquaculture

industry development typically manifest themselves as conflicts between industry,
regulatory agencies, and interest groups over natural resource use and perceived adverse
environmental impacts o f aquaculture.

Conflicts arise over issues o f definitions of

acceptable environmental quality, who should pay the costs o f environm ental protection or
restoration, and whose interests count when issues are decided. This suggests the need for
a decision framework through which the concerns o f competing interests are addressed and
resources allocated.

Institutional arrangements serve the functional role for resource

allocation (Norris, Carriker and Danielson. 1994).
Conflicts between the aquaculture industry and state regulatory institutions affect
aquaculture firm decision making, especially site location and species selection decisions.
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In choosing a site for an aquaculture enterprise, the culturist m ust consider an array of
environmental and operational factors, since aquaculture requires an aquatic environment
and adjacent land base o f operation. Site selection will be affected by the property rights
provided. However, many states lack the necessary institutional and regulatory' structure
for aquaculture operations that require the use o f public resources (DeVoe and Mount.
1989).
One issue that faces all aquaculturists is selection o f a fish species for culture. The
fish farmer can choose either native or non-native species. State fish and wildlife laws
typically classify fish species into categories such as commercial food fish, baitfish.
ornamentals, marine or freshwater game fish.

Many native species, especially game

species, meet all the criteria for ideal aquaculture species (Helfrich, O rth and Neves.. 1992;
Wirth. 1993). However, most game laws completely prevent the m arketing o f "w ild game”
species for food, even if the species was produced as a directed agricultural enterprise
(Haby and Cuenco. 1987).

Research Objectives
General Objective
The overall objective o f this research is to examine the relationships between
property rights, regulation, state regulatory structure and industry developm ent as they
relate to regulatory climate and its effects on aquaculture industry' development, firm
location and species selection decisions.

19

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Specific Objectives
The specific objectives o f this research are to:
1.

Identify and review literature concerning the relationships between property
rights, regulation, and industry development;

2.

Formulate a conceptual model o f aquaculture industry regulation, illustrating
the relationship between political actors, institutional structure, regulatory
climate and firm decision making;

3.

Use the conceptual model as a framework to develop and validate a summated
scale measure o f state regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture, with
underlying dimensions based on four property rights conditions;

4.

Empirically evaluate the impact and significance o f key state institutional
characteristics (lead administrative agency, enforcem ent agency, development
plan, definition o f aquaculture as agriculture, finfish classification, region) on
the regulatory climate; and

5.

Provide policy recommendations to farmers and state aquaculture development
and regulatory officials, based upon the results o f the scale measure and
empirical evaluation.

Research Procedures
Objective One
The first objective o f this research is accomplished through the development of a
comprehensive review o f relevant literature to develop the appropriate theoretical
background for the measurement o f regulation and the impacts o f regulatory climate.
Studies on property rights, environmental regulation o f industry, the institutional
relationships between property rights and regulation, and the impacts o f regulatory climate
on industry growth and development are reviewed and form the basis o f the conceptual
model.
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Objective Two
Based on the literature identified in objective one, a conceptual model o f
aquaculture industry regulation is formulated. Elements o f public choice theory and firm
location theory are combined within an institutional economics framework to explain the
relationships between political actors, institutional structure, regulatory climate and
aquaculture firm location and species selection decisions.

Objective Three
The conceptual model provides the theoretical foundation for the development and
validation o f a property rights-based summated scale measure o f the regulatory climate
toward finfish aquaculture. The items comprising the scale reflect the existence o f specific
environmental regulations which attenuate the four property rights conditions identified by
Randall (1987).

Data Sources
The initial scale item pool will be generated from three data sources. The 1995
State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey by Wirth and Luzar o f aquaculture contacts from
all 50 states and four U.S. territories will serve as the main data source o f scale items.
Surveys completed by State Aquaculture Coordinators and contacts were obtained from 45
states and Guam. This survey, which was the most comprehensive survey o f state
aquaculture regulations conducted to date, obtained information about the state agency or
institution responsible for developing and enforcing aquaculture regulations, ownership and
specification o f property rights by categories o f fish (baitfish, ornamentals, commercial
foodfish. freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish), escapement considerations, and use
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o f aquaculture best management practices. The 46 survey respondents provided answers
for five different categories of finfish, resulting in 230 total observations.
The 1993 State Aquatic Health Policies Survey by the National A ssociation o f State
Aquaculture Coordinators (NAS AC) o f 35 states and Guam provides additional data for the
empirical analysis. Since ten states w hich responded to the 1995 survey did not participate
in the 1993 survey, a State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey 1998 Supplemental
Questionnaire was conducted with 1995 survey respondents, to clarify and update results
for scale items developed from the 1993 survey. The 1998 supplem ental questionnaire
obtained information, by category o f fish, on marketing restrictions, legal status o f fish in
aquaculture facilities, and health certifications for transport o f fish into and within a state.
The supplemental questionnaire also obtained numbers o f producers for each fish category,
and Likert scale self-reports o f state regulatory stringency which are used to validate the
regulatory climate scale.
O bjective F o u r
The objective o f empirically evaluating the impact and significance o f key state
institutional characteristics on state regulatory climate is achieved through two econometric
analyses using two alternative specifications o f the regulatory climate scale as the
dependent variable. A two-limit truncated regression will utilize a truncated continuous
version o f the scale. An ordered probit analysis will explore the use o f a five-category
strictly ordinal version o f the scale. For both analyses, key state institutional characteristics
identified in the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey serve as independent
variables.
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Objective Five
The development of policy recommendations is realized through the review o f
relevant literature, an assessment and comparison o f the relative regulatory climate o f states
toward the culture o f different categories o f finfish, and an examination o f the significance
and impacts o f state aquaculture development and regulatory characteristics on the
aquaculture regulatory climate scale measure. Results and policy recommendations will
be interpreted in light o f the information needs o f the aquaculture community and state
aquaculture development and regulatory agencies.

Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter one introduces the research
problem, objectives and procedures, and presents the institutional economic framework,
property rights theory literature, a brief introduction to environmental regulation and
regulatory climate, and the constraints to aquaculture industry growth and development.
Chapter two reviews the relevant literature on the theories and impacts o f government
regulation, the environmental regulation o f firms, and the impacts o f environmental
regulatory climate on industry economic developm ent, firm location and production
decisions. Chapter two also presents the regulatory climate conceptual model. Chapter
three describes data collection procedures and provides descriptive statistics for both the
1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1998 Supplemental Q uestionnaire.
Classical test theory, the dichotomous choice scale developm ent process, a description o f
the final aquaculture regulatory climate scale measure and appropriate test statistics are
presented in Chapter four. Chapter five includes a description o f the ordered probit limited
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dependent variable model and the empirical results o f the analysis o f the regulatory climate
scale measure as a function o f key state institutional characteristics. Chapter six discusses
the findings, including implications for fish farmers and state aquaculture developm ent and
regulatory agencies, and provides policy recommendations and directions for future
research.
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CHAPTER 2
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION

The study o f government institutions, including government regulation, has
traditionally been viewed as the role o f political science. The structure o f governm ental
institutions may have important policy consequences, since institutions may be structured
to facilitate certain policy outcomes and to obstruct other outcomes. Any substantive policy
change entails institutional change.
The institutional approach in political science has not devoted much attention to the
linkages between the structure o f governmental institutions and the content ofpublic policy.
Instead, institutional studies have usually been limited to describing specific governmental
institutions, including their structures, organization, duties, and functions, without
systematically examining the impact o f institutional characteristics on policy outputs (Dye.
1992).
This chapter examines the political economy o f government regulation, including
the influence o f industry and special interest groups in the developm ent o f institutional
structure and regulatory instruments. It identifies, based on previous research, the impacts
o f state government environmental institutions, especially environmental regulations, on
the regulatory climate toward business, and documents the effects o f regulatory climate on
firm decision making.

Based on the research findings and firm location theory, a

conceptual model o f the regulatory climate-institutional relationships for the finfish
aquaculture industry is proposed.
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Government Regulation of Industry: An Overview
The power o f the governm ent to regulate citizens’ behavior in order to protect the
public’s health, welfare, safety, and morals, is vested in state government. Regulation
provides a mechanism allow ing citizens to exercise political power through governmental
units.

All regulations attem pt to promote economic welfare by correcting im perfections

in private markets, such as m onopolistic and oligopolistic practices, negative externalities
generated in both production and consumption, imperfect information, and fraud. State
regulations that most directly affect businesses take many forms, including environmental
protection and land use, regulation o f labor markets, health and safety codes, regulation o f
financial institutions, and transportation (De Alessi. 1980; Randall, 1987; Tannenwald.
1997).
Two common governm ent regulatory institutions are government bureaus, headed
by career civil servants, and independent regulatory agencies, headed by politically
appointed commissioners.

Regulatory' agencies charged with public health and safety

typically have chosen uniform standards. All firms must comply, regardless o f the cost o f
compliance. This suggests that agencies are mainly concerned with reducing harmful
externalities, with less concern for firm s’ costs (De Alessi, 1980; Jones and Scotchmer,
1990).

The Cost of Government Regulation
All regulations raise the cost o f production for firms and change the allocation o f
economic surplus between firms and consumers and among producer groups. The costs
attributable to regulation are measured by the difference between the costs that occur in the
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presence o f regulation and the costs that would prevail in the regulation’s absence. The
overall social costs o f regulation will generally exceed direct compliance costs because
regulations can cause reductions in output, inhibit investments in productive capital, reduce
productivity, and bring about transitional costs. Regulations raise the costs o f production
and diminish factor productivity by internalizing negative externalities, constraining
technological choice, and requiring outputs, such as periodic reports, that producers would
not normally use (Jaffe, et al., 1995; Tannenwald, 1997).
Rosters (1979) distinguished four classes o f regulation-induced costs incurred by
private firms: administrative costs, compliance costs, transfers, and inefficiency.
Administrative costs include the costs incurred for the staff, supplies, studies, and
consultants’ reports needed for regulatory record keeping and reporting. Com pliance costs
are comprised o f expenditures incurred by firms to meet the specifications established by
the regulations. Transfer costs, not easily captured by cost estimation methods, are incurred
by the diverting o f resources as a result o f regulatory compliance.

Inefficiency costs,

commonly known to economists as deadweight losses, often result from regulatory
restrictions on the range o f permissible prices, practices, or processes.

Theories of Regulation
Theoretical and empirical studies o f regulation normally fall into three areas: (1)
price and entry regulation in industries with competitive market structures, (2) price and
entry regulation in monopolistic industries, and (3) qualitative regulation, w hich attem pts
to cope with various kinds o f market-failure problems indirectly linked to prices, profits,
and market structure. Environmental, health, occupational safety, and product quality
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regulation fall within the third category, with the best-developed theoretical models in non
economic regulation those dealing with environmental external diseconomies (Joskow and
Noll, 1981). All models o f regulation are based on either the “normative theory” o f
regulation or various general process theories o f regulation. The following sections review
key concepts o f popular theories o f regulation

Normative Theory of Regulation
The “normative theory” o f regulation, part o f the public interest model o f political
economy, had great appeal until the 1960s, and is still often the beginning assumption o f
research on regulation. The essence o f this theory is that analysis o f a regulatory process
begins with the assumption that its purpose is to maximize some universal measure o f
economic welfare, such as consumers’ surplus or total surplus, in the public interest.
Market failure is the motivating reason for establishing regulations. Once established,
regulator)' bodies were supposed to lessen or elim inate the inefficiencies caused by the
market failure (Joskow and Noll, 1981).
As a positive theory o f regulation, the normative theory o f welfare economics has
been largely rejected as economists have demonstrated that regulatory agencies, contrary
to theory, make numerous decisions that reduce conventional measures o f economic
welfare (Joskow and Noll, 1981). There are two reasons for the rejection o f this theory.
First, individuals have objectives, such as constitutional freedoms and guarantees o f
procedural fairness, that are affected by the actions o f regulatory institutions, but are not
accounted for in applied welfare economics. Second, political agents are economic actors.
They respond to incentives created by political institutions and administrative processes,
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and would thus be unlikely to seek to maximize conventional measures o f economic
welfare (Joskow and Noll, 1981).

Process Theories of Regulation
General process theories o f regulation tend to be either legislative or bureaucratic.
They focus analysis on the electoral process and the incentives operating on politicians, or
on the bureaucratic process and the incentives operating on regulators. The first category
is represented by the “economic theory’’ o f regulation. Stigler, Posner and Peltzman are its
outstanding proponents (Joskow and Noll, 1981).

The Influence of Regulated Industries
The “econom ic theory" o f regulation was introduced by Stigler (1971) as an
outgrowth o f capture theory, w'hich stated that over time, regulatory agencies come to be
dominated by the industries regulated. Stigler (1971) noted that regulation may be actively
sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon industry.

Stigler’s central thesis

hypothesized that regulation is acquired by the industry and designed and operated for
industry’s benefit. He also hypothesized that every industry or occupation that has adequate
political power to utilize the state will attempt to control entry, and that regulatory policies
will often be fashioned to retard the rate o f growth o f new firms. Stigler also explained that
the industry which seeks regulation must be prepared to pay w ith the two things that
politicians and political parties need: votes and resources (Peltzman, 1989).
Subsequent refinements to Stigler’s economic theory o f regulation by Posner
(1974), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983) have forced an evolution o f the economic
theory o f regulation away from its origins toward an emphasis on the coalitional aspects o f
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politics (Peltzman, 1989). The essence o f this theory is that regulation is a device for
transferring income to well-organized groups if the groups will return the favor with votes
and contributions to politicians. The theory predicts that regulators will use their power to
transfer income from those with less political power to those w ith more political power.
The direction o f this income redistribution depends on the costs and benefits o f regulation
as perceived by different interest groups and their ability to exercise their power in the
political arena (Joskow and Noll, 1981).

Public Interest Group Theories
An organized interest group consists o f a voluntary association o f individuals who
band together to move public policy in a particular general or specific direction. Interest
groups form and multiply to capture rents from the political process by influencing policy
decisions. The number o f such groups increases when returns to lobbying activities increase
or the cost o f organizing groups decreases. Most o f the theories that focus on the regulatory
agencies themselves predict outcomes favorable to organized interests. The legislative
committee structure, the judicial review mechanism, and the administrative process all
favor well organized interests. Arguing one's case in a legislative, regulatory or judicial
hearing is expensive, so organized groups that possess resources to expend in this manner
can be expected to influence policies to the extent that the outcomes depend upon the
information presented in these hearings (Roy, 1995).
Since the early 1970's, interest groups have multiplied in both number and
effectiveness. The congested universe o f special interests with conflicting demands imposes
high costs on the policy making process. Groups frequently block other interest groups'
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demands that might negatively affect them, seriously impeding any comprehensive or
coordinated policy reformulations. Political gridlock is the eventual result. This explains,
in part, why established government programs are difficult or impossible to terminate. As
a result, there are few resources for new programs, and fundamental policy changes are
almost impossible (Batie and Schweikhardt, 1995; Brown and Schweikhardt, 1995).
Bernstein’s (1955) *1ife-cycle theory” o f agencies proposed that agencies age from
active advocates o f generalized consum er interests to passive conduits o f organized groups’
interests. Eckert (1972) explained organized interests’ capture o f agencies by suggesting
that regulators expect to become employees o f organized interests when their regulating
days are over (Joskow and Noll, 1981).

Public Choice Theory
Public choice theory, sometimes called rational choice theory, involves applying
microeconomic principles to the analysis and explanation o f political behavior (Anderson,
1994; Mueller. 1979). Public choice theory suggests that government must perform certain
functions that the marketplace is unable to handle. First, the government must provide
public goods, since the market cannot supply public goods because their costs exceed their
value to any single buyer. Second, externalities, when the activities (i.e., air and water
pollution) o f one individual imposes uncompensated costs on others, represent a market
failure and justify government intervention. The government either regulates the activities
that produce externalities or imposes penalties on these activities in order to compensate
for their social costs (Anderson. 1994; Dye, 1992).
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Public choice theory emphasizes the importance o f individual self-interest as a
motivating force in policymaking and decision-making processes. Public choice theory
recognizes that the interests o f politicians and bureaucrats can contrast with the interests
o f voters. A basic axiom o f public choice, described by James Buchanan, a leading
proponent o f public choice, is that political actors act rationally in pursuit o f their own selfinterest, rather than the people’s (Anderson, 1994).

Politicians and bureaucrats are

interested in winning reelection, garnering campaign contributions, expanding agency
budgets, gaining greater authority and prestige, and expanding the power o f government
(Dye. 1992).
Public choice theory also explains interest groups and their effects on public policy.
The actions o f organizations can be explained in terms o f the behavior o f a "model”
individual (Anderson, 1994).

Individuals seeking special benefits, such as subsidies,

privileges or protections, band together to pressure for government action. The costs o f the
special benefits are dispersed to all taxpayers. No individual taxpayer bears enough o f the
cost to merit spending time, energy, or money to organize in opposition. The resulting
concentration o f benefits and dispersal o f costs results in an interest-group system that
favors small, well-organized, interests seeking government benefits at the expense o f larger
but less organized groups o f taxpayers. The activities o f many special interest groups, over
a long period of time, results in overcreation of government services, programs, and
regulations (Dye, 1992).
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Hahn’s Unified Theory' of Regulation
Hahn (1990) presented a concise unified theory o f regulation within a game
theoretic framework to explain why a particular pattern o f regulation occurs or does not
occur in an industry. Focusing on standards, the dominant instrument in environmental
policy, Hahn suggested that a regulator must balance competing concerns o f two groups,
typically characterized as “the industry” and “political concerns, or environm entalists.”
Industry is concerned with the economic impact o f regulation on profits, and
environmentalists are concerned with the impact o f policy on the environm ent. W hile the
regulator's first choice is to impose standards with both low political and econom ic costs.
Hahn suggests that this solution is not always possible. Assuming that political costs tend
to dominate economic concerns, a standard with low political costs and high economic
costs will usually be preferred to a standard with high political and low econom ic costs.
Hahn also demonstrated how balancing the needs o f industry and environmentalists
can result in more stringent regulation o f new sources o f pollution than existing sources o f
pollution.

Industry,

seeking

low er

costs,

generally

prefers

low

standards.

Environmentalists, in contrast, seek consistently high standards. Stricter standards for new
sources are preferred by both groups over stricter standards for old sources. Hahn explains
this result for industry by suggesting that lower costs to existing firms are more important
than lower costs to new firms. Environmentalists reach this conclusion because they are
thought to take a long-term perspective which concludes that overall environm ental quality
will be improved by imposing stricter standards on new sources o f environmental
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degradation.

The regulator’s choice reduces to choosing the alternative with a high

standard for new sources and a low standard for existing sources.

Research on the Processes Underlying Regulation
Williams and Matheny (1984) analyzed conflicting assertions about the three
fundamental processes underlying the politics o f regulation: (1) the relationship between
market failure and social regulation; (2) the impact o f the economic strength o f regulated
industries on the regulator)' process; and (3) the effect o f organized public interest groups
on the regulatory process. Using data on states’ regulation o f hazardous waste disposal,
Williams and Matheny (1984) concluded that, first, the most significant determinant o f a
state's effort in hazardous waste regulation was the size o f the state's budget, not market
failure.

Second, the quality o f a state’s laws had almost no impact on the level o f either

public or private spending on hazard waste alleviation. These two results together imply
that major changes in both laws and implementing institutions are necessary if social need
is to determine resource allocation. Third, slate level regulator)- effort seemed to be
significantly influenced by industry efforts to evade hazardous waste disposal costs,
resulting in increased government spending and decreased industry spending. Fourth,
public environmental interest group strength was an important determinant o f the level o f
state government hazardous waste regulatory effort, although the groups seemed to have
little impact on the regulatory burden imposed on private industry (W illiams and Matheny,
1984).
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The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation
Stigler (1971) suggested that regulation may be sought by an industry for the
industry’s benefit, or may be imposed by the government for the protection and benefit o f
the public. Environmental regulations, which have grown significantly in the United States
since 1970, fit in the latter category. The primary purpose o f environm ental laws is to
protect the integrity o f natural resources. Most environmental laws operate by identifying
resources to be protected, and then placing restrictions on what can be discharged into the
protected resources. The laws usually identify the types o f conduct known to affect the
resource and place restrictions on those activities (Hamilton. 1992; Jaffe, et al., 1995).
Although there are numerous instruments for environmental management, U.S.
environmental management has traditionally been based on direct regulation, a regulatory
approach known as "command and control” (Dudek and Palmisano. 1988). The most
common "command and control" regulatory method is to require parties to obtain licenses
or permits before engaging in a designated activity.

Licenses are often issued to the

individual applicant listed as the primary responsible party, rather than to the business
entity, and are often not automatically transferable if business ownership changes hands
(Corbin and Young, 1995; Hawke. 1991).
Hamilton (1992) suggested that by imposing a requirement to obtain a license or
permit, the public has the opportunity to set minimum standards for performance, which
must be satisfied before the permit will be granted. Standards may be framed in terms o f
effluent emissions, ambient concentrations or technological specifications.

35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Setting

standards also requires the establishment o f a monitoring agency, which has the power to
impose penalties for non-adherence.
Generally the specification o f aggregate standards includes m axim um upper limits
on the total production o f pollutants. When several sources o f pollution exist in the same
area, regulations must include some mechanism for dividing the aggregate limit among the
several sources. The total o f individual firms’ pollution levels m ust not exceed the
aggregate standards.

Enforcement o f environmental regulations, therefore, reduces to

allocating the rights to discharge pollutants, a scarce resource, among com peting users. In
this sense, the regulation o f pollution is identical to the regulation o f harvesting o f common
property natural resources (Freeman, 1994; Spulber, 1989).

The Costs and Impacts of Environmental Regulation
Environmental regulations have a huge impact on business, w hich bears the brunt
o f the cost o f environmental regulations.

Pollution abatement has em erged as a major

claimant on the resources o f the U.S. economy. Environmental spending in the United
States has been estimated at about S I50 billion per year, or about 2.4 percent o f gross
domestic product (GDP). Furthermore. EPA has projected that annual environmental
compliance spending may reach $190 billion, nearly 2.6 percent o f the GDP by the year
2000 (Jaffe, et al., 1995; Rice, 1994).
Jorgenson and Wilcoxon (1990) analyzed the impact o f environmental regulation
on the U.S. economy by simulating the long-term growth o f the U.S. econom y with and
without regulation. They showed that the long-run cost o f environmental regulation is a
reduction o f 2.59 percent in the level o f the U.S. gross national product. This is more than
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10 percent o f the share o f total government purchases o f goods and services in the national
economy during the period 1973-1985.
Environmental regulations have both direct and indirect effects on a firm ’s costs o f
production, directly through the firm ’s expenditures on pollution reduction and indirectly
through the higher prices it must pay for certain factors o f production that are affected by
regulation. Barbera and McConnell (1990) developed a translog cost function approach to
measuring the impact o f environmental regulations on total factor productivity grow th from
1961 to 1980 for five industries which are am ong the most heavily regulated. The authors
found that the net effect o f abatement requirements, including both the direct and indirect
effects, was to lower total factor productivity in all five industries.
Jaffe. et al.. (1995) posited five ways in which environmental regulations could
negatively affect productivity. First, measured productivity will fall because the production
o f an additional output, environmental quality, causes diversion o f the m easured inputs o f
capital, labor, and energy. Second, new production or management practices undertaken
in response to regulations may be less efficient than old ones. Third, environm ental
investments could crowd out other investments by firms. Fourth, "new -source" bias in
regulations can discourage investment in new, more efficient facilities.

Finally, "best

available control technology” requirements may increase adoption o f technologies at the
time regulations go into effect, but reduce firm s’ incentives to develop new technologies.
Opportunity costs also have real, but much less obvious, effects than firm out-ofpocket expenses for environmental compliance. Opportunity costs often com e in the form
o f the returns a firm would have earned had it invested its environmental com pliance
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expenditures in other areas, such as plant expansion, workforce retraining, or intensified
research and development efforts (Gardiner and Portney, 1994; Jaffe, et al.. 1995).
Pashigian (1984) investigated the impact o f environmental regulations on optimal
plant size and factor shares for the twenty industries with the highest and the twenty
industries with the lowest weighted average o f gross pollution abatement operating cost per
thousand dollars o f value between 1972 and 1977. Pashigian concluded that com pliance
with environmental laws has placed a greater burden on small than on large plants, and has
reduced the number o f plants in the affected industries. Under environmental regulation,
small plants have found it more difficult to compete and survive with larger plants
(Pashigian, 1984).

States1 Role in Environmental Regulation
States are responsible for im plem enting many o f the key environm ental laws
enacted during the last thirty years.

Most federal environmental laws call for shared

implementation between the federal and state governments. The federal governm ent sets
minimum environmental standards, but states are given the latitude to design and
implement their own laws. In essence, the states have program responsibility, while the
federal government has retained authority to judge the acceptability o f states1 programs.
The transfer o f decision making authority to states was ideologically justified as a means
o f promoting greater programmatic independence, responsiveness to constituent needs, and
accessibility to citizen input (Davis and Lester. 1989; Lester, 1994).
This mandated expanded role for state governm ents required that states transform
and modernize their institutional capabilities. State institutional capacity, the ability and
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willingness o f public officials to develop and adm inister public policies, encompasses three
dimensions: political, fiscal, and managerial. States' behavior in environmental protection
policy depends on the extent o f their comm itment to environmental protection and the
extent o f institutional reforms (Lester, 1994).
Lester (1994) divided the states into four groups, known as the Lester Category,
based on level o f commitment (high or low) to environmental protection and institutional
capability (strong or weak).

"Progressive" states were the ten states with a high

com m itm ent to environmental protection, coupled with strong institutional capabilities.
Fifteen "struggler” states had a strong com m itm ent to environmental protection, but limited
institutional capacities. Fifteen "delayer" states showed strong institutional capacity, but
a limited com m itm ent to environmental protection. Finally, ten '"regressive" states had
both weak institutional capacities and a limited commitment to environmental protection.

State Environmental Regulation and Firm Behavior
Jorgenson and Wilcoxon (1990) identified three possible categories o f existing
producers’ responses to new environmental regulations: substitution o f polluting inputs by
less polluting ones, investment in pollution abatement devices to clean up w astes, and
emission-reducing changes in production processes.

The least disruptive response is

switching to cleaner inputs, since it does not require a reorganization o f the production
process (Jorgenson and Wilcoxon, 1990).
Do state-imposed costs o f environmental regulation affect the interstate allocation
o f developm ental resources? There appears to be a widespread belief that the pollution
setting standards and enforcement powers o f state environmental protection agencies
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present a potentially significant influence on the location o f economic activity. Differential
state regulatory policies may be exceptionally important to the strategic behavior o f
corporations in their pursuit o f competitive advantage (Feiock and Rowland, 1990; Jaffe,
et aL, 1995; Stafford, 1985).
Corporations attempt to take advantage o f differences in state regulatory' regimes
by shifting activities between locations, according to the differentials in the regulatory
surface. Although new environmental regulations typically will not cause firms to relocate
existing plants because o f significant relocation costs, firms have more flexibility in making
decisions about the siting o f new plants. Some analysts believe that die threat o f relocation
alone increases the reluctance o f state adm inistrators to impose strict regulatory controls
which might place firms at a competitive disadvantage with similar com panies in
neighboring states. Davis (1992) suggested that state officials' regulatory com m itm ent is
inversely related to the economic importance o f pollution generating firms w ithin the state
(Davis. 1992; Dicken. 1992; Jaffe. et al.. 1995).
According to Feiock and Rowland (1990. p. 561), “A general model o f firm location
decisions posits the location choice o f profit maximizing firms to be a function o f the
availability o f markets, labor costs, energy costs, raw material costs, and costs o f
government.” with government costs and political factors less important than economic
variables. Since state and local policies may affect a firm 's marginal cost o f production,
government costs may become an important factor in the choice among jurisdictions within
a region, once a firm has decided to locate in a particular region (Feiock and Rowland,
1990).
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Business location models and studies also suggest that firms consider the
development level o f their industry when searching for a location. Firms benefit from
locating closely w ith other firms in the same industry, since a well-developed industry
always suggests better infrastructure and service (Mo and Abdalla 1997).

Research on Firms’ Location Decisions
Num erous plant location decision analyses have been conducted in an effort to link
such decisions to environmental regulatory factors. Blair and Premus (1987) reviewed the
major findings o f the industrial location literature. They found that since the 1970s.
industrial location choices have been governed to a lesser extent than in the past by the
traditional location factors: access to markets, labor, transportation and raw m aterials. The
list o f important locational determinants has been expanded to include state and local taxes,
education, business climate, labor skills, and state and local physical infrastructure, many
o f which are directly influenced by state and local government expenditure, tax. and
regulatory policies (Blair and Premus. 1987).
Tannenwald (1997) reviewed 17 different studies o f the impact o f state
environmental regulation on economic developm ent and plant location decisions. The
studies fell into two major groups, based upon estim ation method. Seven studies used case
studies or surveys o f manufacturing firm executives, while ten surveys em ployed
econometric estimation. Surveys generally found that pollution control laws and regulations
exert, at most, a m oderate influence on the location o f a new plant. Two representative
survey-based studies were those performed by Stafford, (1985) and Davis (1992).
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To examine whether variations among areas in the amount o f time and effort
required to obtain permits may be more important in location decisions than variations in
pollution control costs, Howard Stafford (1985) identified the factors that were most
important in the location o f 162 new branch plants o f large U.S. corporations. Traditional
location factors emerged as most critical in new m anufacturing plant location decisions.
Environmental regulations were not a major factor, although when included, environmental
issues were usually considered early in the decision process, usually at the state level o f the
site search process. Stafford found that when environmental regulations are significant,
permit uncertainties and the time required are more important than spatial variations in the
direct costs o f providing

pollution control equipment.

Gray (1997) concurred with

Stafford, and noted that the consequences o f inefficiency and delays are especially severe
for industries w hich are both capital intensive and cyclically sensitive. States identified as
having uncertainty about final permit approval were viewed as especially unfavorable for
new investment (Gray. 1997; Stafford. 1985).
Davis (1992) surveyed chief executive officers (CEOs) o f the fifty largest firms
listed within the mining and manufacturing directories o f Colorado, Montana. Utah and
Wyoming. The survey examined attitudes toward relocation decisions and the factors
which play an important role in shaping these decisions. Over half o f the responding CEOs
affirmed the importance o f state regulatory climate as a major factor.

In addition,

regulatory climate was least likely to be dismissed as an unimportant factor by CEOs.
Tannenw ald's (1997) review o f the ten econom etric studies which form the
backbone of the research on the impact o f state environmental regulation on economic

42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

development found that the majority of studies evaluate the impact o f environmental
regulation on new plant locations and business start-ups. Two reasons were given. New
branch plants are likely to be more responsive to regulatory differences than existing plants,
and environmental regulations on new plants are usually more stringent than those on
existing plants. The most commonly used dependent variable was new plant location.
Other choices o f dependent variable included number o f new firms in an industry,
manufacturing employment and earnings per capita, growth rate in manufacturing
employment, and new plant numbers and birth rate. The impacts o f regulations were
usually measured using OLS regression or conditional logit analysis.
Most o f the econometric studies reviewed by Tannenwald (1997) found negative,
statistically significant relationships between some measures o f regulatory stringency and
their dependent variable for economic activity, although the estimated effects tend to be
small. Moreover, many o f the models explained little o f the variation in their dependent
variable (Tannenwald. 1997).
Four econometric studies o f the impact o f state environmental regulations on
economic development and firm behavior, along with the researchers' major conclusions,
are briefly described below. Two o f the studies, one by Bartik (1985) and one by Feiock
and Rowland (1990) were not included in the Tannenwald (1997) review.
In 1985, Bartik examined how new branch plant location decisions were influenced
by various state characteristics. Although he did not take states’ environmental regulatory
stringency into account, Bartik did show that firms are sensitive to cost variations among
states when deciding where to locate new facilities.
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In a later analysis, Bartik (1988) included six measures o f environmental regulatory
stringency, two measures o f state water pollution regulations and four measures o f state air
pollution regulations, in an exam ination o f whether variations in state environmental
regulations have affected the location o f new manufacturing branch plants by the Fortune
500 companies for the 1972-1978 time period. Bartik included two variables for each
environmental regulation measure: the measure itself, and the measure multiplied by an
indicator o f the importance o f that regulation to the industry. This allowed the coefficient
for each regulation m easure to vary across industries, according to how strongly
environmental regulations affect costs.

No statistically significant effects o f state

environmental regulation on business location were found. The point estimates suggested
that even sizable increases in the stringency o f state environmental regulation are unlikely
to have a large effect on the location decisions o f the average industry. However, for highly
polluting industries, the statistical estimates w'ere not precise enough to rule out large
negative regulatory effects that might be large enough to concern state policymakers.
Bartik's 1988 study ignored possible effects o f environm ental regulation on small
business. To examine assertions that there are economies o f scale in business com pliance
with environmental regulations. Bartik (1989) estimated how the states’ characteristics,
including the strictness o f state environmental regulations, affect small business start-ups
for 19 manufacturing industries. Bartik detected a small, significant, negative impact o f
state-level environmental regulations on the start-up rate o f small businesses. An increase
in regulatory stringency o f one standard deviation was associated with only a one percent
change in the small business formation rate.

44

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

McConnell and Schwab (1990) used a conditional logit model, with a variety o f
alternative measures o f environmental stringency, to examine the effects o f regional
differences in environmental regulation and attainment o f federal ozone standards on the
choice o f location for new automobile industry branch plants. Although they found no
evidence that regional environmental policy played an important role in the location
decisions, McConnell and Schwab did find some evidence that, at the margin, firms were
deterred from locating plants in the most polluted ozone non-attainm ent areas.
Feiock and Rowland (1990) suggested that studies o f regulatory effects on
allocation of industrial resources should concentrate on heavily regulated mobile industries.
They hypothesized that, given the relative rarity o f massive plant relocations, incremental
shifts o f new capital for plant expansion, from one state to another, are a more appropriate
indicator of developmental resources than plant sitings, since new capital shifts may be
much more sensitive to marginal costs o f environmental regulation. Feiock and Rowland
tested their hypothesis by estimating the effects o f private pollution abatement costs on
changes in Chemical and Allied Producer's (CAPs) inter-regional and intra-regional
allocation of new capital, the most important developmental resource, from 1977 to 1982.
The five states where private regulatory costs were highest experienced a significant
decline in new capital investment, while the five states that had the lowest regulatory costs
in 1977 all experienced increases in capital investments. The results o f their dynamic
disequilibrium-adjustment model o f interstate investment provided strong evidence that
private pollution abatem ent costs vary across time and among states and they do influence
the interstate allocation o f developmental resources by the chem ical industry. In fact,
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regulatory costs were the single largest influence on the interstate distribution o f new CAP
capital. Since this is contrary to results from studies o f plant sitings, Feiock and Rowland
concluded that prevalent generalizations about the relationship between regulation and
development may be misleading, inappropriate, and unwarranted.

Measuring the Stringency of State Environmental Regulation
The most difficult problem encountered in all ten econometric location studies
reviewed by Tannenwald (1997) was the issue o f how to measure regulatory stringency.
In their plant location study, McConnell and Schwab (1990) noted the difficulty they
encountered in trying to develop one ideal measure o f the severity of environmental
controls faced by each plant at each potential site. "Existing data are severely limited in
their ability to measure the relative stringency o f environmental regulation, making it
difficult to use such measures in regression analyses o f the effects of regulation on
economic performance" (Jaffe. et al., 1995. page 158).
Few studies control for differences in regulatory clim ate and regulatory uncertainty
between jurisdictions. Existing measures o f stringency are not comparable across states or
partially reflect state-specific characteristics that have little to do with stringency. In
situations where uncertainties or delays surrounding regulation are the greatest impediments
to new plant location decisions, these effects will not be picked up by studies that look
exclusively at source discharge standards or traditional spending for pollution control
equipment as measures of regulatory intensity, unless these direct compliance costs are
highly correlated with the costs o f uncertainty and delay (Jaffe, et al., 1995; Tannenwald,
1997).
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Existing measures o f regulatory stringency fall into three closely related categories:
estimates o f enforcement effort, estimates o f compliance costs, both o f which represent
proxies for environmental stringency, and direct measures o f stringency. Each type o f
measure has distinct advantages and disadvantages, which m ost researchers explicitly
recognize and acknowledge (Tannenwald, 1997).
Measures o f enforcem ent effort include: (1) state spending on air and water
pollution control, divided by either state employment in manufacturing , state value added
in manufacturing, or total state employment; (2) number o f employees working for state
environmental agencies per manufacturing plant; and (3) dummy variables indicating
w hether a state charges fees for permits for pollution control plant construction or
operation. Bartik (1988. 1989) and McConnell and Schwab (1990) both warned that state
expenditures or workforce devoted to pollution control enforcement may simply reflect the
concentration o f heavily polluting industries within the state, rather than the intensity o f
enforcement efforts (Tannenwald. 1997).
Compliance cost proxies for environmental stringency include, but are not limited
to the average cost o f purchasing and operating pollution control plant and equipment, the
ratio o f pollution abatement capital expenditures to the gross product in the state,
environmental control costs as a percentage o f value-added, and the percentage by which
industry compliance costs in a state exceed the national industry average.

All these

compliance cost proxy measures depend critically on accurate measurement o f
environmental spending.

However, there is considerable guesswork involved in any

allocation o f investment costs to pollution abatement. There are also problems controlling
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for state-specific characteristics affecting compliance costs that have nothing to do with
regulatory stringency, such as average firm size, industry mix, and aggregate size o f the
manufacturing sector (Bartik, 1988; Gray. 1997: Jaffe, et al., 1995; Tannenwald, 1997).
A commonly used, but less direct, indicator o f com pliance costs incurred within a
jurisdiction is air quality. According to federal law, businesses in any jurisdiction whose
air quality is below federal standards (non-attainment status) are subjected to stricter
pollution control regulations than businesses in attainment status areas. Four o f the ten
econometric studies reviewed by Tannenwald (1997) included m easures o f attainm ent with
federal particulate emissions standards as independent variables. Unfortunately, in addition
to precipitating more stringent environmental regulations, dirty air also makes a state or
county unattractive to workers, thus driving up labor costs. This effect has nothing to do
with regulatory stringency (M cConnell and Schwab, 1990; Tannenwald. 1997).
Direct measures o f environmental regulation have been both qualitative and
quantitative. Three qualitative standards that have been used to study environmental
stringency include versions o f the Conservation Foundation Index (Duerksen. 1983). the
FREE Index developed in 1987 by the Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment,
and the Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991). Components o f all three indices incorporate
the existence and stringency o f comm on environmental laws and regulations affecting
manufacturing industries, including requirements for state environmental impact
statements, air quality, hazardous waste, superfund laws, air toxics programs, and water
permit requirements.
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The Conservation Foundation Index (Duerksen, 1983) was constructed from 23
environmental and land-use indicators, which ranged from voting records o f a state's
congressional delegation to existence o f state laws that address specific environmental
problems. Each indicator was assigned a point value, from zero to six, based on its relative
importance in assessing a state’s environmental efforts, as judged by the Conservation
Foundation staff.
The FREE Index provides a ranking o f the states, based on each state's
accomplishments in six environmental areas: air pollution reduction, soil conservation,
groundwater protection, hazardous waste management, solid waste and recycling, and
renewable energy and conservation. Ten indicators o f legislation, enforcement, funding
and other considerations were developed for each o f the six environmental areas, and
summed to provide a score (from zero to ten) for each environmental area and an overall
combined score ( 60 points maximum) for each state. The overall scores were also used
to rank the states. The ranking takes into consideration only those elements o f state
programs that have been made into law. formal standards, or guidelines (Fund for
Renewable Energy and the Environment. 1987).
The Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991) is a set o f 256 indicators that measure and
rank each state’s environmental health. The final Green Index score is the sum o f each
state’s ranks for ail 256 indicators, with each indicator carrying equal w eight, and an
appropriate multiplier to compensate for any missing items. One important com ponent o f
the Green Index is Green Policies, a com posite o f 77 indicators used to rank the stringency
o f state environmental regulations. The Green Policies composite includes the status o f 67
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environmental regulations or policies in each state, the state ranking for environmental
program spending, and a count o f the leadership o f pro-environmental forces in Congress.
Tannenwald (1997) does not consider quantitative measures o f stringency as
especially useful because they are so numerous and varied, often not comparable across
states, and highly industry-specific. For example, McConnell and Schwab (1990) included
quantitative restrictions on volatile organic compounds, a major pollutant created by
spraying and painting operations in motor vehicle manufacturing. Bartik (1988. 1989)
attempted to overcome these limitations by using particulate emissions from industrial
boilers, a quantitative environmental standard that is applied by most states to many
different industries.
Gray (1997) disputed Tannenw ald's characterization o f the limited usefulness o f
quantitative measures o f the stringency o f environmental regulations. Gray acknowledged
that quantitative measures are difficult to put together, and the importance o f ensuring that
the particular measure chosen is one that is expected to m atter for the plants being studied.
However, quantitative measures have a key advantage over the usual qualitative measures:
they allow researchers to measure the marginal effects o f one more unit o f regulation.

Environmental Management of Agriculture
The intimate relationship between primary industries, such as agriculture, and the
natural environment distinguishes them from manufacturing industries. The natural
environment is the factory floor for agriculture, and the production processes draw from the
natural processes that produce the environment. As the most extensive user o f land and
water resources, agricultural production activities can radically reshape the environment.
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Growing public alarm over the perceived deterioration o f the rural environm ent, especially
from agricultural externalities affecting water quality, has resulted in increased pressure on
governments to intervene by implementing strict environmental controls on agriculture
through the imposition o f technical standards at the farm level. A griculture is now among
the most heavily regulated sectors in most developed countries (Clark and Lowe, 1992;
Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993).
Production agriculture’s environmental externality problems are divisible into two
basic types, input-related or fundamental. Input-related cultural problem s, involving soil,
water, fertilizer and pesticides associated with production activities, are potentially
correctable problems. Fundamental problems are intrinsic to agricultural production and
cannot be avoided without stopping production. M ost problems in conventional agriculture
are both fundamental and input-related (Torres, 1989).
Agricultural activities have broad social implications that extend beyond the farm
boundaries.

Both the benefits, such as open space and rural landscapes, and costs,

including ground water and surface water contam ination, are large. Balanced, joint public
policy consideration o f both sides o f the issue is warranted. Instead, agricultural
environmental policies have often been disconnected and conflicting, prim arily because
state agricultural and natural resource institutions, including their philosophies, goals and
policies, have evolved independently (Poe, 1997; Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993).
The institutions charged with developing and implementing agricultural policies
frequently differ from those with responsibility for resource policies affecting agriculture.
Agricultural agencies typically view their role as promoting the w ell-being o f the farm
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com m unity. Agriculturally based environmental policies have tended to assign rights to
agriculture. Influenced by agriculture's unique social contract with society, agriculture
institutions have traditionally approached environmental policy problems through technical
assistance, education, and financial subsidies, rather than regulations (Batie, 1990; Poe,
1997; Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993).
In contrast, environmental and conservation agencies are mandated to protect the
integrity o f natural resources. Environmental policies operate on an alternative, public trust
rights allocation supporting the public's right to a clean environment. Regulations
specifying quotas and standards are the predominant approach to controlling environmental
risks (Poe, 1997; Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993).
As a result o f the differences between agricultural and environm ental protection
institutions, it is difficult to identify a single, standard set o f policies or policy objectives
that apply specifically to agricultural resources. State agricultural/environmental policy
instruments run the gamut from program s providing financial incentives for adoption o f
beneficial m anagem ent systems, to laws that limit land use. restrict the use o f specific
potential water contam inants (e.g.. fertilizers and pesticides) or establish the liability o f
farmers whose practices create negative environmental externalities. M andated practices
can include bans on the use o f chemicals, and requirements for certain production practices
(Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993). Quotas and standards are the predom inant state
approach to controlling environmental risks from agricultural sources.
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Environmental Regulation and the Farm Economy
M andated practices, quotas and standards all impose costs on agricultural producers.
Torres (1989) discussed the importance o f understanding the nature and structure o f the
farm economy and the major role it plays in the development o f appropriate models for
environmental regulation o f agriculture. Generally, the economic structure facing an
individual farmer is a close approximation o f the neoclassical perfect competition
paradigm. The farmer is a price-taker; in most cases, he cannot influence either the input
prices he pays or the output prices he receives. The farmer’s control over income is in the
number o f units o f output produced for sale.
The farmer-as-price-taker economic fact demands regulators' sensitivity to the
heterogeneity o f farming. Since a given regulatory program will impose costs unevenly
across farming operations, the impact o f additional regulatory compliance costs will be felt
differently, depending upon the farm’s size and organizational structure. This combination
o f farm heterogeneity, combined with the competitive nature o f farm markets, severely
limits the farm er's ability to pass pollution reduction costs to consumers or purchasers.
Small farmers, unlike large farmers, cannot absorb regulatory' costs, nor can they spread
costs through the operation like vertically integrated farms. Those small farmers subjected
to especially high regulatory costs may not survive the regulation (Torres, 1989).
Schmitz, Boggess and Tefertiller (1995) interviewed thirty-six Florida dairy farmers
from all the state’s major production areas, to determine the impact o f the total government
regulatory environment on their operations. The respondents ranked environmental
regulations as the most important problem, with 75 percent o f the farmers indicating that
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waste disposal regulations created the most serious problems. Farmers spent an average
of 21.6 percent o f their work day dealing w ith regulations. Regulations also negatively
affected the relationships between 86 percent o f the farmers and their bankers, and
generally limited expansion o f dairy herd size. Costs increased, milk production declined,
and production shifted to other areas o f the state. The researchers also found that the most
regulated region o f Florida, Okeechobee, bore the greatest costs.

The Industrializing U.S. Livestock Sector
"The current environmental problems o f animal agriculture are the result o f the
interaction o f a complex set o f public policy, institutional, technological, and economic
forces," according to Abdalla. Lanyon. and Hallberg (1995, p. 1234). The U.S. livestock
production and marketing system has been undergoing significant structural change toward
industrialization for more than four decades. As livestock producers have invested in costeffective, output-increasing technologies, often without consideration o f environmental
effects, farm structure has been evolving from dispersed crop-livestock operations to fewer,
larger farms specializing in livestock (dairy, cattle, poultry, hogs, fish) production.
Livestock producers have also integrated into marketing stages, located in clusters near
processing facilities and specialized infrastructure (Abdalla, Lanyon, and Hallberg, 1995).
The quantity and concentration o f animal wastes have increased w ith the changing
livestock sector structure, burdening local environments with water and air pollution, odors,
and insect problems.

Local conditions, including climate, soils, geology and existing

pollution levels, all affect the environment’s capacity to assimilate agricultural pollution.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that about one-third o f all agricultural
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nonpoint source water pollution is attributable to anim al production operations, and that
feedlots were a more important source o f river impairments than storm sewers or industrial
sources.

In many cases, public concerns over the im pacts o f animal operations have

provided political pressure for imposition o f more stringent environmental controls and
limits on the growth o f livestock agriculture (Abdalla, Lanyon. and Hallberg, 1995; Purvis
and Outlaw, 1995).
Abdalla, Lanyon, and Hallberg (1995) exam ined the interaction between public
policies and the dynamic forces o f livestock agricultural industrialization. They identified
the factors that have shaped the present spatial distribution o f animal agriculture, described
the nature o f public policy response to concerns over environmental effects, and illustrated
the problems associated with devising new institutions to improve performance.
The transformation o f livestock agriculture to a specialized, capital-intensive
industrial activity is consistent with changes in economic location factors over time. As
described by Abdalla. Lanyon. and Hallberg (1995), three sets o f external forces,
technological change, shifting market forces and demand, and new government policies and
programs, initiated the processes o f structural change. The structural change prompts a
four stage, evolutionary adjustment process, resulting in new subsector relationships and
new institutional arrangements to manage and coordinate new risks (Abdalla. Lanyon. and
Hallberg. 1995; Purvis and Outlaw, 1995).
The new institutional arrangements resulting from the industrialization o f animal
agriculture include changes in state environmental regulatory policies. States have
implemented a wide array o f policy tools, with a mind-boggling degree o f variation across
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states. States differ in their pollution discharge standards, facility requirements, permitting
requirements (filing activity, waiting periods, and/or fees), monitoring, compliance
enforcem ent, and noncompliance fines or penalties. The number o f possible combinations
o f these differing state regulatory instruments complicates attempts to systematically
classify and compare states' statutory rigor (Smith and Kuch, 1995).
Purvis and Outlaw (1995) examined case studies o f Florida and Texas dairy
producers to document experiences with variations in state environmental regulatory
policies targeted toward animal agriculture. Implementation o f the Florida Dairy Rule from
1987 to 1991 was handled in a manner which promoted technological innovation and
experimentation, with cost-sharing and experimental permits as deliberate policy
instruments. In contrast. Texas dairy farmers experienced contentious, divisive, and timeconsum ing public hearings on dairy farm siting and permitting. The result was high
transaction costs and restrictions which constrained expansion, thus deterring technology
adoption to exploit size and scale economies.

Environmental Regulation and Animal Agriculture Location Decisions
A key agricultural policy issue is the effect o f differences in state institutions and
environmental policies on the location o f animal production. Environmental restrictions
cannot induce someone to move an existing farm. Natural capital is immobile, even in the
long run.

However, environmental regulations pertaining to natural resource-based

industries can affect where specific animal species are raised (Jaffe, etal., 1995; Smith and
Kuch. 1995).
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Variations in state environmental regulatory policies targeted toward animal
agriculture may alter the comparative advantage o f a state. Less stringent water quality
regulations in North Carolina have been cited as an important factor influencing movem ent
o f the hog industry into that state in the 1980s and early 1990s. Virginia, with restrictive,
costly environmental permitting requirements, experienced a 21 percent loss o f hog farms
o f 1,000 head or more between 1987 and 1992.

North Carolina, with m inimal

environmental permitting requirements, saw a 47 percent increase over the same period
(Abdalla. Lanyon, and Hallberg, 1995: Mo and Abdalla 1997; Smith and Kuch, 1995).
National trends in livestock concentration suggest that other factors besides
environmental regulations also play a role in the location o f livestock agriculture.
Minnesota, with its highly restrictive regulations, and more lenient Iowa experienced
almost identical rates o f growth in the number o f hog farms with 1,000 head or more.
Arkansas and Oklahoma, despite significant differences in environmental regulations, were
the two states that experienced the greatest rates o f growth (Smith and Kuch, 1995).
Research on the effects o f environmental policies upon the location o f farms and
related agribusinesses has been limited. Lopez and Henderson (1989) utilized telephone
interviews o f food processing executives in six Northeast states to identify factors affecting
locational choices for their plants. Versecky and Lins (1995) surveyed Illinois agribusiness
decision-makers about factors affecting expansion and contraction. Findings from both
studies suggest that state environmental policies and their enforcement do appear to
influence location, growth and expansion decisions o f agribusinesses (Mo and A bdalla
1997).
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Vesecky and Lins (1995) conducted surveys o f both Illinois agribusiness input
supply firms and processing and distribution firms to determine business attitudes and
perceptions with respect to factors associated with expansion or contraction decisions. The
most important factor influencing the expansion decision for both input and processing and
distribution firms is proximity to markets. W orker's compensation laws and insurance
rates were the two most negative factors identified by expanding firms. Unemployment
insurance taxes, liability award trends and costs related to environmental regulations also
received negative rankings in both surveys.
The results for firms which had contracted by more than ten percent were much
different than the results for expanding firms. For input supply firms, costs to comply with
environmental regulation had the greatest influence on the contraction decision, followed
by wage rates, stringency o f enforcement o f environmental regulations, w orker's
compensation insurance rates, and availability and cost o f labor. In contrast, the cost to
comply with environmental regulation and w orker's compensation insurance rates were not
important for processing and distribution firms that contracted in size. All o f the top five
important factors for processing and firms were unimportant factors for input supply firms,
and the five least important factors for input firms were important factors for processing
and distribution firms.
Mo and Abdalla (1997) investigated the role o f differences in state environmental
policies on recent swine industry' changes for 16 major hog producing states.

They

specifically examined whether the stringency o f environmental regulations affected the
growth rate of hog inventory. They included four categories o f independent variables:
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natural endowment factors, economic factors, business climate factors, and regulation
factors, which included two subcategories, general taxation policy and environmental
regulation (Mo and Abdalla 1997).
Mo and Abdalla (1997) had difficulty obtaining data for the last two categories,
business climate and regulation factors. The 1990 U.S. census data on the proportion o f
rural population in the total population was used as a crude proxy for business climate for
all seven years. Property tax per acre o f farm land was used as a measure o f the stringency
o f taxation policy. Two established indices o f the stringency o f environmental regulation,
including the Lester Category, were tested (Mo and A bdalla 1997).
Mo and Abdalla (1997) found the general econom ic factors to be the most
important, o f the four categories of variables, affecting swine industry growth. The results
for the two indices measuring the stringency o f state environm ental policies were mixed.
The Lester Category was both significant and o f the expected sign, supporting the
hypothesis that expansion o f the sw'ine industry is influenced by differences in the
stringency o f states' environmental regulations. Mo and A bdalla suggested that the Lester
Category performed better because it accounts for each state's institutional capabilities to
implement existing policies, in addition to indicators o f the stringency o f environmental
regulations.
Among the limitations of their research. Mo and A bdalla (1997) noted that the
environmental indices used are not tailored to agriculture-specific regulatory efforts. They
recommended that future research efforts should address regulations specifically aimed at
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pollution from animal agriculture, and should also encompass the states' institutional
capacities to implement environmental rules (M o and Abdalla 1997).

A Theoretical Model Explaining Firm Location Decisions
The institutional approach to economic policy analysis described in chapter 1, with
its focus on the broad political character o f economic life, provides the underlying
framework for developing a general theoretical model to explain firm location decisions.
Embedded w ithin this framework are elements o f both the public choice theory o f selfinterested political actors and firm location theory, both previously described in this
chapter.
The theoretical firm location model is illustrated in Figure 2.1. According to public
choice theory, the relative political influence o f the political actors (self-interested
individuals, bureaucrats and groups) determines the important structural characteristics o f
state institutions affecting industry. The institutional structure, in turn, influences the status
o f the various location decision factors, including state regulatory climate. Finally, in
accordance with firm location theory, firm location decisions are made based on an
evaluation o f the various firm location factors.

Aquaculture Regulatory Climate Conceptual Model
Western, industrialized countries are perceived as having tended to over-regulate
the aquaculture industry. Aquaculturists must cope with a restrictive state regulatory
climate consisting o f a complex network o f laws and regulations dealing with land tenure,
water use. environmental protection, pollution prevention, public health, and fisheries in
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Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model Explaining Firm Location Decisions
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general. The result has been confusion, conflicts and overlapping o f provisions, which
causes industry frustration (Pillay, 1992).
As part of a Northeastern Regional Aquaculture Center project, Wypyszinski. et al.,
(1994) analyzed and made recommendations for the improved application o f laws directly
affecting aquaculture in the northeastern United States. The authors identified seven major
topical areas directly pertinent to the aquaculture industry: siting, water use. stocking,
cultivation, harvesting, product marketing, and government assistance. Selecting the proper
site was identified as the most important consideration in starting up an aquaculture
operation. An aquaculture operation's success is dependent on the aquaculturisf s ability
to exercise control over the site through ownership, lease or other form o f conveyance. Site
selection was also the most difficult and least specific step in the aquaculture process
(DeVoe and Mount, 1989).
The species selection decision directly affects four o f the seven major issues:
stocking, cultivation, harvesting, and product marketing. Fingerling stocking rate and
timing varies by species. Cultivation and harvesting practices are also species-specific.
Many states forbid or restrict possession and marketing o f aquaculture products from game
species. Thus, the critical species selection decision is constrained by state fish and wildlife
regulations, one component o f regulatory climate.
The theoretical model explaining firm location decisions, described previously, can
be directly applied to the aquaculture industry to model the relationship between state
institutions and regulatory clim ate toward fish culture.

Path diagrams are a commonly

used method for depicting causal relationships among a set o f variables. By convention,
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squares or rectangles are used to represent measured variables, and circles or ellipses are
used to represent latent variables. A straight arrow draw n from one variable to another
indicates that the two are causally related, and also indicates the direction o f causality
(DeVillis, 1991; M acCallum, 1995).
Figure 2.2 illustrates the conceptual model o f the aquaculture regulatory climate institutional relationships. Both the site and species selection decisions represent location
decisions w ithin the context o f the conceptual model. These decisions are. in large part,
influenced by state regulatory climate, which can be considered one location decision
factor.

Regulatory climate, defined as the stringency o f state regulations impacting

aquaculture, is shown as an ellipse, indicating that regulatory climate is a latent variable
w'hich cannot be easily m easured in a direct fashion.
The process o f establishing the regulatory climate toward aquaculture begins with
the relevant political actors, identified here as industry groups, bureaucrats, environmental
groups, recreational interests, and consum er groups. The roles and importance o f the
relevant political actors and state institution structural characteristics is described below.
T he Political A ctors
Aquaculture policy instruments are not usually developed using a logical and well
ordered institutional process. Instead, they slowly evolve as agencies attempt to formulate
and implement policies based on often vague legislative mandates. Thus, policy is
developed by those who implement it. Decisions are often made within a public and
political marketplace. The marketplace may be primarily bureaucratic, if the process is
based on scientific managem ent, pluralistic if decisions are reached through an open
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Figure 2.2 Conceptual Model of Aquaculture Regulatory Climate-Institutional Relationships

political process, or a combination o f both approaches. This adaptive implementation
process is often driven by bargaining among industry groups, resource user groups
(sportsmen and recreational interests, etc.), environmental groups, and those bureaucrats
charged with policy implementation (Sylvia, 1997).
While some state agencies handle aquaculture permitting with a cooperative,
problem-solving attitude, there are usually some other parties, both public and private,
which take an adversarial approach to aquaculture. Opponents ofaquaculture include some
conservation coalitions, competing industries' spokesmen, and antagonistic government
agencies (Mattei, 1995).
Floyd, et al„ (1991) examined the policy issues associated with expanded
aquaculture production in the twelve-state north central region o f the U.S. They surveyed
a sample of aquaculture producers, university aquaculture researchers, cooperative
extension agents and specialists in aquaculture, state agency regulators in departments o f
agriculture and environmental protection and natural resource agencies, and environmental
group representatives. Post hoc analysis verified significant attitudinal differences between
group pairs and confirmed policy issues that best predicted group membership.

Industry
The level o f development o f state aquaculture policy is largely a function o f the
amount and scale o f industry activity and the experience o f regulatory agency staff. In
many states, the regulations which control the aquaculture industry have been written and
enforced by wildlife agencies; however, the agencies are not mandated to consider the
effects o f regulations on industry'. As a result, industry has not been involved in forming
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regulations. In states where aquaculture has had a longer history and/or significant
economic impact, permit and environmental monitoring programs tend to be better
organized and more friendly to industry (Cline. Warren and Walker, 1994; Ewart, Hankins,
and Bullock, 1995).

Bureaucrats
Decisions to manage and allocate natural resources are ultimately made using the
currencies that characterize the political and bureaucratic arena, security and discretionary
income within the corridors o f bureaucratic management, primarily state natural
resource/environmental protection agencies and, to a lesser extent, state agriculture
departments (Sylvia, 1997). Results o f a survey o f fish and wildlife agency regulators by
W heaton. Pybus and Blakely (1993) suggest that natural resource regulators perceive that
agricultural agencies generally do not have the statutory authority to protect w ildlife
populations, nor the expertise to recognize the legitimate concerns for wildlife posed by
potential adverse environmental effects o f aquaculture operations (W heaton. Pybus and
Blakely, 1993).
Interest groups that generally support natural resource and environmental protection
agencies are firmly established and much more numerous than aquaculturists. G iven the
relative difference in political power, it is unlikely that state legislators will divest these
agencies o f their regulatory powers over aquaculture because o f support from the
aquaculture industry (Floyd, et al.. 1991).
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Environmental Groups
Floyd, et al., (1991) found that fifty-three percent o f the environmentalists surveyed
expressed interest in being involved with environmental regulatory issues associated with
aquaculture, but only thirty-six percent indicated that they were familiar with aquaculturerelated environmental issues. Members of the environmental community were also quick
to voice their concerns about water quality issues from pollution o f public waters from
aquaculture effluents.

Consumer groups
To date, consumer advocacy groups have had little impact on aquaculture policy.
Since aquaculture represents a relatively small source o f food in the United States, it
captures little attention in the public arena, despite its possession o f what some believe is
great potential. Many observers believe that if market dem and is great, ways to cut through
the institutional barriers will be found. (Nichols, 1985)

Institutional Structure
Institution structural characteristics directly determ ine the state’s regulatory climate.
The choice o f state institutional structure characteristics im portant in the determination o f
regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture was developed from the literature on the
constraints to aquaculture industry growth and development. Important state characteristics
include the existence o f a state aquaculture development plan, the finfish classification
(baitfish, ornamental, commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish, marine gamefish), the
legal definition o f aquaculture as a form of agriculture, the lead state administrative and
enforcement agencies, and the region.
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Develonmcnt Plan
Many states, through policy statements and legislation, have called for the
accelerated development o f the aquaculture industry. States have been formulating formal
aquaculture development plans to promote industry growth and expansion. These plans,
which undergo continual clarification and refinement, provide guidance for the
establishment o f contemporary developmental and regulatory mechanisms to accommodate
the aquaculture industry’s needs (DeVoe and Mount, 1989).

Finfish Classification
United States common law has historically divided animals into one o f two
categories: domestic (domitae naturae) and wild (ferae naturae). Domestic animals may
be owned, with absolute private property rights. Wild animals are only considered property
while the animal remains in a person’s possession. Courts have traditionally classified fish
as wild. If the fish escapes, the former possessor has no property rights (McCoy. 1996).
State fish and wildlife agencies laws also classify fish species into categories, such
as baitfish. ornamentals, foodfish and gamefish.

Different classifications o f fish are

regulated differently by state fish and game agencies. There appears to be a continuum o f
regulatory restrictiveness, with baitfish culture being subject to the least restrictions,
followed by ornamental and commercial foodfish. Gamefish species are legally considered
wild, and not capable o f private ownership, regardless o f 100 percent possession. Thus,
culture o f freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish is highly restricted in many states.
Some states are taking action steps to solve this problem by specifying that fish raised in
aquaculture facilities are privately-owned, thus providing more legal protection.
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Defining Aquaculture as Agriculture
Commercial aquaculture is in the early stages o f development in most states in the
U.S. Regulators have tended to classify fish farming as an industrial activity requiring
regulatory treatment different from other forms o f agriculture (Ewart, Hankins, and
Bullock, 1995). Major industry efforts have been expended to have states legally declare
aquaculture a form o f agriculture, based upon the belief that agriculture status confers
certain legal protections In the Floyd, et al., (1991) survey, there was general agreement
among producers, researchers, extension agents and specialists that aquaculture should be
defined as agriculture. In contrast, state natural resource regulators disagreed with defining
aquaculture as agriculture. The Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture (1993) concluded that
the treatment of aquaculture as a form o f agriculture would provide a positive development
climate.

Administrative and Enforcement Agency
Within states, conflicts arise between the agencies that have responsibility for the
management o f natural resources and those agencies responsible for agricultural
development. In most states, regulation o f the aquaculture industry has evolved in state
game and fish departments that are often oriented toward production and protection of
game species for recreational experiences rather than toward food production. (Devoe,
Pomeroy and Wypyszinski, 1992).
According to the Floyd, et al., (1991) survey results, an important theme with fish
farmers is regulatory jurisdiction. Which state agency should be responsible for industry
regulation? Survey results indicated that producers, researchers, extension agents and
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specialists believe that jurisdiction over aquaculture belongs in state departm ents o f
agriculture, which producers feel would provide economic advocacy and sympathetic
industry regulation. State natural resource regulators favored retaining control of
aquaculture in natural resources departments.

Region
The 50 states maintaining widely varying rules and regulations create a bewildering
array o f regulations. The aquaculture industry is openly frustrated that requirem ents often
vary so much between neighboring states that it is difficult to satisfy each regulation and
remain competitive. Regional compacts offer hope for addressing a wide array of
conflicting state regulations that are hindering aquaculture (Cline, W arren and Walker.
1994).
There are several additional reasons why the region may have significant impacts
on state regulatory climate. For purposes o f setting research priorities and disbursing
federal aquaculture research funds, the USDA divides the United States into five regional
zones (northeast, southern, western, north-central, and tropical-subtropical), each serviced
by a regional aquaculture center. Although there is considerable overlap, regions differ in
terms o f environmental conditions, species cultured, population density, and importance
and influence o f the aquaculture industry and environmental groups.

Summary
This chapter provided an overview on the political economy o f government
regulation. Important theories o f regulation, including public choice theory, were reviewed,
and the costs and impacts o f state environmental regulations on firm location decisions

70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were examined. The chapter also discussed the shortcomings and inconsistent performance
o f existing regulatory climate proxies and indices used to measure the stringency o f state
environmental regulations. The unique environmental problems o f the industrializing U.
S. livestock agriculture, and the limited research on the effect o f variations in state
environmental regulatory climate on the location o f livestock agriculture were carefully
delineated. By combining elem ents o f public choice theory and firm location theory within
an institutional economics framework, a theoretical model was developed to explain the
institutional relationships underlying firm location decisions. The theoretical model was
then applied to the rapidly expanding U.S. aquaculture industry to develop a conceptual
model which illustrates the relationships between political actors, institutional structure,
regulatory climate and aquaculture firm location and species selection decisions.
The next chapter will describe the data collection procedures and descriptive
statistics for the two primary data sources used in this research, the 1995 State Finfish
Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire. For each o f the
two survey instruments, survey sample information, survey adm inistration procedures,
questionnaire design, and response frequency distributions will be reported and discussed.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The data used in the computation o f the state aquaculture regulatory climate scale
and the estimation of the effects o f state institutional variables on regulatory climate were
collected via two mail surveys conducted by the Louisiana State University Department of
Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness. The 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program
Survey examined the issues associated with the development and assignm ent o f property
rights to cultured fish and the use o f incentive-based programs by states and U.S. territorial
governments. A 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire updated and clarified information
collected in two surveys: a 1993 Aquatic Animal Health Survey conducted by the National
Association o f State Aquaculture Coordinators (NASAC) and the 1995 State Finfish
Aquaculture Program Survey.
Both the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1998
Supplemental Questionnaire were conducted in accordance with Dillmams Total Design
Method, which recommends particular questionnaire format and mailing procedures to
maximize response rate and response quality (Dillman, 1991). This chapter reports survey
sample information, survey administration procedures, questionnaire design, and
descriptive statistics for both the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the
1998 Supplemental Questionnaire.
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1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey
The 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey, which was the most
comprehensive survey o f state aquaculture regulations conducted to date, obtained
information about the status o f state finfish aquaculture programs, the roles o f state
agencies responsible for developing and enforcing aquaculture regulations, ow nership and
specification o f property rights to different categories o f fish (baitfish, ornamentals,
commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish), and states’ use o f
incentive programs to promote aquaculture industry regulatory compliance (A ppendix A).
S urvey Sam ple
The survey instrument was mailed to official aquaculture coordinators and contacts
from all 50 states and four U.S. territories. The coordinators, state governm ent officials
who are responsible for coordinating aquaculture programs at the state or territorial level,
represent the official state first contacts for state-level aquaculture developm ent and
regulatory program information. Names and addresses were obtained from the 1995 edition
o f the Directory o f State Aquaculture Coordinators and Contacts. compiled and maintained
by the Alternative Farming Systems Information Center at the USDA/ARS National
Agricultural Library in cooperation with the National Association o f State Aquaculture
Coordinators (USDA/ARS, 1995).

Survey Administration
The first mailing to the aquaculture coordinators and contacts included a
questionnaire, a postage-paid return envelope, and a letter identifying the survey’s puipose
and the proposed application o f the data (Appendix A .l). A second m ailing, sent
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approximately two months after the first m ailing, was directed to non-respondents. It
included a letter reiterating the importance o f responding to the survey, another copy o f the
original survey, and another postage-paid return envelope. Approximately two weeks after
the second mailing, non-respondents were contacted by telephone and asked to please
complete the survey and fax the completed survey. A copy o f the survey was faxed to any
non-respondent who indicated that he did not have a copy o f the original survey.

Survey Design
The survey instrument (Appendix A.2) was divided into three sections designed to
provide data for com putation o f the regulatory’ climate scale and estim ation o f the
regulatory' climate ordered probit model, along w ith information on states' use o f incentivebased mechanisms and additional contextual information. M ost questions were framed in
the dichotomous choice form, asking a particular closed response, "yes", "no", or
“uncertain" to a specified question.
The first section elicited general information about the state's finfish aquaculture
program and industry. Question one (Q -1) asked w hether the state has a formal aquaculture
development program or initiative, and in what year the program began. The state agencies
responsible for developing and administering aquaculture programs and enforcing
aquaculture regulations were identified in question two (Q-2), since an im portant theme
with fish farmers is regulatory jurisdiction. In m ost states, regulation o f the aquaculture
industry has evolved in state game and fish departments, but some producers believe that
state jurisdiction o f aquaculture belongs in state departments o f agriculture, which are
charged with developing agricultural industries for commercial purposes and are perceived
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as providing economic advocacy and sympathetic industry regulation (Floyd, et al.. 1991).
As a result, there has been a movement, both at the state and federal levels, to have
aquaculture legally declared "agriculture," with regulatory authority placed with
departments o f agriculture. The next question in the first section, Q-3, explored w hether
aquaculture was legally considered an agricultural activity in the state, and in what year
aquaculture was declared to be agriculture.
Question four (Q-4), determined the number o f private finfish aquaculture facilities
operating in each state. The state requirement that private fish farms obtain a general
license or permit to operate in the state was the topic o f question five (Q-5). The legal
status offish in aquaculture facilities as privately owned, exempt from wildlife laws, and
livestock was explored in a three-part question six (Q-6). The final question in the first
section, Q-7, asked the respondents to list, in descending order, the top four finfish species
cultured in private aquaculture facilities in the state, based on farm gate market value.
The laws defining, regulating, and protecting aquaculture are often intermingled
with laws pertaining to wild aquatic stocks. These state fish and wildlife laws typically
classify fish species into categories such as ornamentals, baitfish, commercial food fish and
game fish. Property rights vary, depending on the category, and often restrict possessing,
killing or marketing for food, even if the species was produced as a directed agricultural
enterprise. The second section o f the survey contained eight dichotomous choice questions
which explored issues relating to the ownership and specification o f property rights to five
different categories o f finfish (ornamentals, baitfish, commercial foodfish. freshwater
gamefish, and marine gamefish) and an “other" category.

75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Question eight (Q-8) asked whether fish from the different categories, when
confined in an aquaculture facility, were considered private property owned by the farm
operator. The next two questions investigated whether an aquaculturist is required to obtain
a special license or permit to possess and culture the different categories o f fish (Q-9), and
whether any required special possession permit is transferable upon change o f fish farm
ownership (Q -10). Question eleven (Q -11) inquired if an aquaculturist is required to design
his facility to prevent escapement o f the fish, while question twelve (Q-12) examined
whether unauthorized removal or destruction o f cultured fish from an aquaculture facility
was legally considered poaching or theft.
The last three questions in the second section investigated various reporting
requirements and marketing restrictions.

Written fish inventory or production report

requirements were elicited in question thirteen (Q-13), while question fourteen (Q-14)
determined if a marketing paper trail was required to sell farm-raised fish from the different
categories. Question fifteen (Q -l 5) was an open-ended question requesting respondents to
describe any specific limitation or regulations on the sale or disposition o f fish from the
different categories.
The third and final section o f the survey examined states’ use o f incentive-based
programs as an alternative policy option to costly regulatory programs for promoting
regulatory' compliance by the aquaculture industry. Question 16 (Q -16) determined if states
have developed aquaculture Best Management Practices.
Four questions examined states’ use o f the four general classes o f economic or
market-based incentive instruments described by Luzar and Diagne(1993): direct payment
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systems for adopting specific management practices, including cost sharing, matching
grants, and subsidies (Q -l7); environmental liability requirements, including surety bonds
and liability insurance (Q -l8); special fees, taxes, or assessments, with receipts used for
environmental or natural resource programs (Q -l9); and tradable pollution rights system s,
such as tradable discharge permits, discharge reduction credits, waste deposit-refund
system, and habitat mitigation banking (Q -21).
One o f the most significant policy problems affecting aquacultural developm ent is
effluents.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates all discharges o f

pollutants under authority from the Clean Water Act (CWA), which provides for the
issuance o f National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits to control
all non-exempt point source pollutant discharges, including aquaculture production wastes.
A CWA provision allows the EPA to delegate its NPDES permit authority to individual
states to regulate point-source discharges into waters within the state borders.

State

NPDES programs must be equivalent to the EPA’s, and may impose more stringent perm it
requirements (Ewart. Hankins, and Bullock. 1995). Question twenty (Q-20) elicited
whether the state issues permits for aquaculture effluent discharges and exam ined the
discharge permit fee structure.

Survey Summary' and Descriptive Statistics
O f the surv eys sent to 50 states and four U.S. territories, completed surveys were
returned by 45 states (90 percent) and Guam (25 percent) for an overall response rate o f
85.2 percent. The 46 survey respondents provided answers for five different categories o f
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finfish, resulting in 230 total observations. Appendix A.3 contains summary statistics and
frequency tables for the completed surveys.

Profile of State Finfish Aquaculture
Forty-three respondents provided estimates for the number o f private finfish
aquaculture facilities currently operating in the states (Q-4; Table A.3.4). The estim ates
totaled 4,908 private finfish aquaculture facilities. Individual state estimates ranged from
zero to four hundred, with a mean o f 114 fish farms per state and a standard deviation o f
119.6 fish farms.

As expected, trout and catfish species were the top finfish species

cultured in private aquaculture facilities, based on farm gate market value (Q-7; Table
A.3.7). Nineteen states (41.3 percent) reported various trout species as the num ber one
cultured species. Fourteen states (30.4 percent) reported catfish species as the top cultured
species. Other top cultured species include tilapia (four states), salm on species (three
states) and ornamentals (two states).
As the aquaculture industry has expanded, states have been form ulating
development plans to attract and retain the industry. Twenty-two responding states (47.8
percent) reported having formal aquaculture development programs and initiatives, while
twenty-two respondents (47.8 percent) indicated that their state has not yet form ulated a
formal program (Q -l; Table A .3.la). O f the twenty-two states reporting formal
development programs, only four states (18.2 percent) had established a plan in the 1973
to 1984 period (Q -l; Table A .3.lb). No plans were established in 1985-86. The rate o f
program developm ent accelerated after 1987 and through the early 1990s, w ith eight
programs established in the three year period from 1987-89 and nine programs established
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in the 1990-92 period. No development plans were reported as being established during
the 1993-95 three year period.
Based on survey responses, responsibility for developing and administering state
aquaculture programs rests largely with state departments o f agriculture, state fish and
wildlife departments, and university cooperative extension services, either individually or
shared (Q-2a; Table A.3.2a). Twenty-eight responding states (60.9 percent) impart program
responsibility to state departments o f agriculture. State fish and wildlife departments have
program responsibilities in fifteen states (32.6 percent) and ten states (21.7 percent) grant
program development authority to university cooperative extension services.
The agency responsibility picture reverses for enforcement o f aquaculture
regulations (Q-2b; Table A.3.2b). State fish and wildlife departments have enforcem ent
responsibility in 37 states (80.4 percent), and state natural resources departments have
enforcement authority in 13 states (28.2 percent). Only fifteen states (32.6 percent) give
enforcement authority (sole or shared) to state departments o f agriculture.
Despite the small percentage o f states which impart enforcement authority to state
departments o f agriculture, over two-thirds (67.4 percent. 31 states) o f the responding states
legally consider aquaculture an agricultural activity (Q-3; Table A.3.3a). In nine states (19.6
percent), aquaculture is not considered a part o f agriculture. The temporal progression o f
states’ establishing aquaculture as agriculture closely follows the inception o f state
aquaculture development plans (Table A.3.3b).

By 1987, only six states had legally

declared aquaculture a form o f agriculture. The number had increased to twenty-five
responding states (54.3 percent) by 1995. Six o f the thirty-one states reporting aquaculture
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as part o f agriculture failed to provide the year that aquaculture was legally declared an
agricultural activity.
The vast majority o f states (38), representing 82.6 percent o f respondents, require
that fish farms obtain a general license or perm it to operate in the state (Q-5; Table A.3.5a).
Only six states (13.0 percent) did not require a general license or permit. In m ost cases, the
general license is not transferable upon change in fish farm ownership (Table A .3.5b). O f
the thirty-eight states requiring the general license, twenty states do not allow license
transferal, while only 14 states reported that the general license was transferable. Four
states expressed uncertainty about the transferability o f the general license.

Property Rights to Fish
The overall legal status o f fish as property varies considerably between states.
While the majority o f responding states (40 states or 87 percent) consider fish in
aquaculture facilities to be private property, only 22 states (47.8 percent) exem pt the fish
from state wildlife laws and only 17 states (37.0 percent) bestow livestock status on fish
confined in aquaculture facilities (Q-6: Table A.3.6). The legal status o f cultured fish as
private property was relatively uniform across four o f the five fish categories: ornamentals,
baitfish, commercial foodfish and freshwater gamefish (Q-8; Table A.3.8). Between 4042 states (87.0-91.3 percent) considered all four categories as private property. However,
only 28 states (60.9 percent) reported that cultured marine gamefish are private property.
The other eighteen responding states (39.1 percent) were either uncertain or did not provide
the information.
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Property rights to fish are often accompanied by state requirements for a special
license to possess and culture the fish. The number o f states mandating special possession
licenses varied by category o f fish (Q-9; Table A.3.9). Nineteen states (41.3 percent)
reported special licenses to possess and culture ornamentals. Twenty-two states (47.8
percent) require special licenses to possess baitfish and marine gamefish. Tw enty-eight
states (60.9 percent) mandate special permits for commercial foodfish, and tw enty-nine
states (63.0 percent) require the special possession license for freshwater gamefish. A large
amount o f uncertainty was noted in possession license requirements for marine gam efish;
more than one-third o f states (16 states or 34.8 percent) were uncertain or did not provide
the requested information. For all fish categories, less than one-half o f the states requiring
a special possession license allowed the special license to be transferred upon a change in
fish farm ownership (Q-10: Table A.3.10).
In addition to special possession license requirements, property rights to farmed fish
are usually accompanied by a requirement that the culture facility be designed to prevent
fish escapement (Q -l 1; Table A .3 .11). The number (and percent) o f respondents requiring
escape-proof design for ornamentals, baitfish, commercial food fish, freshwater gam efish
and marine gamefish are twenty-six (56.5 percent), nineteen (41.2 percent), tw enty-seven
(58.7 percent), twenty-three (50.0 percent), and nineteen (41.3 percent), respectively.
Although the degree o f uncertainty was relatively low, ranging from 2-3 states in each fish
category, the number o f states which failed to provide information for this question was
relatively large, especially for ornamentals and baitfish with seven non-responsive states
(15.2 percent) and marine gamefish with thirteen non-responsive states (28.3 percent).
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M ost states provide some legal protection for fish farm ers’ property rights to
cultured fish by considering unauthorized removal or destruction o f fish from an
aquaculture facility as theft, rather than poaching, which is applicable to wild fish.
Penalties for violating farmers’ rights are much more severe for theft than poaching.
Poaching is usually punishable by small fines, while theft can involve large fines and jail
sentences. For all fish categories except marine gamefish, thirty-five states (76.1 percent)
consider unauthorized fish removal or destruction as theft (Q -l 2: Table A.3.12). Twentyfive states (54.3 percent) reported that unauthorized removal or destruction o f marine
gamefish is considered theft. Twenty states (43.4 percent) were either uncertain o f the
poaching versus theft status for marine gamefish or failed to provide the requested
information. For all five finfish categories, only one state reported that unauthorized
removal or destruction o f fish from an aquaculture facility was considered poaching, rather
than theft.
A small proportion o f states require that fish farmers subm it an annual written fish
inventory or production report for all categories o f fish in aquaculture facilities (Q -l3:
Table A.3.13). The number (and percent) o f respondents requiring a written production
report for ornamentals, baitfish, commercial food fish, freshwater gamefish and marine
gamefish are ten (21.7 percent), fourteen (30.4 percent), seventeen (37.0 percent), seventeen
(37.0 percent), and twelve (26.1 percent), respectively.
In addition to production reports, some states also mandate marketing reports in the
form o f marketing paper trails required for a fish farm operator to sell farm-raised fish (Q13; Table A.3.14). The marketing paper trail requirements vary significantly between fish
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categories. Ornamentals, baitfish and marine gamefish are less regulated, in terms o f
marketing paper trails, than commercial food fish and freshwater gamefish. Only thirteen
respondents (28.3 percent) require a paper trail for ornamentals. Seventeen respondents
(37.0 percent) and sixteen respondents (34.8 percent) mandate paper trails for baitfish and
marine gamefish. respectively. More than one-half o f the respondents, twenty-five states
(54.3 percent) for commercial foodfish and 26 states (56.5 percent) for freshwater
gamefish. require a marketing paper trail to sell farm-raised fish.
A number o f responding states also reported and described specific limitations or
regulations on the sale or disposition o f farm-raised fish from the five fish categories (Q -15;
Table A.3.15). Possession and sales o f certain ornamental species are restricted, and some
species cannot be released in any surface waters. Some states prohibit sales of live baitfish
or restrict import or export o f baitfish species. Commercial foodfish sales can be affected
by sales possession seasonality limits and transport licenses. States often set maximum size
limits for freshwater gamefish and restrict sales to recreational pond stocking only. States
can set species and marking requirement for marine gamefish raised on sea ranches and
limit sales of certain species.

States’ Use of Incentive Programs
During the 1990s, states have been taking positive action to reduce harmful
environmental externalities caused by livestock agriculture operations. Policy makers have
an array o f instruments at their disposal to control environmental externalities.

One

commonly used device has been voluntary or mandatory Best Management Practices
(BMPs). Only nine states (19.6 percent) have developed finfish aquaculture Best
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Management Practices (Q-16; Table A.3.16a). O f those nine states, four reported that the
BMPs were voluntary, four reported that BMPs were mandatory, and one respondent was
uncertain whether the BMPs were voluntary or mandatory (Table A.3.16b)
One approach to environmental protection that is generating much interest as an
alternative to command and control regulations is incentive-based mechanisms (IBM ),
which provide continuing incentives for polluters to search for cost minimizing w ays o f
abating pollution (M arkandya and Richardson, 1992). Four general classes o f econom ic
or market-based incentive instruments have been used to control environm ental
externalities in other industries: direct payment systems for adopting specific m anagem ent
practices, environmental liability requirements, special fees, taxes, or assessments, with
receipts used for environmental or natural resource programs, and tradable pollution rights
systems (Luzar and Diagne, 1993). Several states have begun experimenting with the use
o f incentive-based mechanisms for the aquaculture industry'.
Two states (4.3 percent) and Guam (2.2 percent) have implemented direct paym ent
programs (cost sharing, matching grants, or subsidies) for finfish aquaculture operations
to promote environmental compliance (Q -l7; Table A.3.17). Maryland reported
development of a state cost sharing program for soil conservation and water quality
practices. Maryland also has a 50 percent matching grants program for fish farm ers to
design and construct small wastewater treatment facilities which reduce discharge or
recycle water. West Virginia Department o f Agriculture provides low interest loans for
aquaculture producers.

Guam has implemented 50 percent cost sharing for heavy

equipment, a tax rebate program, and low cost loans.
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Eight states (17.4 percent) reported the use o f environmental liability requirements
(surety bonds, liability insurance) for finfish aquaculture operations (Q-18; Table A.3.18).
M ontana requires an annual bond as a condition for license renewal. Two states use
environmental liability for eradication o f exotic species in cases o f escapement. Georgia
specifies liability insurance for dangerous species, such as piranha. Louisiana requires a
525,000 bond for tilapia producers to cover eradication o r habitat restoration if farmed
tilapia should escape. Delaware requires that farmers o f black bass species post a $5,000
surety bond to guarantee environmental compliance. Bonding company eligibility
requirements essentially guarantee the character o f the bond holder and minimize the risk
o f illegal activity. Five states require surety bonds and/or liability insurance for restoration
o f leased sites. M innesota specifies that surety bonds are necessary to provide water
restoration funds for net-pen aquaculture in mine pits. California requires both surety
bonds and insurance for lessees o f State water bottom s.

Rhode Island. Maine, and

W ashington mandate bonds for leases sites, to cover clean-up in case o f abandonment.
Nine states (19.6 percent) reported the use o f special taxes, fees, or assessments,
with receipts used for environmental or natural resource programs (Q -l9; Table A .3.19).
M ost were license, lease, or permit fees. Four state program s are worthy o f note. Florida
water management districts can add a mill to the property tax to pay for storm water
management programs and operation o f district offices. Maine requires that all fish farms
pay a special tax o f one cent per pound for benthic environmental monitoring. Oregon can
mandate special study fees to determine possible impacts o f aquaculture facilities to native
fishes. Vermont charges special fees used for a state fish health inspection program.
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Only two states (4.3 percent) reported the availability o f pollution rights systems to
enhance aquaculture industry compliance with environmental quality standards (Q-21:
Table A.3.21). Habitat mitigation banking is used in Colorado. It is also available in
Louisiana, but to date had not been used for an aquaculture facility.
Little has been done by states to use incentive programs to reduce aquaculture
facility wastewater discharges. No state or territory has tried tradable discharge permits,
discharge reduction credits, or waste deposit-refund systems. Thirty-four responding
states/territories (73.9 percent) issue NPDES or similar discharge permits for aquaculture
effluents (Q-20: Table A.3.20a). However, seldom is the fee structure set-up to provide
that "the polluter pays" or to provide incentives for discharge reductions (Q-20: Table
A.3 .20b). Nine states (19.6 percent) charge no fee, while eight states (17.4 percent) charge
a flat fee. Only three states (6.5 percent) specify a categorical fee, based on facility type
(pond, flow-through, recirculating, etc.). Eight states (17.4 percent) reported some type o f
graduated fee: one state with the fee based on annual fish production, three states with a
graduated fee based on effluent concentration, and four states with the discharge fee based
on water flow rate.

1998 Supplemental Questionnaire
The State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire
updated and clarified information collected in two surveys: a 1993 Aquatic Animal Health
Survey conducted by the National Association o f State Aquaculture Coordinators (NASAC)
and the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey described above (Appendix B).
The 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire collected updated information about the size ofeach
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state's finfish aquaculture industry, ownership and specification o f property rights, state
marketing restrictions, and health certification requirements for each o f five categories o f
fish (baitfish, ornamentals, commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish and marine
gamefish). The questionnaire also obtained respondents’ self-assessment o f state regulatory
stringency toward fish farming for each fish category.

Questionnaire Sample
The survey instrument was mailed to official aquaculture coordinators and contacts
from the 45 states and one U.S. territory (Guam) who responded to the original 1995 State
Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey. Names and addresses were obtained from the April
1997 edition o f the Directory o f State Aquaculture Coordinators and Contacts, compiled
and maintained by the Alternative Farming Systems Information Center at the USDA/ARS
National Agricultural Library in cooperation with the National Association o f State
Aquaculture Coordinators (USDA/ARS. 1995).

Questionnaire Administration
The first mailing included a 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire and a letter
identifying the questionnaire’s purpose, the proposed application o f the data, and a request
to fax back the completed questionnaire (Appendix B .l).
Approximately three weeks after the first mailing, non-respondents were contacted
by telephone and asked to please complete and fax the questionnaire. A copy o f the original
questionnaire was faxed to any non-respondent who indicated that he did not have a copy.
Ten days later, non-respondents were faxed another copy o f the original questionnaire and
a letter reiterating the importance o f their response. One week later, continuing non-
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respondents were again contacted by telephone and asked to return the completed
questionnaire.

Questionnaire Design
The 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire instrument (Appendix B.2) was divided into
two sections. The first section requested general information about the state's finfish
aquaculture program, including the total number o f private finfish aquaculture facilities (Q1) and an estimate o f the number o f private fish farms raising each o f the five categories
o f fish (Q-2). The third question (Q-3) was framed in the dichotom ous choice form,
requesting a closed "yes"', "no", or "uncertain'* response to a question asking whether the
state maintained a list o f fish species that are prohibited from entering state waters.
The second section consisted o f five dichotomous choice questions exploring issues
related to regulation and ownership specification for farm-raised fish from the five fish
categories previously described.

The regulatory issues included any state limits or

restrictions on sales and marketing o f farm-raised fish (Q-4), and requirements for a health
certification for farm-raised fish entering the state (Q-7) or shipped within the state (Q-8).
Ownership specification issues included whether the different categories o f fish, when
confined in an aquaculture facility, are exempt from state wildlife laws (Q-5) and legally
considered livestock (Q-6). The final question (Q-9) obtained self-reports o f the overall
stringency o f state regulation o f fish farming for each fish category. The question used a
Likert scale ranging from “ I ” to "5” , where "1” represented extremely lenient regulation
and "5** represented extremely stringent regulation.
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Questionnaire Summary and Descriptive Statistics
O f the questionnaires sent to the 45 states and one U.S. territory (Guam) which
responded to the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey, 43 com pleted surveys
were returned for an overall response rate o f 93.5 percent. The 43 survey respondents
provided answers for five different categories o f finfish. resulting in 215 total observations.
Appendix B.3 contains summary statistics and frequency tables for the com pleted surveys.

Profile of State Finfish Aquaculture
Forty-one respondents provided estimates for the number o f private finfish
aquaculture facilities currently operating in the states (Q -l; Table B.3.1). The estimates
totaled 4.929 private finfish aquaculture facilities. Individual state estim ates ranged from
two to 609. with a mean o f 120 fish farms per state and a standard deviation o f 151.9 fish
farms. Respondents also provided estimates o f the number o f private fish farms raising
each o f five categories o f fish in the state: ornamentals, baitfish, com mercial foodfish,
freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish (Q-2; Table B.3.2). The total (and state mean)
number o f farms raising each o f the five categories was: ornamentals. 378 (10.2): baitfish.
486 (12.5); commercial foodfish. 2642 (66.1); freshwater gamefish. 1362 (34.1); and
marine gamefish, 69 (1.8) farms.

Legal Status of Cultured Fish
The legal status o f cultured fish as exempt from state wildlife laws varied by fish
category (Q-5; Table B.3.5). Commercial foodfish were most frequently exempted, with
tw enty-four states (55.8 percent) reporting that commercial foodfish were exempt from
wildlife laws, while being subject to wildlife laws in nineteen states (44.2 percent). The
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number (and percent) of respondents exempting ornamentals, baitfish, freshwater gamefish
and marine gamefish from state wildlife laws are twenty-two (51.2 percent), nineteen (44.2
percent), twenty-one (48.8 percent) and fifteen (34.9 percent), respectively.
A similar situation exists with respect to states which legally consider fish in an
aquaculture facility as livestock, although the number o f states which consider the fish as
livestock is lower for all categories o f fish and there is a high degree o f uncertainty among
respondents (Q-6: Table B.3.6). Twelve states (27.9 percent) consider ornamentals as
livestock, while eighteen states (41.9 percent) do not consider ornamentals as livestock, and
thirteen respondents (30.2 percent) are uncertain. Sixteen states (37.2 percent) consider
baitfish in aquaculture facilities as livestock, whereas 17 states (39.5 percent) do not, and
ten respondents (23.3 percent) expressed uncertainty. Twenty states (46.5 percent) reported
that commercial foodfish are considered livestock, while fourteen states (32.6 percent) did
not. and nine respondents (20.9 percent) are uncertain. Freshwater gamefish in aquaculture
facilities are considered livestock in fifteen states (34.9 percent). Eighteen states (41.9
percent) do not consider cultured freshwater gamefish as livestock, while ten states (23.3
percent) expressed uncertainty. Only ten states (23.3 percent) considered marine gamefish
as livestock, while seventeen states (39.5 percent) denied livestock status to cultured marine
gamefish and fourteen respondents (32.6 percent) were uncertain about the legal status o f
marine gamefish as livestock.

Regulation of Fish Farms
Most states control the species o f fish that can be cultured within the state by
maintaining a list o f fish species which are prohibited from entering state waters (Q-3;
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Table B.3.3). Thirty-five states (81.4 percent) maintain a prohibited species list. Only four
states (9.3 percent) indicated that they do not have a prohibited species list.
Even when states allow fish species to enter the state, they sometimes require a
health certification for farm-raised fish entering the state (Q-7; Table B.3.7) or being
shipped within the state (Q-8; Table B.3.8). The number (and percent) o f respondents
requiring a health certification for ornamentals, baitfish, commercial food fish, freshwater
gamefish and marine gamefish entering the state are eight (18.6 percent), eleven (25.6
percent), seventeen (39.5 percent), nine (20.9 percent), and eleven (25.6 percent),
respectively. No states reported any health certification requirements for baitfish or
commercial foodfish being shipped within the state. Six states (14.0 percent) reported
intrastate shipment health certification requirements for ornamentals, and four states (9.3
percent) required the health certifications for intrastate shipment o f both freshwater and
marine gamefish.
Many states also limit or restrict the sale or marketing o f the different categories o f
fish (Q-4; Table B.3.4). Freshwater gamefish are the most heavily regulated fish category,
with thirty states (69.8 percent) limiting marketing. Sales and m arketing o f both baitfish
and commercial foodfish are restricted by 18 states (41.9 percent), with twenty-four states
(55.8 percent) reporting no restrictions. Marine gamefish marketing is limited by twentyone states (48.8 percent), with fifteen states (34.9 percent) reporting no restrictions.
However, there appears to be a some uncertainty about marine gamefish, with seven states
(16.3 percent) either reporting uncertainty or providing no answer. Ornamental species are
subject to the least marketing restrictions. Only ten states (23.3 percent) reported the
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existence o f marketing restrictions, while thirty-one states (72.1 percent) reported no
restrictions.
Respondents used a Likert scale to rate the overall stringency o f their state's
regulation o f fish farming for each fish category (Q-9). The Likert scale ranged from " I "
to "5". where “ 1" represented extremely lenient regulation and *'5V>represented extremely
stringent regulation. Table B.3.9a provides a frequency table for the respondent ratings.
Ratings for ornamentals and baitfish appeared to be bi-modal at ratings o f " T - and "3”
while ratings for commercial foodfish. freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish clustered
around a rating o f “2". Table B.3.9b provides summary statistics for respondent ratings
o f overall regulatory stringency for each fish category'. Ratings for all five fish categories
ranged from a minimum o f ” 1” to a maximum o f ”5". The mean ratings (and standard
deviations) were ornamentals. 2.84 (1.41); baitfish, 2.10(1.03); commercial foodfish, 2.70
(1.29): freshwater gamefish. 2.56 (.94); and marine gamefish. 2.61 (1.25).

Summary'
This chapter provided a detailed description o f the two primary data sources for this
research, the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1998 Supplemental
Questionnaire. The 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey examined the issues
associated with the roles o f state agencies responsible for developing and enforcing
aquaculture regulations, the ownership and specification o f property rights to cultured fish,
and the use o f incentive-based programs by states and U.S. territorial governments. The
1998 Supplemental Questionnaire collected information about the size o f each state's
finfish aquaculture industry, the legal status o f cultured fish, state marketing restrictions.
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fish health certification requirements, and respondents7self-assessment o f state regulatory
stringency toward fish farming.

For both survey instruments, sample information,

administration procedures, questionnaire design and response frequencies were described.
The next chapter details the developm ent and validation o f a measure o f state
regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture. Since regulatory climate is a latent variable,
not directly measurable, a procedure is described for developing an objective, quantitative
summated scale measure of state regulatory climate for the aquaculture industry, using
attenuations o f property rights conditions as underlying effect indicators o f regulatory
climate. The final validated scale, which combines the advantages o f direct quantitative
measures and qualitative indices, is presented.
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CHAPTER 4
THE AQUACULTURE REGULATORY CLIMATE SCALE

Many constructs in social science research, such as regulatory clim ate, are latent
variables, theoretical abstractions that are not directly observable or measurable. Although
a latent variable cannot be quantified directly, it presumably takes on a specific value under
a specified set o f conditions. The existence o f latent variables may be inferred from their
behavioral consequences. In other instances, it is more useful to assess a latent construct
through an objectively constructed and validated scale (DeVillis, 1991).
This chapter presents a summated scale measure o f state regulatory climate toward
finfish aquaculture. First, classical test theory', the underlying rationale for measurement
scales, is reviewed. The six-step scale development process is then detailed. Finally, the
specific procedures used to develop the finfish aquaculture regulatory climate scale are
described, and the final scale is presented and evaluated.

The Measurement Scale Concent
According to Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), measurement consists o f rules for
assigning symbols to objects in order to represent quantities o f attributes numerically or to
define whether objects fall in the same or different categories with respect to an attribute.
These well-defined rules provide a level o f standardization and quantification which takes
the guesswork out o f scientific observation and permits the use o f mathematical analysis
which is often essential to the elaboration o f theories.
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Measurements fall into four major classes: nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio.
Nominal scales contain rules for deciding whether two objects are equivalent or not
equivalent. Ordinal scales involve rules for deciding whether one object is greater than or
less than another object with respect to a given attribute. With ordinal scales, a set o f
objects is ordered from "least’’ to "m ost” with respect to an attribute o f interest, but the
quantity o f the attribute which each object possesses and the distance between objects with
respect to the attribute are unknown.

With interval scales, the rank ordering and the

distances among objects on an attribute are known. A ratio scale is an interval scale with
a rational zero. Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) noted that addressing the most common
problems o f scaling rarely requires ratio scales. Although defining an interval can be
important, ordering is the most crucial concept.
A summated scale measure is a collection o f multiple, equally w eighted items
intended to reveal the levels o f theoretical variables not observable by direct means
(DeVillis. 1991; Spector. 1992). A summated scale may be either reflective or formative
(Black. 1997). In a reflective scale, such as the regulatory climate scale developed in this
chapter, the items which comprise the scale are "effect indicators” whose values are caused
by the latent variable. The strength o f the latent variable is presumed to cause the set o f
items to take on a certain value. The causality (represented by the direction o f arrows in a
path diagram) is from the latent variable toward the underlying dimensions represented by
the items.
A formative scale, called an index, consists o f items which are “cause indicators”
that determine the level o f the latent variable. The direction o f path diagram arrows in an
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index is from the scale items toward the latent variable (Bollen and Lennox, 1991; DeVillis,
1991).
The causal relationship described above between a latent variable and the reflective
scale items implies specific empirical relationships. If an item value is caused by the latent
variable, then that item value and the true score o f the latent variable should correlate. The
latent variable can also be invoked as the basis for correlations am ong items, and that
information can be used to infer how highly each item was correlated with the latent
variable (DeVillis, 1991).

Theory Underlying Scale Measures
Classical test theory provides the underlying rationale for sum m ated scale measures.
The theoretical value that a subject has on a variable o f interest is the subject’s true score,
while the observed score is the score actually derived from the m easurem ent process. The
true score cannot be directly observed, and so is inferred from the observed score. Each
individual item is designed to be an observation o f the latent variable, with each item
representing an individual assessment o f the true score (DeVillis, 1991; Spector, 1992).
According to classical test theory, the observed score is com prised o f three
components: the true score, random measurement error, and bias. T hat is:
O = T + E + B

(4.1)

where O is the observed score, T is the true score, E is random m easurem ent error, and B
is bias. Measurement errors, because they are random, are assum ed to have a population
mean o f zero. These measurement errors are inversely related to reliability. Bias consists
o f systematic influences on observed scores that do not reflect the true score.
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Bias

represents alternative latent variables that influenced observed scores. Validation o f a scale
is essential to demonstrate that the scale measures what was intended, rather than bias
(Spector, 1992).
Classical test theory, as described by DeVillis (1991), starts with three basic
assumptions about items and their relationships to the latent variable and sources o f error.
First, the amount o f error associated with individual items varies randomly. Second, item
error terms are not correlated with one another. Third, error terms are not correlated with
the true score o f the latent variable. This third assumption am ounts to defining error as the
residual after considering all relationships between a set o f items and their latent variable.

Theoretical Measurement Models
There are four types o f measurement models consistent with classical test theory
which are used in developing scales: the model o f parallel tests, the tau-equivalent tests
model, the congeneric model, and the general factor model. In its most orthodox form,
classical test theory is based on the assumption o f parallel tests, where each individual item
is viewed as a test for the value o f the latent variable. The most stringent of the three
models, the parallel test model is based on the underlying rationale that each scale item is
precisely as good a measure o f the latent variable as any other scale item. Thus, individual
items are strictly parallel. The parallel tests model adds two assumptions to the three
classical test theory assumptions described earlier. The am ount o f influence from the latent
variable to each item is assumed to be the same for all items, and each item is assumed to
have the same amount o f error as any other item. These two added assumptions mean that
the correlation o f each item with the true score is identical, and implies that correlations
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among items are identical and the items all have equal means and equal variances (DeVillis,
1991).
The tau-equivalent tests model relaxes the assumption that the error variances
associated with each item are equal. Items are still parallel in terms o f how much they are
influenced by the latent variable, but are not necessarily influenced to the same extent by
extraneous factors. Because errors can vary, item means and variances can vary (DeVillis,
1991).
The congeneric model, which is the most common scale measurement model in
social sciences, is based upon an even more relaxed set o f assumptions. Beyond the three
basic classical test theory assumptions, the congeneric model merely assumes that all scale
items share a common latent variable, and that each item reflects the true score to some
degree. The relationship between each item and the latent variable m ust be statistically
significant, but the items need not have equal relationships to the latent variable, and error
variances need not be equal.
The congeneric model is a special case o f the general factor model, a more liberal
approach which does not assume that only one latent variable is the source o f all
covariation among the scale items. Instead, the general factor model allows multiple latent
variables to underlie a set o f items. The general factor model attempts to determine
whether a set of items has one or many latent variables underlying them. With the general
factor model, a construct o f interest can be operationalized at multiple levels o f specificity.
Each level could subsume those that follow, allowing the possible development o f scale
measures at each level of specificity (DeVillis, 1991).

98

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Scale Development Procedure
The scale development process, as described by Churchill (1979), DeVillis (1991),
and Spector (1992) consists o f six steps: (1) construct definition and construct domain
specification, (2) generation o f an initial item pool, (3) determ ination o f measure structure,
(4) reliability assessment and item analysis, (5) confirmatory factor analysis, and (6)
validity assessment. In practice, steps 3 and 4 are performed simultaneously in an iterative
fashion.

Construct Definition and Construct Domain Specification
Defining the construct, or latent variable, can be the m ost difficult pan o f scale
development. The nature o f the construct o f interest must be carefully and specifically
delineated. A construct only takes on meaning as part o f a broader network that describes
relationships among many constructs. Substantive theories related to the construct being
measured play an important role in conceptualizing the construct and should always be
considered before trying to operationalize the construct. At the very least, a tentative
theoretical model should be specified to serve as a guide to scale developm ent (DeVillis,
1991; Spector, 1992).
The conceptual effort begins with a general definition o f the construct, and then
moves to specifics. A literature review typically serves as the starting point for construct
definition, with prior conceptual definitions and uses providing the initial definitional
foundation. The review is then broadened to encompass related constructs to articulate the
target construct’s conceptual boundaries (Clark and Watson, 1995; Spector, 1992).
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Once the construct has been defined, the construct domain or dimensionality is
conceptualized. Constructs can range from being highly specific to being multidimensional,
with several underlying dimensions. The conceptual specification o f the dimensions o f the
construct must be as exact as possible. Recurring issues and themes that have appeared
when theorists have defined the construct o f interest should be identified through a review
o f the literature. Ultimately, the decision on how finely to subdivide a construct must be
based on both theoretical and empirical utility. Subdividing is indicated when subdividing
adds to the explanatory power o f a theory and can be supported empirically (Churchill,
1979; Spector. 1992).

Generation of an Initial Item Pool
The creation o f the initial item pool is a critical step in scale construction. The scale
items that comprise the initial item pool are observed variables that represent the latent
variable’s underlying domains. The fundamental goal is to systematically sample all
content that is relevant to the latent variable (Clark and Watson, 1995). The content o f each
item can be generated by the researcher or culled from research relating to the latent
variable. Items should be scaled in the same direction, and each item should give an
indication o f the strength o f the latent variable. A high score should represent a high level
o f the latent variable, and a low score should represent a low level (DeVillis. 1991).
Number o f Items
Multiple items should be identified to capture each o f the dimensions o f the
construct o f interest. Many measured dimensions o f a latent variable are broad in scope and
not easily assessed with a single item. Scale precision increases with multiple items.
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Single item scales are imprecise because they restrict measurement to only two levels. A
multiple item scale is also more reliable than a single item scale; multiple items improve
reliability by allowing random errors o f measurement to average out (Churchill, 1979;
Spector, 1992).
Since the internal consistency reliability o f a scale varies as a function o f the
num ber o f items, having many items in the initial item pool helps assure internal
consistency. DeVillis (1991) noted that it is not unusual to have an initial item pool that
is three or four times as large as the final scale. However, the initial item pool may be as
small as 50 percent larger than the final scale if items are particularly difficult to generate
for a given content area or if empirical data indicate that numerous items are not necessary
to achieve good internal consistency.

Item Format
Numerous formats for scale items exist, and to assure compatibility, the
determination o f the format should take place simultaneously with the generation o f items.
Classical test theory and the theoretical measurement models presented earlier in this
chapter are more consistent with certain response formats. In general, scales consisting o f
items which are scorable on some continuum and which are summated to form a scale score
are most compatible with classical test theory (DeVillis, 1991).
Scale items typically consist o f two parts, a stem and a series o f response options.
The stem may be a question or a declarative statement expressing an opinion. The response
options accompanying each stem may be possible answers to the stem question or
descriptors indicating the strength o f agreement or disagreement with the stem statement.

101

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The first issue to be decided in constructing response options is the nature o f the responses.
According to Spector (1992), the three most common responses are agreement, evaluation,
and frequency. Agreement requests that subjects indicate the extent to which they agree
with the item stem. Evaluation asks for an evaluative rating for each item stem, and
frequency asks for a judgm ent o f how often each item has occurred (DeVillis, 1991;
Spector, 1992).
How many response options should be available for each stem? Variability is a
desirable quality of a scale. If a scale lacks enough variability to discriminate differences
in the underlying construct, correlations o f the scale with other measures will be restricted
and the scale's utility will be limited. Many scale items and numerous response options
within items will both increase variability. Another consideration in selecting the number
o f response options is the respondent's ability to discrim inate meaningfully between
response options. Items which limit response options to an obvious continuum o f
unambiguous choices, ordered from low to high with numbers assigned to each response
choice, seem to work best for developing summated scales (DeVillis, 1991; Spector. 1992).

Specific Types of Response Formats
Although there are a wide variety o f scale item response formats, several ways to
present items, reviewed by DeVillis (1991), are widely used and have been proven
successful in diverse scaling applications. These include the semantic differential method,
the Likert scale method, and binary responses. The semantic differential scale method is
chiefly associated with attitude research, typically in reference to one or more stimuli.
Identification of the target stimulus is followed by a list o f bipolar adjective pairs
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representing opposite ends o f a continuum defined by the adjectives. The respondent
identifies the point along the continuum which characterizes the stimulus (DeVillis. 1991).
The Likert scale method is widely used in scales measuring opinions, beliefs and
attitudes. With the Likert scale method, the stem item is presented as a declarative sentence,
followed by response options w hich indicate varying degrees o f agreement or endorsement
o f the statement. Response options are worded to have roughly equal intervals with respect
to agreement, forming a continuum from strong disagreement to strong agreement.
The binary options format, also called dichotomous choice, gives subjects a choice
between two options for each item. For example, subjects might be asked to answer "ves"
or "no" to a list o f items sharing a common latent variable. According to DeVillis (1991.
pg. 73), "A major shortcoming o f binary responses is that each item can have only one o f
two levels o f covariation: agreement or disagreement." Since the variance o f a sum m ated
scale is equal to the sum o f all the elem ents in the covariance matrix for the individual
items, each item o f a binary response contributes little to that sum because o f the limitations
in possible variances and covariances (DeVillis, 1991). Binary items do have one m ajor
advantage: they are extremely easy to answer, since the burden placed on the subject is very'
low for any one item. Subjects are often willing to complete more binary items than they
would be willing to complete if the items used a format demanding concentration on finer
distinctions (DeVillis, 1991).

Determination of Measure Structure
Once the first two steps in the scale development process described above are
completed, a measurement model is proposed which shows the hypothesized relationship
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between a latent (unobserved) variable and its underlying dim ensions, as represented by the
observed variables selected from the item pool. The m easurement model, usually displayed
as a path diagram, forms an operational definition o f the latent variable from the theoretical
definitions (Floyd and W idam an, 1995; Hoyle and Smith, 1994). The path diagram can
help show how scale items are causally related to the latent variable, and can also help
understand how relationships am ong scale items imply relationships between items and the
latent variable (DeVillis, 1991).
In this research, the latent construct o f interest, state regulatory climate, represents
the degree of regulatory stringency. Since regulation is conceptually viewed as an
attenuation of private property rights, four property rights conditions (ownership,
specification, transferability, and enforcement) are hypothesized to serve as underlying
domains. Regulations which attenuate the four property rights conditions serve as observed
indicator variables. The intensity o f regulatory climate determines the level o f property
rights attenuation. Thus, the regulatory climate scale is conceptualized as a reflective scale,
with scale items as effect indicators o f regulatory climate. A path diagram illustrating the
proposed congeneric measurement model for state regulatory clim ate is shown in Figure
4.1.

Exploratory Factor Analysis
Preliminary determ ination o f the scale’s structure is accomplished through
exploratory factor analysis.

Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical method used to

analyze the structure o f the correlations among a large number o f variables in a data matrix
by defining a set o f common underlying dimensions, or factors. Exploratory factor analysis
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Figure 4.1 Proposed Regulatory Climate Measurement Model

has three purposes.

First, it determines how many factors underlie the set o f items.

Second, it condenses information by correlating items. Third, factor analysis defines the
substantive content or meaning o f the factors. The overall goal o f factor analysis is to
maximize the variance explained by the measure while minimizing the number o f factors
and scale items (Crocker and Algina, 1986; DeVillis, 1991; Hair et al., 1995; McDonald,
1981; Nunnallv and Bernstein, 1994).
The factor analysis mathematical model, as described by N orusis (1994), appears
similar to a multiple regression equation, with the independent variables in multiple
regression analysis replaced by groups o f variables that characterize unobserved factors.
Each variable is expressed as a linear combination o f unobserved factors. In general, the
factor model for the /th standardized variable is given by;
x ,\ = A ,\F \ +

+ - + A tkFk + U,

(4.2)

where the F s are the common factors, U is the unique factor analogous to the error term
in regression analysis, and the A 's are the coefficients used to combine the k factors.
The factors, which are inferred from the observed variables, can be estimated as
linear combinations o f the variables. The general expression for Fr the estimate o f the /th
factor is:
F, = WlXX, - lVl2X2 + ... + I V , ^

(4.3)

where the IF/s are the factor score coefficients, and p is the number o f variables (Norusis.
1994).
Exploratory factor analysis is accomplished through a three-step process. The first
step is designing the factor analysis, and consists o f computing the correlation matrix for
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all the variables. The second step, factor extraction, consists o f determ ining the number
o f factors necessary to represent the data and the method for calculating them. The final
step, interpretation o f the factors, includes factor rotation and exam ination o f factor
loadings and the factor matrix (Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).

Designing the Factor Analysis
Factor analysis design requires three key decisions: the num ber o f variables and
their measurement properties, the necessary sample size, and calculation o f the correlation
matrix which is the input data (Hair, et al., 1995). Variables used for factor analysis are
generally assumed to be metric.

Non-m etric variables such as dichotom ous choice

variables can be used, but the limited variance in dichotomous choice variables may
negatively affect factor analysis results. Several key variables w hich are theorized to
closely reflect the underlying factors should be identified, and may serve as marker
variables for interpretation o f factors. The number o f variables to be used also affects the
sample size necessary to obtain factor analytic results. The general rule, stated by Hair, et
al. (1995, p. 373) is that “the minimum is to have at least five times as m any observations
as there are variables to be analyzed, and the more acceptable range would be a ten-to-one
ratio."
Two o f the key underlying statistical assumptions o f factor analysis are that data
have been gathered from independent observations and that the same process that describes
variables’ influences on each other is operating in every' observation. These two basic
statistical assumptions, typically known as “i.i.d.” or '‘independent and identically
distributed observations,” assume that the processes underlying the model are homogenous
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across all observations (Bentler and Chou. 1987; Black, 1997). If process differences for
identifiable subpopulations are suspected, it is appropriate to perform the analysis
separately in these populations. The homogeneity assumption can be evaluated in part by
a multiple-group or multiple population model (Bentler and Chou, 1987).
The factor analysis begins with the computation o f the correlation matrix for all
variables, based upon the Pearson product-moment correlation (r) o f two continuous
distributions. The sign and size o f r denote the direction and degree o f relationship between
two variables. The use o f r requires that certain assumptions be met. First, the relationship
between two variables should be essentially monotonic and preferably linear. Second, the
relationship must be homoscedastic. Finally, the errors affecting each o f the variables must
be normally distributed. These three assumptions: linearity, hom oscedasticity. and
normality are important in interpreting correlation results. When the Pearson productmoment correlation is used in analysis, there will be no real problem unless these three
assumptions are seriously violated. Differences in the distribution shapes o f the variables
will restrict the size of the correlation. These effects will be slight with continuous
variables, but can be quite large with categorical variables, especially when they are
dichotomous (Nunnally and Bem stein, 1994). For this reason, factor analysis results for
dichotomous or ordinal variables with few categories should be viewed with caution and
as strictly exploratory.
In addition to the above statistical assumptions for the data correlation matrix, the
matrix must have enough correlations to justify the use o f factor analysis (Hair, et al.,
1995). For factor analysis to be appropriate, there should be a substantial num ber of
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correlations greater than 0.30. The Bartlett test o f sphericity, a statistical test for the
presence o f correlations among the variables, estimates the statistical probability that the
correlation matrix has significant correlations by testing the hypotheses that the correlation
matrix is an identity matrix, with all diagonal terms equal to 1 and all off-diagonal terms
equal to 0. The value o f the sphericity test statistic is based on a chi-square transformation
o f the determinant o f the correlation matrix. If the hypothesis that the correlation matrix
is an identity cannot be rejected because the observed statistical significance level is large,
the use o f factor analysis should be reconsidered (Norusis, 1994).
Another measure o f the degree o f the appropriateness o f factor analysis is the
Kaiser-M eyer-Olkin (KMO) measure o f sampling adequacy, an index for comparing the
magnitudes o f the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes o f the partial
correlation coefficients. The index ranges from zero to one. Small values for the KMO
measure, below the 0.5 level, are unacceptable and indicate that correlations between pairs
of variables cannot be explained by the other variables and factor analysis may be
inappropriate (Hair, et al., 1995: Norusis. 1994).

Factor Extraction
The process o f factor extraction involves determining the underlying latent variables
(factors) that can account for the patterns o f correlation (DeVillis, 1991). Two basic
methods, described by Hair et al. (1995) and Norusis (1994), are commonly used to obtain
factor solutions: principal components analysis or common factor analysis, also called
principal axis factoring. In principal components analysis, linear combinations o f the
observed variables are formed. Unities are inserted in the diagonal o f the correlation
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matrix. As a result, the total variance in the matrix is considered in the factor matrix. The
first principal component is the factor that accounts for the largest amount o f variance in
the data.
Common factor analysis proceeds in the same manner as principal com ponents
analysis, except that correlation matrix diagonals are replaced with estimates o f variable
communalities, the proportion o f shared, or common, variance among the variables. Thus,
factors obtained from common factor analysis are based only on the common variance.
Com m on factor analysis suffers from the problem o f factor indeterminacy. There is no
unique solution, since several different factor scores can be calculated from the factor
model results (Hair, et al.. 1995: Norusis. 1994).
The choice o f which factoring method to use depends on the objective o f the
researcher, but the problems inherent in common factor analysis have contributed to
widespread use and popularity o f principal components analysis. When the researcher is
concerned with identifying the minimum number o f factors needed to account for the
maximum proportion o f the variance in the data matrix, the principal components model
is most appropriate. Both o f the factor extraction methods give essentially identical results,
in most cases, if the communalities exceed 0.60 for most variables (Hair, et al., 1995).

Number of Factors Extracted
Once the extraction method has been determined, the initial unrotated factors are
extracted. Examination o f the unrotated factor matrix can provide a preliminary' estimate
o f the number o f factors which should be extracted. Several guidelines have been
developed to determine the number o f factors to extract. In practice, one rarely relies on one
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criterion; instead, m ultiple criteria are examined over the course o f several trial analyses
to arrive at the best representation o f the data to use in determining the number o f factors
to extract (Hair, et al., 1995). Four widely used criteria: the a priori criterion. K aiser’s
eigenvalue rule, C attell’s scree test, and the percentage o f variance criterion are briefly
discussed in the following paragraphs.
The a priori criterion is used when the analyst has prior knowledge about the
number o f factors to extract. Analysis is stopped when the desired number o f factors has
been extracted. The a priori criterion approach is useful when testing theory about the
number o f factors (Hair, et al.. 1995).
K aiser’s eigenvalue rule, also called the latent root criterion, is the most com m only
used extraction technique. The eigenvalue is the sum o f squared loadings for a factor, and
represents the am ount o f variance accounted for by a factor. The total variance is the sum
o f the variance o f each variable. All variables are expressed in standardized form, w ith a
mean o f 0 and a standard deviation and variance o f one. The eigenvalue rule is based on
retaining only factors that explain more variance than the average variance explained by
one o f the original items. Only those factors having eigenvalues greater than one are
considered significant. The eigenvalue rule is most reliable when the number o f variables
is between 20 and 50. When there are less than 20 variables, the eigenvalue rule tends to
extract too few factors (DeVillis, 1991; Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).
C attell’s scree test is used to determine the number o f factors that can be extracted
before the am ount o f unique variance begins to dominate the common variance. The scree
plot is a plot o f the total variance associated with each factor, and is developing by plotting
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the eigenvalues on the vertical axis and a horizontal axis corresponding to successive
factors, in their order o f extraction. The plot, which bears a physical resemblance to the
profile o f a hillside, shows a distinct break, or "elbow" between the steep slope o f the large
factors and the gradual trailing o ff o f the eigenvalues for the later factors. The portion o f
the plot beyond the elbow corresponds to the rubble, or scree, that gathers at the base o f a
hillside. C attelfs guidelines suggest retaining factors above the elbow and rejecting factors
below the elbow. As a general rule, C attelfs scree test results in at least one more factor
being considered significant than does the eigenvalue rule (DeVillis, 1991: Hair, et al..
1995: Norusis. 1994).
The percentage o f variance criterion uses the cumulative percentages o f the variance
extracted by successive factors as the criterion. Although no absolute threshold has been
adopted, in the social sciences it is common to consider a solution that accounts for 60
percent o f the total variance as a satisfactory factor extraction solution (Hair, et al., 1995).

Interpretation of the Factors
Once the initial factor analysis has been performed and the number o f factors has
been extracted from the correlation matrix, the nature o f the latent variables (factors)
underlying the set o f variables in the matrix must be interpreted. It is often difficult to
identify meaningful factors based upon the initial solution, since the variables and factors
often do not appear correlated in any interpretable pattern (Norusis, 1994).

Factor Rotation
The rotation o f factors is an important tool in interpreting factors. Rotation attempts
to transform a complicated initial matrix into a simpler one that is easier to interpret, thus
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reducing some o f the ambiguities which accompany the initial analysis. With factor
rotation, the reference axes o f the factors are turned about the origin until another position
has been reached (Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).
In orthogonal rotation, the simplest type o f rotation, the axes are kept perpendicular
with respect to one another. The independence o f factors is preserved w ith orthogonal
rotation; factors are uncorrelated. The true value o f a variable on any given factor is
independent o f its true value on any other extracted factor (DeVillis, 1991). Varimax, the
definitive orthogonal rotation method, approaches rotation by m axim izing the sum o f
variances o f squared structure elements in the columns o f the factor structure matrix.
Before computing the variance o f the column squared structure elem ents, the squared
elements in each row are divided by the sum o f squares to normalize the variables. This
makes the variables equally important in determining the rotated solution (Nunnally and
Bernstein, 1994).
Alternatively, the factors can be rotated so that the axis for each successive factor
is fitted optimally, without retaining the 90-degree angle between the reference axes. This
type o f rotation, called oblique rotation, is more flexible than orthogonal rotation and more
realistic because the important underlying factors are not assumed to be uncorrelated with
each other. Instead o f maintaining independence between the rotated factors, oblique
rotation allows correlated factors (DeVillis, 1991; Hair, et al., 1995).
According to Norusis (1994), rotation does not affect a factor solution's goodness
o f fit. The factor matrix changes, but the communalities and the percentage o f total
variance explained do not change. The percentage of variance accounted for by each o f the
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factors does change, because rotation redistributes individual factors’ explained variance.
Different rotation methods may identify som ew hat different factors.
Hair, et al. (1995) suggested that the choice between an orthogonal or oblique
rotation should be based on research needs. An orthogonal solution is best if the researcher
wants to reduce the number o f original variables, regardless o f the meaningfulness o f the
resulting factors, or if the researcher wants to reduce a large number o f variables into a
smaller set o f uncorrelated variables for subsequent use in regression analysis or other
prediction technique. An oblique rotation is m ost appropriate if the goal is to obtain several
theoretically meaningful factors.

Factor Loadings and the Factor Matrix
The final result o f factor analysis is a rotated factor loading matrix with the
identified factors as columns and the variables as rows. The factor loadings are the
standardized regression coefficients in a m ultiple regression equation where the original
variable is the dependent variable and the factors are independent variables. When the
estimated factors are uncorrelated (orthogonal) with each other, the factor loadings are also
the correlation between the original variables and the factors. Squared factor loadings
indicate what percentage o f the variance in an original variable is explained by a factor.
The statistical significant o f factor loadings is determined by the desired significance level
(a), power level, and sample size (Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).
Several guidelines have been developed to assist in the interpretation o f factor
loadings. First, the larger the absolute size o f a factor loading, the more important the
loading in interpreting the factor. A rule o f thum b is that factor loadings greater than +/-
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0.30 are minimally acceptable, loadings of +/- 0.40 are more important, and loading over
+/- 0.50 have practical significance. Second, the statistical power concept can be employed
to specify significant factor loadings for differing sample sizes. The larger the sam ple size,
the sm aller the loading to be considered significant. Finally, the number o f variables being
analyzed and the number o f factors extracted both play a role in determining the acceptable
level for a loading to be judged significant. The larger the num ber o f variables in the
analysis, the smaller the loading to be considered significant. The larger the num ber o f
factors, the larger the loading on later factors to be considered significant. Based on a .05
significance level, a power level o f 80 percent, and standard errors assumed to be twice
those o f conventional correlations, factor loadings above .45 are considered significant for
a sample size o f 150 observations, while factor loadings above .40 are considered
significant for a sample size o f 200 observations (Hair, et al., 1995).
A fter the factor loadings have been examined to determine the significant factor
loadings for each variable, the researcher attempts to assign meaning to the pattern o f factor
loadings. According to Hair, et al. (1995. p. 366), factor loadings "are the key to
understanding the nature o f a particular factor.” A factor may be defined by the variables
that load most heavily on the factor. The content o f the variables loading on a factor can
help discern the nature o f the latent variable represented by each factor. For each extracted
factor, a label is intuitively developed based on its appropriateness for representing the
underlying dimensions o f the factor (DeVillis, 1991; Hair, et al., 1995).
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Item Analysis and Scale Reliability Assessment
The purpose of item analysis and reliability assessment is to "purify” the measure
by discarding non-representative, poorly correlated items and, thus, reduce the number o f
items. The goal is to produce a tentative scale, ready for validation, consisting o f items
which have a high correlation with the true score o f the latent variable (DeVillis, 1991;
Spector. 1992). Although item analysis and reliability assessment are described separately,
the two processes are performed together.

Item Analysis
Item analysis provides information on how well each individual item relates to the
other items in a scale. The correlation between any two items equals the square o f the
correlation between either item and the true score. The correlations among items provides
information about relationships to true scores. The higher the correlations among items,
the higher are the individual item reliabilities and the more reliable will be the scale. Item
analysis seeks to find a set o f scale items that are highly intercorrelated (DeVillis. 1991).
The item analysis process involves examination o f the communality and the rotated
factor matrix. The factor analysis solution is the starting point for item (variable) analysis.
Communalities, which are provided for each item, should be evaluated to determine
whether they meet acceptable levels. Communalties can range from 0 to 1. A communality
o f 0 indicates that the common factors explain none o f the variable's variance, while a 1
indicates that all the variance is explained by the common factors. For any scale items with
communalities less than 0.50, the common factors do not account for at least one-half o f
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the items' variance, and the item should be considered for deletion if the item is only o f
minor theoretical importance (Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).
The rotated factor matrix also provides useful information for item analysis. Any
items which do not load on any factor should be evaluated for possible deletion. Items o f
minor importance may be eliminated, and the factor model respecified by deriving a new
factor solution with non-loading items eliminated. Items with significant loadings on more
than one factor should also be examined and considered for deletion. Ideally, each item
should associate with only one factor (Hair, et al.. 1995).

Reliability Assessment
A ccording to Schriesheim. et al. (1993. p. 393), "The reliability o f a scale is a
situational indicator o f the effectiveness o f the instrument and it m ust be demonstrated a
posteriori for every sample to which it is administered.” Reliability is a variance ratio equal
to the true score variance divided by the total variance o f the scores.

As discussed

previously, classical test theory states that an observed scale score is composed o f two
components, the true score and an error score, with measurement error uncorrelated with
the true contribution to the score. Since the true score and error score cannot be observed
directly, it is impossible to now the exact value o f a scale’s reliability. Researchers use
reliability coefficients which represent approximations o f true scale reliability (M iller.
1995).
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, the most commonly used reliability coefficient,
assesses the internal consistency o f a scale. Churchill (1979) asserted that coefficient alpha
should be the first measure calculated to assess the quality o f a scale. Coefficient alpha is
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the proportion o f a scale’s total variance attributable to the true score o f the latent variable
underlying the scale items. The square root o f coefficient alpha is the estim ated correlation
o f the test with errorless true scores. Coefficient alpha is com puted by the formula:
V

a

=

k - 1

1-

“.

^a}

(4.4)

)

where k is the number o f items in the scale (Crocker and Algina. 1986; Nunnally and
Bernstein, 1994).
The value o f coefficient alpha, which can be used for any scale on which scores are
produced by summing the scores o f two or more items, is a direct function o f both the
number o f items and the magnitude o f their intercorrelation. The coefficient alpha can be
raised by increasing the number o f items in the scale. Coefficient alpha can range between
0 - 1, with values above .70 generally considered good. In exploratory scale development.
.60 is acceptable (DeVillis, 1991; Hair, et al.. 1995; Spector, 1992).
Miller (1995) noted that a computed coefficient alpha only equals the scale
reliability under the assumption that all pairs o f items are tau-equivalent (see previously
described theoretical measurement models section). This assum ption states that all items
have equal loadings on a single common factor with their unique variances composed
entirely o f error. When the tau-equivalence assumption is violated, alpha tends to
underestimate test reliability.

M iller (1995) concluded that alpha is a lower-bound

approximation to test reliability for scales designed to measure a single trait dimension.
However, alpha has little value as an index o f scale dim ensionality, and can badly
underestimate reliability if the scale is not unidimensional.
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Reliability assessment also involves examining information about the relationship
between the individual items and the composite scale. Two reliability assessment outputs
are useful for examining this relationship: item-total correlation, and alpha-if-item-deleted.
Since the goal o f scale development is a set o f highly inter-correlated items, each
item should correlate substantially with the set o f remaining scale items. This property for
each item is evaluated by examining its item-total scale correlation. The corrected itemtotal scale correlation, which is the Pearson correlation coefficient between the score on the
individual item and the sum o f the scores on the remaining items, correlates the item with
all the scale items, excluding itself. An item with a high corrected item-total scale
correlation is more desirable than an item with a low value (DeVillis, 1991, Norusis. 1994).
It is useful to know how each item in a scale affects the internal consistency o f the
scale. The '‘alpha if item deleted” indicates the effect that deleting an item will have on the
scale's coefficient alpha. If deletion o f an item will significantly raise the value o f the
coefficient alpha, then that item should be considered for deletion if the item is not
theoretically important (DeVillis. 1991; Norusis. 1994).

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis, a special case o f structural equation modeling, is used
to confirm hypothesized factor structures and validate the dimensional structure o f the scale
measure.

A factor structure is explicitly hypothesized and tested for its fit with the

observed covariance structure o f the measured variables (Floyd and W idaman, 1995).
Confirmatory factor analysis can also be used to revise and refine scales and their structure.
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The Structural Equation Modeling Concent
Structural equation modeling (SEM ) is a comprehensive, multivariate statistical
technique for testing hypotheses about relationships among observed and latent variables.
A key characteristic o f SEM is its ability to represent unobserved, latent variables in these
relationships.

SEM combines aspects o f multiple regression for examining linear

dependence relationships and factor analysis for representing latent variables with multiple
observed variables.

SEM allows multiple latent constructs indicated by observable

explanatory (or exogenous) variables, recursive and non-recursive relationships between
constructs, and multiple latent constructs indicated by observable responses (or
endogenous) variables. SEM represents an efficient technique for estimating a series of
separate, interdependent multiple regression equations simultaneously, while accounting
for measurement error in the estimation process (Hair, et al.. 1995; Hoyle. 1995; Joreskog
and Sorbom, 1996a).
A structural equation model consists o f two basic components (submodels), the
measurement model and the structural model. The measurement model, which specifies
the rules o f correspondence between observed and latent variables, allows the use o f several
observed variables (indicators) for a single independent or dependent variable. The
measurement model specifies the indicators for each construct and describes the
measurement properties (reliabilities and validities) o f each observed variable for
estimating the causal relationships (Hair, et al., 1995; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a). For
example, in scale development, the measurement model assesses the contribution o f each
scale item and can incorporate the scale's reliability into the estimation o f the relationships
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between dependent and independent variables. Although similar to factor analysis, the
measurement model differs from factor analysis in the degree o f research control. In the
measurement model, the researcher specifies which variables are indicators o f each
construct, with variables having no loadings on any construct other than the specified
construct (Hair, et al., 1995).
The structural, or path model, is useful in representing interrelationships o f
variables between dependence relationships. The structural model specifies causal
relationships among the latent variables, describes the causal effects, and assigns the
explained and unexplained variances. Theory is used to determine which independent
variables should predict each dependent variable (Hair, et al., 1995; Joreskog and Sorbom,
1996a).
SEM requires a theory-based approach, since the models must be almost completely
specified by the researcher. "Each component o f the structural and m easurem ent models
must be explicitly defined. Moreover, any model modifications m ust be made through
specific actions by the researcher’' (Hair, et al., 1995; p. 625). For this reason, confirmatory
modeling, where the researcher specifies a single model and structural equation modeling
is used to assess its significance, is the most direct application o f structural equation
modeling. Confirmatory factor analysis is especially helpful in the validation o f scales
developed to measure specific latent constructs (Hair, et al., 1995).
Confirmatory factor analysis through structural equation modeling is accom plished
through a series o f steps, described by Hair, et al. (1995). First, a theoretically based model
is developed. Next, a set o f structural and measurement equations is specified. Third, the
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input matrix type is chosen. The model is then estimated, and finally, the results are
evaluated for goodness-of-fit. Potential problems in estimation are introduced when the
observed variables are not multivariate normal.

This can occur when the observed

variables are continuous but nonnormal, dichotomous, or ordered categories. These
problems can be accounted for by changing the correlation coefficients and adjusting the
estim ation procedure (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; West, Finch and Curran, 1995).

Developing the Structural Equation Model
The structural equation model, based on causal relationships between variables, is
developed from a path diagram which portrays the relationships between the variables. The
objective is to model the relationships between variables, both latent (also called
constructs) and observed, with the smallest number o f theoretically justifiable paths or
correlations among variables. All variables are placed in one o f two classes: exogenous
or endogenous. Exogenous variables, also called source or independent variables, are not
caused or predicted by any other variables in the model.

Endogenous variables are

predicted by one or more other variables. Endogenous variables can predict other
endogenous variables, but an exogenous construct can only be causally related to
endogenous variables (Hair, et al.. 1995). A theoretical structural equations model path
diagram is shown in Figure 4.2.
Once all the causal relationships have been developed in the path diagram, an
estim ation model is specified in formal terms through a series o f equations that define the
measurement model by specifying which observed variables measure which latent
variables, the structural equations linking the latent variables, and a set o f matrices showing
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any hypothesized correlations among latent or observed variables. In developing the
structural equations, each endogenous variable is the dependent variable in a separate
equation (Hair, et al., 1995).
Using LISREL notation, a multi-factor, congeneric confirmatory measurement
model can be taken directly from Joreskog and Sorbom (1996a) as
x=

+6

(4.5)

where x is a vector o f q observed variables. £ is a vector o f n underlying factors such that
n<cj. A x is a q x n matrix o f coefficients relating to the regression o f the observed variables
x on the underlying factors £, and 6 is a vector o f q variables that represent random
measurement error and measure specificity. It is assumed that E(£) = 0 and E(8) = 0. and
5 is uncorrelated with £. The variance-covariance matrix for x. defined as Z . is
£ = A<I>A' + 0

(4.6)

if O = E(££') is taken as a correlation matrix and 0 = E(55') is diagonal. If (q-n)2< q+n,
this relationship can be tested statistically.
A confirmatory structural model which specifies the causal relations o f the latent
constructs to one another is given by Joreskog and Sorbom (1996a) as:
q = Bti + TE, + C

(4.7)

where q is a vector o f m endogenous constructs, E, is a vector o f n exogenous constructs,
B is an m x m matrix o f coefficients representing the effects o f the endogenous constructs
on one another, T is an m x n matrix o f coefficients representing the effects o f the
exogenous constructs on the endogenous constructs, and C is a vector o f m residuals (errors
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in equations and random disturbance terms (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). When B = 0,
the endogenous constructs are specified as uncorrelated and equation (4.7) reduces to

q = T$ + C

(4.8)

The distinction between endogenous and exogenous constructs was not relevant in
the confirmatory measurement model, where all observed variables were denoted as x. In
the specification o f structural models, observed variables of exogenous constructs are
denoted as x, while observed measures o f endogenous constructs are denoted as y. In
modeling a confirmatory structural equation model, the latent variables from the
measurement model become endogenous constructs, and the observed variables which were
denoted as x in the measurement model are denoted as y, and are described by a separate
measurement submodel, given as
y = A,, q + e

(4.9)

where y is a vector of p observed variables, q is a vector o f m latent dependent
(endogenous) variables, Av is a p x m matrix o f coefficients o f the regression o f y on q , and
e is a vector o f p measurement errors in y.
In confirmatory structural equation modeling, the structural subm odel (4.8) and the
measurement submodel for y given in (4.9) are estimated simultaneously by combining
equations (4.8) and (4.9) to give
y = Av(r$ + C) + e

(4.10)

with covariance matrix
£ = AV(T® n + 'P)AV' + 0 C
where Y is the residual covariance matrix (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a).
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(4.11)

Input Matrix Type
Unlike other multivariate techniques, structural equation m odeling only uses the
variance/covariance matrix or correlation matrix as the input data. Hair, et al. (1995; p.
636) note that the correlation matrix in SEM is “'sim ply a standardized variance/covariance
matrix in which the scale of measurement o f each variable is removed by dividing the
variances or covariances by the product o f the standard deviations.” The correlation matrix
is the preferred input data matrix in confirm atory factor analysis because the objective is
exploration o f the pattern of interrelationships between variables (Hair, et al., 1995). When
the observed variables to be analyzed by structural equation modeling are ordinal, without
an origin or unit o f measurement, correlation matrices are also the only meaningful moment
matrices (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996b).
As was the case in exploratory factor analysis, the Pearson product-moment
correlation is the most widely used means o f computing the correlation matrix between the
observed variables for structural equation modeling. However, the assumption o f metric
variables underlying the product-moment correlation makes it inappropriate for structural
equation modeling o f ordinal or censored observed variables. Bentler and Chou (1987)
suggested that methods which require continuous observed variables can be used when the
variables have four or more categories, but with three or fewer categories, alternative
procedures should be used.

Failure to use the right type o f correlations can lead to

considerable bias in estimated structural equation parameters. The polychoric correlation
is appropriate for use if the observed variables are ordinal with three or more categories
(Hair, et al.. 1995; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996b).
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The polychoric correlation is not a direct correlation between two sets o f ordinal
variable scores, but is an estimate o f the correlation in the latent bivariate normal
distribution representing the two ordinal variables. For each ordinal variable x . it is
assumed that there is a latent continuous variable £ that is normally distributed with a mean
o f zero and unit variance. A Monte Carlo study o f six correlation measures for ordinal
variables reported by Joreskog and Sorbom (1996b) concluded that: (1) all correlations are
biased downwards, but the bias for the polychoric correlation is small and negligible for
moderate sample sizes; (2) the polychoric correlation is generally the best estimator; (3) the
polychoric correlation is almost always the best correlation in the sense o f being closest to
the true population correlation (p): and (4) only the polychoric correlation appears to be a
consistent estimator o f p.

Model Estimation
Once the structural equation model has been specified and the input data correlation
matrix selected, the specified model is estimated. Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Hair,
et al. (1995) recommend a two-stage process o f structural equation modeling. The
confirmatory measurement model developed through the exploratory factor analysis is
estimated, respecified if necessary, and then fixed in the second stage when the respecified
confirmatory measurement and the confirmatory structural models are sim ultaneously
estimated.
The most widely used program for estimation o f structural equations is LISREL
(Linear Structural RELations) by SSI Scientific Software International.

LISREL can

perform any o f seven different methods o f estimation: instrumental variables (IV), two-
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stage least squares (TSLS), unweighted least squares (ULS), generalized least squares
(GLS), Maximum likelihood (ML), generally weighted least squares (WLS), and diagonally
weighted least squares (DWLS) (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a). For this research, the
generalized least squares (GLS) estimation was selected and will be described.
Generalized least squares (GLS) is a full-information, iterative procedure which
minimizes the fit function:
F=Vi*tr\QL- S ‘X):]

(4.12)

where /r[(I - S ' [£ ) 2] represents the sum o f squares o f the residuals weighted by the inverse
o f the sample covariance matrix. The covariance matrix S is computed from the correlation
matrix R using the formula
S=DRD,

where D = (d ia g S )''2

(4.13)

is a diagonal matrix o f standard deviations. The GLS fit function is equivalent to
minimizing the sum o f squares o f the residuals weighted by the inverse o f the sample
covariance matrix. For theory testing and development, full-information methods, such as
GLS. have several relative strengths. First, they provide parameter estimates that best
explain the observed covariances in the data matrix. They also provide the most efficient
parameter estimates and an overall test o f model fit (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988).
In order to begin estimation, the GLS estimation method requires approximations
to the parameters. These parameter starting values are computed in LISREL by Two Stage
Least Squares (TSLS). The GLS estimator is consistently efficient and has large-sample
standard errors under normal theory. GLS may be used to compute parameter estimates
even if the distribution o f the observed variables deviates from normality. The computed
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standard errors and chi-square goodness o f fit measures may also be used, if interpreted
cautiously (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a).
One commonly encountered problem in estimation is rejection o f the input matrix
because the matrix is not positive definite. Two reasons have been offered for this
occurrence. First, there may be linear dependencies among the observed variables. Second,
the input matrix may not be a covariance matrix o f real numbers, which will cause the
matrix to have one or more negative eigenvalues. This can occur if the polychoric or
tetrachoric correlations are used, rather than raw scores, in com puting the covariance
matrix. Negative eigenvalues can also occur when pairwise-deletion o f m issing values is
used to generate a covariance matrix (Bentler and Chou, 1987; Chou and Bentler. 1995).
To provide for situations in which the input matrix is not quite positive-definite, LISREL
includes a provision for “ridge” estimation. In “ridge” estim ation, a constant times the
diagonal o f the input matrix is added to the input matrix.

The constant is normally

determined by the program, but may be specified by the researcher (Joreskog and Sorbom,
1996).

Model Evaluation
The first step in evaluating a confirmatory structural equation model is an
examination o f the respecified measurement model and the structural model com ponents.
Evaluation begins by examining the models for offending estim ates and correcting them.
The most common types o f offending estimates are negative or nonsignificant error
variances for any variable, standardized coefficients exceeding 1.0, or very large standard
errors for any estimated coefficient. Evaluation also includes exam ining the significance
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o f estimated coefficients, based upon reported t values for each coefficient. In addition, the
standardized solution, where the estimated coefficients all have equal variances and a
maximum value o f 1 and closely approximate effect sizes shown by beta weights in
regression, should be examined.

The measurement m odel should also be examined to

assess the magnitude and significance o f estimated loadings for the observed variables.
The reliability for each latent variable can be assessed using Cronbaclvs alpha, composite
reliability, and variance extracted for each latent variable.
Once any offending estimates have been corrected, the next step is to evaluate the
m odel's goodness-of-fit.

W hen the model estimation procedure has converged to a

solution, a single number, the value o f the fitting function, is produced that summ arizes
the degree of correspondence between the observed covariance matrix and the covariance
matrix implied by the model. Different tests and measures are available to evaluate the
overall model fit. the measurement model fit. and the structural model fit. The different fit
measures vary in effectiveness as model estimation method, model complexity, and sample
size vary (Hair, et al., 1995; Hoyle, 1995).
Goodness-of-fit measures for assessing the overall model fit include absolute fit
measures, incremental fit measures, and parsimonious fit measures. Absolute fit measures
assess the overall fit o f the full model, including both the structural and measurement
models collectively. The M inimum Fit Function Chi-Square, the Goodness-of-Fit Index,
and the Root Mean Square Error o f Approximation (RM SEA) are commonly reported
overall fit measures. The M inimum Fit Function Chi-Square is the only statistically based
measure o f the goodness-of-fit available in structural equation modeling. A large value
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relative to the degrees o f freedom signifies considerable difference between the observed
and estimated matrices (Hair, et al., 1995). The G oodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) is a nonstatistical measure ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 representing a poor fit and 1 representing a
perfect fit. The GFI compares the squared residuals from prediction with the actual data,
but is not adjusted for degrees o f freedom.
The Root Mean Square Error o f Approximation (RM SEA) is a measure which
attempts to correct for the Chi-square statistic’s tendency to reject models with a large
sample. The RMSEA represents the model’s expected goodness-of-fit if the model were
estimated from the population, not just the sample. Values in the .05 to .08 range are
considered ideal, with a maximum acceptable value o f 0.10 (Hair, et al.. 1995).
Incremental goodness-of-fit measures assess the estimated structural equation model
compared to a null model. The Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), an extension o f
the GFI adjusted for the degrees o f freedom, the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI). the
Normed Fit Index (NFI). the Comparative Fit Index (CFI). and Incremental Fit Index (IFI).
all with a recommended level o f .90, are five popular incremental fit measures (Hair, et al..
1995).
Parsimonious fit measures assess the parsimony o f the estimated model by
evaluating the model fit versus the number o f estimated coefficients or degrees o f freedom
needed to achieve that level o f fit. An appropriate measures o f parsimonious fit is the
normed Chi-square (AVdf).

Normed Chi-square values in the 1.0 - 2.0 range are

recommended. Values below 1.0 are typical of overfitted models, while values above the
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upper threshold are not truly representative o f the observed data and need improvement
(Hair, et al., 1995).
Hu and Bentler (1995) noted three major problems w ith using Chi-square values
and fit indices for evaluating goodness-of-fit: small sample bias, estimation effects, and
effects o f violations o f normality and independence. Chi-square tests may not perform
adequately at all sample sizes. For example, the Normed Fit Index (NFI) tends to be far
less than 1.0 when sample size is small. Different estim ation methods yield chi-square
statistics that perform better or worse at various sample sizes. All goodness-of-fit indices
based on Chi-squares, used to evaluate results for non-normal variables estimated through
GLS should be interpreted with caution, since these test statistics may not have the chisquare distribution if the multivariate normal distribution assum ption is false. Results
depend on the model and the degree o f nonnormality (Chou and Bentler. 1995: Joreskog
and Sorbom, 1996a). In general, chi-squares are inflated, resulting in the rejection o f true
models (West, Finch and Curran, 1995). For example, the NFI based on GLS estimation
tends to over-reject models even at moderate sample sizes. The NonNormed Fit Index
(NNFI) based on GLS rejected models too frequently at sample sizes o f 500 or less. The
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) and the Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI) both
performed well under GLS estimation, at all sample sizes, when variables are distributed
independent o f each other, regardless o f the form o f the distribution o f the observed
variables (Hu and Bentler, 1995).
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Validity Assessment
Validity refers to the scientific utility o f a measuring instrument, i.e., how well it
measures what it purports to measure (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Reliability o f a
scale, described previously, is a necessary pre-condition for validity. Validity assessment,
as described by DeVillis (1991), Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), and Schriesheim, et al.
(1993). involves examining three types o f validity: content validity, predictive (criterion)
validity, and construct validity. Validation o f a scale alw ays requires empirical
investigations, with the nature o f the scale and form o f validity dictating the needed
empirical evidence.
Content validity is concerned with item sampling adequacy, the extent to which the
set o f items reflects the content domain. The establishment o f content validity can be
viewed as a minimum initial requirement for all new or previously unexamined measures.
There are two major standards for ensuring content validity: a representative collection o f
items and sensible methods o f scale construction. Theoretically, when a scale's items are
a randomly chosen subset o f the universe o f feasible items, a scale has content validity.
Content validity is also inferred from the manner in which a scale is constructed, and is
ensured by a well-formulated scale construction procedure. M ost content validity problems
appear to derive from shortcom ings in the scale construction or refinement process when
scales are developed w ithout adherence to the steps outlined above (DeVillis, 1991;
Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994; Schriesheim, 1993).
Predictive (criterion) validity evaluates the functional relations between the measure
and criterion variables, and concerns using the scale to estim ate some criterion behavior
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that is external to the scale itself. According to DeVillis (1991. pg. 45), "the most
important aspect o f criterion-related validity is not the tim e relationship between the
measure in question and the criterion whose value one is attempting to infer but, rather, the
strength o f the empirical relationship between the two events.” The correlation coefficient
has been the traditional index o f predictive validity. Once the criterion variable is obtained,
the validity o f prediction prim arily consists o f correlating scores on the predictor with the
criterion values. The size o f the correlation, commonly called the "validity coefficient”
directly indicates the predictive validity o f the scale. If the correlation is high, no other
standards are necessary (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).
Construct validity is concerned with the relationship o f a scale score to other
variables, and refers to the extent to which the measure behaves the way it should
(correlation) with regard to established measures o f other constructs (DeVillis. 1991;
Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Some researchers have argued there is only one type o f
validity, construct validity, and that both content and predictive validity are subsumed
within construct validity. Satisfactory demonstration o f both content validity and criterionrelated validity are necessary forjudging a measure as having reasonable construct validity
(Schriesheim, et al.. 1993). The most prevalent point o f view, as described by Nunnally
and Bernstein (1994) is that there are three major aspects o f construct validation: (1)
specifying the domain o f observables related to the construct; (2) using empirical research
and statistical analysis to determine the extent to which the observables tend to measure the
same, several different, or many different things; and (3) determining the extent to which
the supposed measure o f the construct is consistent with "best guesses” about the construct.
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This consists o f determining whether a scale measure o f a construct correlates in expected
ways with measures o f other constructs - how well the measure fits into a network o f
expected relationships, the "nomological network” (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).
Although construct validity usually stresses correlations among various measures,
but there is no simple correlation strength cutoff to demonstrate construct validity. Two
measures may share more than construct similarity. For example, some o f the covariation
between two constructs may be due to measurement similarity, rather than construct
similarity. To conclude construct validity, the magnitude o f correlations between the
constructs should, at a minimum, demonstrate covariance above and beyond that
attributable to shared method variance. Unfortunately, such a differentiation o f covariance
is not possible by simply examining a single correlation between two constructs (DeVillis.
1991).
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) contend that the comprehensive two-stage modeling
and estimation approach, discussed previously, enables a comprehensive, confirmatory
assessment o f construct validity. They assert that the measurement model provides a
confirmatory assessment o f convergent and discriminant validity. The test o f the structural
model, given acceptable convergent and discriminant validity, constitutes a confirmatory
assessment o f nomological validity (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988).
ICnown-groups validation, another construct validity

procedure,

involves

demonstrating that the scale can differentiate members o f one group from members o f
another group, based on their scale scores. The purpose may be either theory related or
purely predictive (DeVillis, 1991; Spector, 1992). Known-groups validation is closely
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related to the concept o f measure invariance between groups, which concerns the degree
to which a measure retains its meaning across groups. M easurem ent invariance can be
viewed as a continuum ranging from equivalence o f the measurement model form and all
parameters to nonequivalence o f form. To justify meaningful between-group comparisons
o f the means o f latent variables specified in the measurement model, between-group
invariance must be demonstrated in the number o f factors, the pattern o f factor loadings,
and the magnitude o f at least one factor loading per latent variable, and preferably all factor
loadings. If these conditions are met, then between-group com parisons can be undertaken,
using f-tests or Analysis o f Variance (ANOVA) (Hoyle and Sm ith, 1994).

Regulatory Climate Scale Estimation Results
This section describes the actual procedures used to develop and validate an
aquaculture regulatory climate summated scale. The scale developm ent and validation
process closely followed the six-step scale development procedure outlined previously.

Initial Item Pool
The initial item pool consisted o f 18 dichotomous choice items reflecting the
existence and stringency o f state regulatory conditions attenuating each o f the four property
rights dimensions. For example, ownership rights can be affected by possession permit
requirements and definitions specifying legal status as wildlife, private property, and/or
livestock. Transferability can be represented by regulations affecting transportation and
marketing, such as marketing restrictions, marketing paper trails, and transportation health
certifications.
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These 18 items were obtained from a 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program
Survey and a follow-up 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire. Forty-five states and Guam
participated in the surveys and provided answers for five categories o f finfish. including
ornamentals, baitfish, commercial foodflsh, freshwater gamefish and marine gametish,
resulting in 230 observations. Table 4.1 describes the 18 items which constituted the initial
item pool, including the designated variable names, the source o f each item, and the
property rights condition hypothesized as attenuated by each item.
Items were coded as three-category ordinal variables: No = 0, Uncertain = 1. and
Yes = 2. Items were scaled in the same direction, requiring that som e items be reversecoded so that the "2" coded value represented the high stringency condition. Table 4.1
indicates which items were reverse-coded.
Four items (GLTR, SLTR, BMP, and ENVL) were deleted from the initial item
pool based on various criteria, including judgem ent o f the theoretical adequacy o fth e items,
large percentage o f missing values, and lack o f variance. The rem aining fourteen items
were included in an initial exploratory factor analysis.

Exploratory Factor Analysis
The fourteen remaining items were subjected to a principal components factor
analysis with Varimax orthogonal rotation. Five factors with eigenvalues over 1.0 were
extracted. Examination o f the factor loadings indicated that ten items had significant
loadings on only one factor, while four items loaded on multiple factors. Three ot the four
multiple loading items represented the only items for which data were not directly reported
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Table 4.1

Initial Item Pool Description

Variable
Name

Short
Name

Source'

G e n L ic e n s e

GL

Q 5a, 95

S p e c ific a tio n

G e n L ic T r

GLTR*

Q 5b , 95

T ra n sfera b ility

P rivP rop erty

CPPR*

Q 8. 95

O w n e r sh ip

S p L ic e n s e

SL

Q 9, 95

S p e c ific a tio n

S p L icT r a n s

SLT R*

Q IO , 9 5

T ra n sfera b ility

E sca p e

E SC

Q 1 1. 9 5

S p e c ific a tio n

Facility design required to prevent fish
escapem ent

T h e ft

TH

0 1 2 . 95

E n fo r c em e n t

Unauthorized rem oval or destruction o f fis h
from facility is considered theft vs. poaching

R eport

REP

Q 1 3 , 95

S p e c ific a tio n

Slate requires a written fish inventory or
production report

P aperT rail

M PT

Q 1 4 , 95

S p e c ific a tio n

Marketing paper trail required to sell farmraised fish

B m g m tP r

BM P

Q 1 6 , 95

S p e c ific a tio n

State has develop ed aquaculture Best
M anagement Practices

E n virL iab

ENVL

Q 1 8 , 95

S p e c ific a tio n

State mandates environm ental liability
requirements for aquaculture operations

D isP e rm it

DP

Q 2 0 , 95

S p e c ific a tio n

State issues permits for aquaculture effluent
discharges

P ro S L ist

P SL

Q 3, 98

O w n e r sh ip

M k tR estrict

MR

Q 4, 98

T ran sferab ility

State lim its or restricts sale or marketing o f
farm-raised fish

E x e m p t W L aw

EXR*

Q 5, 98

O w n e r sh ip

Fish in aquaculture facility are exem pt from
state w ild life laws

L iv e s to c k

L SR *

Q 6, 98

O w n e r sh ip

Fish in aquaculture facility are legally
considered livestock

H ealth C ertE

HCE

Q 7 , 98

T ra n sfera b ility

Health certification required for farm-raised
fish entering state

H ea lth C ertW

new

Q 8 , 98

T ran sferab ility

Health certification required for fish shipped
w ithin the state

Rights
Condition

Variable Description

General license required for fish farms
Required general lic e n se is transferable
Fish in aquaculture facility are considered
private property
Special state license/perm it required to
possess, culture fish
Special license is transferable

State has a list o f f is h sp ecies that are
prohibited from entering state w aters

a Source show n is Q uestion number. Surv ey year
* Variable was reverse-coded
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for the five fish categories; the data for the five categories were extrapolated. These three
items (DP, GL, and PSL) were subsequently dropped because o f concerns over possible
violations o f the independence o f observations assumptions o f factor analysis.
The remaining 11 items were factor analyzed with the SPSS statistical analysis
computer program, using principal components factor analysis with orthogonal rotation.
The output from this exploratory factor analysis is shown in Appendix C. The KaiserMeyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy value (.654) and the B artlett's test o f
sphericity Chi-square value o f 421.701 demonstrated that there were enough correlations
to justify the use o f factor analysis. Communalities (Table C.2) for all items, except
Livestock (.489), were above the 0.5 desired level. The Livestock item was retained
because o f theoretical importance. Four factors with eigenvalues over 1.0 were extracted.
These four factors explained 64.6 percent o f the total variance (Table C.4), which is above
the 60 percent threshold for a satisfactory factor extraction solution. Examination o f the
final rotated factor matrix, shown in Table C.6. indicated that ten variables had significant
factor loadings on only one factor. Only one variable (Report) loaded significantly on
multiple factors. The variable was retained because o f theoretical importance. The pattern
o f item loadings also allowed clear interpretation o f the four extracted factors. The first
factor, which accounted for 26.6 percent o f the total variance, represented the
Transferability property right condition. Factors two, three, and four represented
Specification, Ownership, and Enforcement, respectively. The results suggest that the 11
items constitute an overall scale with four distinct subscales representing the four property
rights conditions.
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Because the observations for this research were gathered for five categories o f fish
for each state, the observations can be viewed as five repeated measures for each state.
Therefore, it was deemed necessary to test the independence o f observations assum ption
underlying factor analysis (Black, 1998). Two procedures were used. First, observations
were averaged across fish categories for each o f the 11 variables, giving an average variable
value for all categories for each state. Each total variable thus became the average extent
o f regulation in the state for that variable. In essence, the data were aggregated by state
before factor analysis.

A factor analysis was performed using the variable averages.

Second, observations were sorted by fish category, a separate correlation m atrix was
developed for each fish category, and factor analysis was performed for each fish category.
No valid results were obtained for fish category five (marine gamefish) because the
correlation matrix was not positive-definite, due to a large number o f missing observations.
The significant factor loadings from both independence test procedures and the
exploratory factor analysis (considered a disaggregate analysis) described above were
displayed together in a single factor matrix, shown in Table 4.2. This allowed for a visual
comparison o f the pattern o f significant factor loadings, by variable, for the disaggregate
exploratory factor analysis, the analysis o f the variable averages, and the analysis for the
five fish categories. While some differences in factor loading patterns are expected, a close
similarity in factor loadings can serve as confirmation o f the validity o f the independence
assumption for the data set (Black, 1998).
The patterns o f factor loading for the disaggregate and averaged variable were
almost identical. Since aggregating before factor analysis gives the same structure as the
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Table 4.2

Factor Loading Matrix for Tests of Independence Assumption
COM PONENT

PrivProperty
Escape

Transferability

Specification

Ownership

Enforcement

1

2

j

4

2

2

D, A, 2, 3, 4

I

HealthCertW

D. A. 1, 3 .4

J

D, A. 1,2. 3 .4
D. A. 1 ,2 .4

MktRestrict
D, A. 3

D, A. 1 ,2 ,4

=
=
=
=
=
=

4

D, A, 2, 3
A, 4

D. A. 1.2. 3 .4
D. A. 1.2. 3, 4

Theft
D
A
1
2
3
4

2
D, A, 1,2, 3, 4

PaperTrail

SpLicense

1,2

D. A. 1,2, 3 .4

Livestock

Report

1
D, A, 2 ,3 ,4

ExemptWLaw
HealthCertE

D, A, 1 ,3 ,4

D isaggregate exploratory factor analysis
A verage variables across fish categories for each state
Ornamental fish category
B aitfish fish category
C om m ercial t'oodfish fish category
Freshwater gam efish fish category
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disaggregate analysis, the similarity in factor loadings serves as a first-level confirm ation
o f the independence assumption. The pattern o f factor loadings for the analyses by fish
category were also very similar, which serves as further confirmation o f the independence
assumption.
Reliability assessment was performed on the 11-item factor correlation m atrix and
the four individual factor subscales. The results are shown in Appendix D. The corrected
item-total correlations, shown in Table D .l, were reasonable for all items except
PrivProperty and Livestock, the two items which constitute the Enforcement factor. Both
items showed weak, negative correlations with the other nine scale items.
Cronbach’s alpha, also known as the reliability coefficient, is the major criterion in
reliability analysis for assessing the internal consistency o f a scale. The alpha coefficient
is a direct function o f both the number o f items and magnitude o f their intercorrelation.
Alpha for the 11-item scale, shown in Table D.2 was .673. w'hich is above the m inim um
.60 threshold for exploratory scale development. The alpha coefficients for the
transferability, specification, ownership, and enforcement subscales are .638. .686. .552.
and .382, respectively. These reliability coefficients suggest that the enforcement subscale
has weak internal consistency. Despite the questionable results for the Enforcement factor
with its two items, the factor and items were retained for further analysis because o f
theoretical importance, since the factor analysis was viewed as strictly exploratory.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis through structural equation modeling requires the
specification o f two models, the measurement model and the structural model.
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The

measurement model specifies the indicators for each construct and describes the
measurement properties (reliabilities and validities) o f each observed variable for
estimating the causal relationships. The structural model specifies causal relationships
among the latent variables, describes the causal effects and assigns the explained and
unexplained variances (Hair, et al., 1995; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a).
The confirmatory factor analysis was performed through the recommended twostage process o f structural equation modeling (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Hair, et al..
1995). The measurement model developed through the exploratory factor analysis was
estimated, respecified and then fixed in the second stage when the respecified measurement
model and structural model were estimated simultaneously.

Measurement Model Estimation
The 11-indicator, four-latent variable congeneric measurement model developed
through exploratory factor analysis was estimated with generalized least squares (GLS), an
iterative procedure which minimizes the sum o f squares o f the residuals weighted by the
inverse o f the sample covariance matrix. The input data were the correlation matrix
between the observed variables. However, since the observed variables were ordinal, the
Pearson product-moment correlation was inappropriate for confirmatory analysis. A matrix
o f polychoric correlations was computed through the PRELIS 2 computer program.
PRELIS 2 is a program for multivariate data screening and data summarization which
serves as a preprocessor for the LISREL structural equations modeling program. The
polychoric correlation matrix was used as the input data matrix for the confirmatory factor
analysis.
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Evaluation o f the estimated m easurem ent model confirmed the results o f the
exploratory factor analysis. The enforcement latent construct and its two indicator items
did not correlate adequately with the other three latent variables, and the coefficients for
the two indicator variables (PrivProperty and Theft) had opposite signs. The enforcem ent
latent variable and the two indicator variables were dropped from the measurement model.
A modified measurement model was specified, consisting o f three latent variables
representing transferability, specification, and ow nership. Each latent variable was defined
by three observed variables.
The nine-indicator, modified m easurement model was re-estimated using a new
polychoric correlation matrix and GLS estimation. Results are shown in Appendix E. The
polychoric correlation coefficient was not positive definite, so the ridge option in LISREL
was invoked, with a ridge coefficient o f 1.00 (Table E .l).

All estimated regression

coefficients are significant and o f expected signs. There were no offending estimates: all
error variances are positive and significant, and no standardized coefficients exceed 1.0.
Goodness-of-fit measures were examined to assess the overall measurement model
fit. These include absolute fit measures, incremental fit measures, and parsimonious fit
measures. The goodness-of-fit statistics are shown in Table E.4. Absolute fit measures
assess the overall fit o f the full model, including both the structural and m easurement
models collectively. The Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square (41.69) was higher than
desired, but chi-square values for non-normal variables estimated through GLS should be
interpreted with caution (Joreskog and Sorbom. 1996a). The Root Mean Square Error o f
Approximation (0.084) was slightly higher than the ideal .05 to .08 range, but was below
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the maximum acceptable value o f 0.10. The Goodness-of-Fit Index (.96) was close to the
1.0 value which represents a perfect fit.
Incremental goodness-of-fit measures assess the estimated structural equation model
compared to a null model.

The Non-Normed Fit Index (0.73) was lower than the

recommended 0.90 level. The Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (.92) was above the
recommended acceptance level o f greater than 0.90. The Com parative Fit Index (0.82) and
Incremental Fit Index (0.84) values did not reach the desired 0.90 level, but the fits are
reasonable.
Parsimonious fit measures assess the parsimony o f the estimated model by
evaluating the model fit versus the number of estimated coefficients or degrees o f freedom
needed to achieve that level o f fit. An appropriate measure o f parsimonious fit is the
normed Chi-square (AfVdf) (Hair, et al., 1995). The calculated normed Chi-square o f 1.74
was within the recommended 1.0 - 2.0 range.
Based upon the regression coefficient results and key goodness-of-fit measures
(GFI. AGFI. normed Chi-square) which perform well with GLS estimation, the estimated
nine-item, three latent construct congeneric measurement model was accepted as
adequately representing the relationships between the nine observed indicator variables and
the transferability, specification and ownership latent constructs.

Structural Model Estimation
A structural model with regulatory climate as a second-order latent factor was
specified, based on the regulatory climate conceptual model presented in chapter 2 and the
estimated measurement model, and estimated using GLS. The estimation results are given
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in Appendix F. The path loadings and error variances are provided in Table F. 1 The path
regression coefficients, along with their t - values, are also shown visually in path diagram
form in Figure 4.3. All path coefficients are o f the expected sign. All path coefficients,
except for the RegClimate - Ownership path (r = 1.90), are statistically significant at the
a = .05 level. The RegClimate - Ownership path is significant at the a = .10 level.
Because the measurement model was specified in the structural equation model, all
goodness-of-fit measures are identical to measurement model goodness-of-fit results.

Final Regulatory Climate Scale
The confirmatory factor analysis results suggest that state regulatory climate can be
adequately represented by a nine-item, three-latent variable summated scale. The final
regulatory climate scale, shown in Table 4.3, consists o f three subscales which represent
three underlying property rights conditions: transferability, specification and ownership.
Each subscale (three items with item values ranging from 0 - 2 ) has a range o f 0 - 6. The
overall summated regulatory climate scale has a theoretical range from 0 - 1 8 . Descriptive
analysis indicates that the overall regulatory climate scale has observed minimum and
maximum values o f 0 and 17, respectively, a mean value o f 8.08, standard deviation o f
4.446. a median value o f 8, a mode o f 10, skewness o f .035 and -.808 kurtosis. The
frequency distribution for the respondents’ computed regulatory climate scale values is
given in Table 4.4. A histogram illustrating the shape, center, and spread o f the distribution
is shown in Figure 4.4. A normal curve is superimposed on the histogram to help judge
whether the data are normally distributed.

146

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

r -i

vo SS

90

00 ~
o

O '*•

O
°®\ ^*1
o \ 'O

cT

m
IN O'

<N O
00 <N

o
o

00 nT
'*■ in
00

so in '

n-

~

'O
oo

in

2s

5 Sc

oo
00

fn
v£>
o’

<N

O

m o
00
r\
o fN

T-. O
00•

O •'

o r*

147

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2 £

Figure 4.3 Path Diagram for Estimated Structural Equation Model

oo 2

Final Nine-Item Regulatory Climate Scale

Table 4.3

Variable Name

Short
Name

Variable Description

Transferability:
HealthCertE

HCE

Health certification required for farm-raised
fish entering state

Escape

ESC

Facility design required to prevent fish
escapement

HealthCertW

HCW

Health certification required for fish shipped
within the state

Specification:
Special state license/permit required to possess,
culture fish

SpLicense

SL

Report

REP

State requires a written fish inventory or
production report

PaperTrail

MPT

Marketing paper trail required to sell farmraised fish

ExemptWLaw

EXR

Fish in aquaculture facility are exempt from
state wildlife laws

Livestock

LSR

Fish in aquaculture facility are legally
considered livestock

MktRestrict

MR

State limits or restricts sale or marketing o f
farm-raised fish

Ownership:
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Table 4.4

Frequency Distribution of Computed Regulatory'Climate Scale Values
(Scale = 0 - 1 8 , with higher number reflecting more strict regulatory
stringency)

Scale Value

Valid 0
1
2
J->
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Valid Total
Missing
Total

Frequency

10
1
9
13
10
11
13
8
17
8
21
12
13
2
11
2
9

Percent

Valid Percent

0

4.3
.4
3.9
5.7
4.3
4.8
5.7
3.5
7.4
3.5
9.1
5.2
5.7
.9
4.8
.9
3.9
1.3
0.0

5.8
.6
5.2
7.5
5.8
6.4
7.5
4.6
9.8
4.6
12.1
6.9
7.5
1.2
6.4
1.2
5.2
1.7
0.0

173
57
230

75.2
24.8
100.0

100.0

j

Cum. Percent

5.8
6.4
11.6
19.1
24.9
31.2
38.7
43.4
53.2
57.8
69.9
76.9
84.4
85.5
91.9
93.1
98.3
100.0
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Regulatory Climate Scale Value

Figure 4.4

Histogram Illustrating the Shape, Center, and Spread of the
Regulatory Climate Scale Distribution
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A Shapiro-Wilks test o f normality was performed in SAS to evaluate the normality
o f the regulatory climate scale. The results (W = 0.948, p = 0.0001) indicate that the
distribution o f the regulatory climate scale deviates significantly from normality. The
scale's normal probability plot suggests that the distribution o f the regulatory climate scale
is truncated at both ends, with a large degree o f truncation at the lower end o f the scale.

Validity Assessment
Construct validity o f a summ ated scale is accomplished by exam ining the
correlation o f the scale with other established measures o f the same latent construct.
However, there are no established measures o f regulatory climate for agriculture, and
previous studies using existing manufacturing industry measures have shown m ixed results.
To evaluate the validity o f the regulatory climate scale, the scale values for each state and
Guam were computed for each category o f fish (shown in Table 4.5) and correlated with
two proxies for state regulatory climate. The two proxy measures were obtained from the
State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire, which
elicited the respondents' Likert scale self-assessments o f state regulatory clim ate toward
aquaculture for each fish category (Table B.3.9), and the number o f fish farms in each o f
the five categories (Table B.3.2). The correlation o f .274 with self-assessments o f state
regulatory climate was significant at the 0.01 level and o f the expected sign.

The

correlation between the regulatory' climate scale value and the number o f fish farms in each
o f the five categories of -.170 was significant at the 0.05 level and o f the expected sign,
indicating a negative relationship between regulatory stringency and the num ber o f fish
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Table 4.5

Computed Regulatory Climate Scale Values for each State and Guam,
by Category (Scale = 0 - 18, with higher number reflecting more strict
regulatory stringency)

O rn a m en ta ls

B a itfish

C o m m e r c ia l

F r e sh w a te r

M arine

F o o d fis h

G a m e fis h

G a m e fish

2

2

0

9

2

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

A r iz o n a

8

10

16

16

16

A r k a n sa s

0

0

0

2

NA

C a lifo r n ia

8

10

11

11

11

C o lo r a d o

10

10

12

16

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

D e la w a r e

4

3

6

6

7

F lo r id a

0

0

0

6

4

G e o r g ia

12

10

10

10

10

H a w a ii

4

4

14

8

8

12

12

10

12

NA

I llin o is

3

3

4

5

NA

In d ia n a

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Io w a

I

9

13

11

NA

K a n sa s

3

3

3

3

NA

2

2

4

NA

7

4

6

9

9

NA

NA

11

NA

NA

10

14

14

14

14

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

6

6

6

8

5

NA

NA

11

NA

NA

13

7

2

8

11

M is so u r i

0

0

2

0

NA

M o n ta n a

14

16

16

16

NA

A la b a m a
A la s k a

C o n n e c tic u t

Id aho

K e n tu c k y
L o u is ia n a
M a in e
M a ry la n d
M a ssa c h u se tts
M ic h ig a n
M in n e s o ta
M is s is s ip p i

(table 4.5 continued)
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O rn a m en ta ls

B a itfis h

C o m m e r c ia l

F r e sh w a te r

M arin e

F o o d fish

G a m e f is h

G a m e fish

10

10

10

10

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

8

16

14

14

15

N e w J e rsey

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

N e w M e x ic o

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

N e w Y ork

NA

NA

12

16

14

N o rth C a r o lin a

4

3

3

3

7

N o r th D a k o ta

5

7

10

12

8

O h io

7

5

9

9

NA

O k la h o m a

10

10

10

8

8

O regon

11

17

15

17

17

P e n n s y lv a n ia

6

6

6

6

9

R h o d e Islan d

9

NA

NA

NA

11

S o u th C a r o lin a

5

5

8

14

8

S o u th D a k o ta

8

7

7

11

NA

10

14

11

10

8

5

5

5

5

5

U tah

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

V erm on t

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

6

6

10

8

8

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

W est V ir g in ia

12

NA

12

12

12

W is c o n s in

11

8

12

12

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

3

3

3

4

4

N e b r a sk a
N evada
N e w H a m p sh ire

T en n essee
T exas

V ir g in ia
W a sh in g to n

W y o m in g
G u am

N A = N ot available, due to non-response or m issing data
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farms. These significant correlations provide evidence for construct validity o f the
regulator}' climate scale for disaggregate, fish category data.
Construct validity was assessed for the regulatory climate scale on an overall state
basis. State average regulatory climate scale values across fish categories were computed
and correlations with the average of the state regulatory stringency self-assessm ents across
all fish categories were computed. The state average scale values were also evaluated for
correlations with the total number o f fish farms in each state. To adjust for possible effects
o f state size, the total number o f fish farms in each state was also divided by the total
number o f farms in the state and by the total land in farms for each state to obtain two
proportions: total number o f fish farms as a fraction o f a state's total farms, and total
number o f fish farms as a fraction o f a state's total farmland. The data for number o f state
farms and land in farms was obtained from the US DA/NASS Agricultural Statistics 1997.
The results o f correlation analysis failed to show any statistically significant correlations
between the average state regulatory climate scale values and total num ber o f fish farms in
the state or the proxies for average state regulatory stringency. Therefore, construct validity
could not be demonstrated for aggregate state data.
Known-groups validation, which demonstrates that a scale can differentiate
members o f one group from members o f another group based on their scale scores, is a
useful construct validation procedure. However, as discussed previously in this chapter,
meaningful between-group comparisons can only be justified when between-group measure
invariance has been demonstrated. If these conditions are met, then between-group
comparisons can be undertaken, using Analysis o f Variance (ANOVA).
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The tests of the independence o f observations assum ption for factor analysis found
that the patterns of factor loading were very similar across fish categories, and serves as
evidence o f between-group measure invariance.

An A N O V A was perform ed on the

computed regulatory climate scale value for all observations to determ ine if there are any
statistically significant (a = .05) differences in regulatory clim ate betw een fish categories.
The ANOVA F-test results (F = 2.576, p = .039) indicated that at least one statistically
significant difference exists between the fish categories. A D uncan’s multiple range test,
described by Bums and Bush (1995), was performed to identify the pairs o f statistically
significant differences between the fish category means. Results from the D uncan's test
indicated that ornamentals are significantly different from freshwater gam efish and marine
gam efish. To further investigate the fish category differences, AN O V A analyses and
D uncan’s multiple range tests were also performed for the three subscales.

Results

indicated that there is no significant difference between fish categories for transferability.
Ornamentals differed from commercial foodfish and freshwater gam efish in specification
o f rights. Ornamentals and commercial foodfish were both significantly different from
freshwater gamefish on the ownership subscale.

Summary
This chapter described the procedure for developing an objective, quantitative
summated scale measure. The scale developm ent procedures, including exploratory factor
analysis and confirmatory structural equation modeling, were utilized to develop and
validate a property rights-based summated scale measure o f state regulatory climate toward
finfish aquaculture for five categories o f finfish: ornamentals, baitfish. commercial
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foodfish, freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish. The nine-item overall regulatory
climate scale is comprised o f three 3-item subscales which represent three property rights
conditions: transferability o f rights, rights specification, and ownership. The final
aquaculture regulatory climate scale values for each state, by fish category, were listed in
tabular form. Finally, ANOVA between-group comparisons indicated differences between
the fish categories for the overall regulatory climate scale and the three subscales.
The next chapter will empirically test the conceptual relationship between
institutional structure and state regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture. A model
incorporating the regulatory climate scale measure as the dependent variable will be
presented. Empirical estimation results for the model, for both ordinary least squares
(OLS) and ordered probit analyses will be reported and discussed.
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CHAPTER 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE INSTITUTIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS AND REGULATORY CLIMATE

In chapter 2, elements o f public choice theory and firm location theory were
combined within an institutional economics framework to develop a theoretical model
explaining the institutional relationships underlying firm location decisions.

The

theoretical model was then applied to the U.S. aquaculture industry to develop a conceptual
model which illustrates the relationship between state institutional structure and regulatory
climate, one decision factor in aquaculture firm location and species selection decisions.
This chapter empirically examines the relationship between state institutional
structure characteristics and regulatory climate toward the aquaculture industry. An
empirically testable institutional economic model, based on the conceptual model from
chapter 2. is developed, with aquaculture regulatory climate as the dependent variable and
key state characteristics reported in the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey as
independent variables. To estimate the empirical model, two alternative forms o f the
regulatory climate scale developed in chapter 4 are used as dependent variables in a twolimit truncated regression and an ordered probit analysis.

For both analyses, state

institutional characteristics serve as the independent variables.

State Institutional Structure and the Aquaculture Industry
The implementation o f legal and regulatory programs affecting the aquaculture
industry are administered at the state level in the U.S. As a result, regulatory programs and
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permit requirements vary from state to state. The wide variation in state regulatory policies
toward the aquaculture industry have resulted in significant interstate differences in
regulatory climate, and may affect where fish are grown. The current highly variable
regulatory environment is perceived to be a major constraint to aquaculture industry
development (DeVoe and Mount, 1989; McCoy, 1996; Wypyszinski, et al., 1994).
The inadequacy o f existing state institutions to reconcile the expanding aquaculture
industry's needs with changing social and environmental protection goals has been the
source o f serious conflicts between the aquaculture industry and state regulatory institutions
(DeVoe and M ount, 1989). Over the last decade, there has been a recognized need to adjust
the structure o f institutional arrangements to facilitate the aquaculture industry's growth
and development. The demand for institutional change has resulted in m ajor changes in the
states' approaches to the aquaculture industry and the evolution o f new institutions which
ensure attention to the industry’s changing needs.

Institutional Economic Model and Data Description
The conceptual model from chapter 2 which illustrates the relationship between
state institutional structure and regulatory’ climate, one decision factor in aquaculture firm
location and species selection decisions, can be expressed as an empirically testable
institutional economic model. The relationship can be given by:
Regulatory = /(definition o f aquaculture, development plan, adm inistrative
Climate
agency, enforcement agency, finfish classification, region)

(5.1)

where the regulatory climate scale developed and validated in chapter 4 serves as the
dependent variable, and the independent variables are key state institutional characteristics.
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Regulatory Climate Dependent Variables
The regulatory climate scale (RCSCALE) developed in chapter 4 is an 18-category
ordinal scale, which permits a researcher to rank-order respondents. Anderson and Philips
(1981) argued that, in some cases, an ordered categorical variable can be considered a
coarsely measured version o f a continuous variable, and that it is reasonable to assume that
the ordered categories correspond to non-overlapping and exhaustive intervals o f the real
line. Nunnally and Bernstein (1994, p. 115) "treat a variable as continuous if it provides
11 or more levels, even though it is not continuous in the mathematical sense." Since the
RCSCALE consists o f 18 separate categories, it can be considered as "assum ed interval."
with the values connoting a continuum o f labels which are equal distances apart. The
designation o f the scale as interval appearing allows a higher level o f measurem ent and the
application o f more powerful statistical techniques, such as linear regression, than can be
used with ordinal scales (Bums and Bush, 1995).
If the RCSCALE is strictly considered an ordinal variable, practical interpretation
is difficult, and linear regression is inappropriate as an estim ation method.

Limited

qualitative dependent variable models would provide preferred estimation methods. The
18-category ordinal dependent variable would be difficult to analyze because there are too
many ordered alternatives (Hill, 1998). A strategy suggested by Hill (1998) is to partition
the 18-category scale into a sm aller number (no more than five or six) o f ordered
alternatives, based upon the distribution or clumping of values on the RCSCALE. This
would enhance practical interpretation and allow estimation using limited qualitative
dependent variable estimation methods.
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Traditional partitioning strategies for mound-shaped distributions are based on the
Empirical Rule, which states that approximately 68 percent o f the measurements will fall
within one standard deviation o f the mean value, approximately 95 percent will fall within
two standard deviations, and essentially all the measurements will fall within three standard
deviations o f the mean (McClave and Dietrich, 1988; Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams.
1993). Use o f the Empirical Rule to partition the regulatory climate scale (RCSCALE)
would result in only three stringency categories (low, average, and high), because the
RCSCALE negative kurtosis (-.808) resulted in a flattened distribution and a larger than
normal standard deviation (4.46). The middle "average" stringency category would include
RCSCALE values from 4-12. This range is considered too wide for practical interpretation
and empirical estimation purposes.
An alternative five-category scale partitioning strategy, still based on standard
deviations, was developed for this analysis. The middle "average" stringency category' was
set one standard deviation wide, centered at the RCSCALE mean (8.08). The "average”
category included RCSCALE values from 6-10.

Additional categories, one standard

deviation wide, were established with endpoint RCSCALE values one and two standard
deviations above and below the "average” category endpoints.
The resulting partitioned regulatory' climate category (RCCAT) ordinal scale
variable consists o f five categories, representing increasing levels o f regulatory stringency:
very low, low, average, high, and very' high, coded as 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Table
5.1 describes the RCCAT and shows the RCSCALE values included in each RCCAT
category. A descriptive analysis indicated that the RCCAT has observed minimum and
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Table 5.1

Regulatory Climate Category (RCCAT) Variable Descriptions

Coding

RCSCALE Values
Included

Very Low

0

0- 1

Low

1

2 -5

Average

2

6 - 10

High

j

11-14

Very High

4

15 - 17
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maximum values o f 0 and 4. respectively, a median value and mode o f 2. skewness o f .086,
and -.440 kurtosis. The frequency distribution for the com puted RCCAT values is given
in Table 5.2. A histogram, with superimposed normal curve, illustrating the shape, center,
and spread o f the distribution is shown in Figure 5.1.

Computed regulatory climate

category (RCCAT) values for each state and Guam are provided in Table 5.3.
In order to justify using the RCCAT as a proxy for the RCSCALE in empirical
analysis, comparability between the RCSCALE variable and the RCCAT must be
demonstrated statistically. Pearson correlations (for continuous variables) and Spearm an's
rank order correlations (for ordinal variables) between RCSCALE and RCCAT were
computed to evaluate the strength o f the relationship between the two variables. Very high
correlation coefficients w ould indicate that the two variables are statistically comparable
and that RCCAT can be substituted for RCSCALE in empirical analysis. The computed
Pearson correlation (r=.960) and Spearman's rank-order correlation (r= .959) were both
very close to 1.00 and statistically significant (a=.01). suggesting that RCSCALE and
RCCAT are statistically equivalent.
An ANOVA analysis was also performed on the partitioned regulatory climate
categories (RCCAT) value for all observations to determine if there are any statistically
significant (a = .05) differences in regulatory climate category (RCCAT) between fish
categories. The ANOVA F-test results (F = 2.940,/? = .022) indicated that at least one
statistically significant difference exists between the fish category means. A Duncan's
multiple range test was performed to identify the pairs o f statistically significant differences
between fish category means. The results from the D uncan's multiple range test failed to
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Table 5.2

Valid

Frequency Distribution of Partitioned Regulatory Climate Category
(RCCAT) Variable

Very Low
Low
Average
High
Very High

Valid Total
M issina
Total

Frequency

Percent

11
43
67
38
14

4.8
18.7
29.1
16.5
6.1

6.4
24.9
38.7
22.0
8.1

173
57
230

75.2
24.8
100.0

100.0

Valid Percent

Cum. Percent
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6.4
31.2
69.9
91.9
100.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

Regulatory Clim ate Category

Figure 5.1

Histogram Illustrating the Shape, Center, and Spread of the
Partitioned Regulatory Climate Category (RCCAT)
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Table 5.3

Computed Regulatory Climate Category (RCCAT) Values for Each
State and Guam, by Fish Category

O r n a m e n ta ls

B a itfish

C o m m e r c ia l

F r e sh w a te r

M a rin e

F o o d fish

G a m e fis h

G a m e fis h

L ow

L ow

V ery L o w

A verage

L ow

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

A verage

A verage

V ery H ig h

V e r y H ig h

V e r y H ig h

V ery L ow

V ery L ow

V ery L o w

L ow

NA

C a lifo r n ia

A verage

A verage

H igh

H ig h

H ig h

C o lo r a d o

A verage

A verage

H ig h

V e r y H ig h

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

L ow

Low

A verage

A verage

A verage

Very' L o w

V ery L ow

V ery L o w

A verage

L ow

G e o r g ia

H ig h

A verage

A verage

A verage

A verage

H a w a ii

L ow

Low

H igh

A verage

A verage

Idaho

H ig h

H ig h

A verage

H ig h

NA

Illin o is

L ow

Low

L ow

L ow

NA

In diana

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

V ery L o w

A verage

H ig h

H ig h

NA

K an sas

L ow

L ow

L ow

Low

NA

K en tu c k y

L ow

L ow

L ow

L ow

NA

L o u isia n a

A verage

L ow

A verage

A verage

A verage

NA

NA

H igh

NA

NA

A verage

H igh

H ig h

H ig h

H ig h

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

A verage

A verage

A verage

A verage

L ow

M in n e so ta

NA

NA

H igh

NA

NA

M is sissip p i

H ig h

A verage

L ow

A verage

H ig h

M isso u r i

V ery L ow

V ery L ow

L ow

V ery L ow

NA

M o n tan a

H ig h

V e ry H ig h

V ery H ig h

V e r y H ig h

NA

A la b a m a
A la sk a
A r iz o n a
A rk a n sa s

C o n n e c tic u t
D e la w a r e
F lo rid a

Io w a

M a in e
M arylan d
M a ssa c h u se tts
M ic h ig a n

(table 5.3 continued)
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O r n a m e n ta ls

B a itfis h

C o m m e r c ia l

F r e sh w a te r

M a rin e

F o o d fis h

G a m e fis h

G a m e fis h

A verage

A verage

A verage

A verage

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

A verage

V e ry H ig h

H ig h

H ig h

V e r y H ig h

N e w Jersey

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

N e w M e x ic o

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

N e w Y o rk

NA

NA

H ig h

V e r y H ig h

H ig h

N orth C a ro lin a

L ow

L ow

L ow

L ow

A verage

N orth D a k o ta

L ow

A verage

A verage

H ig h

A verage

O h io

A verage

L ow

A verage

A verage

NA

O k la h o m a

A verage

A verage

A verage

A verage

A verage

H ig h

V e ry H ig h

Very' H ig h

V e r y H ig h

Very- H ig h

P en n sy lv a n ia

A verage

A verage

A verage

A verage

A verage

R h od e Island

A verage

NA

NA

NA

H ig h

Low

Low

A verage

H ig h

A verage

Sou th D a k o ta

A verage

A verage

A verage

H ig h

NA

T e n n e ss e e

A verage

H ig h

H ig h

A verage

A verage

T exas

L ow

L ow

L ow

L ow

L ow

Utah

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

V erm o n t

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

A verage

A verage

A verage

A verage

A verage

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

W est V ir g in ia

H ig h

NA

H ig h

H ig h

H ig h

W isc o n sin

H ig h

A verage

H ig h

H ig h

NA

W y o m in g

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

L ow

L ow

Low-

L ow

L ow

N e b r a sk a
N evada
N e w H a m p sh ire

O re g o n

Sou th C a ro lin a

V ir g in ia
W a sh in g to n

G uam

N A = N ot available, d u e to n o n -re s p o n se o r m issin g data
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distinguish any statistically significant differences between ornamentals, baitfish and
commercial foodfish, or between commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish, and marine
gamefish. Ornamentals and baitfish were significantly different from freshwater gamefish
and marine gamefish. These results are very sim ilar to the ANOVA results, reported in
chapter 4. from the homogenous group comparison with the original regulatory clim ate
scale values.

State Institutional Characteristic Independent Variables
The choice o f state institutional characteristics to include as independent variables
in the empirical analysis, along with the direction o f preliminary hypothesized impacts on
regulatory climate, was developed from the literature on the constraints to aquaculture
industry growth and development. The data for the independent variables were obtained
from the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey, described in chapter 3.
Major industry efforts have been expended to have states legally declare aquaculture
a form o f agriculture, based upon the belief that agriculture status confers certain beneficial
tax and legal protections. The Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture (1993) concluded that
the treatment o f aquaculture as a form o f agriculture would provide a positive development
climate. Therefore, the definition o f aquaculture as agriculture is hypothesized to have a
negative influence on the stringency o f state environmental regulations.
Many states have been formulating formal aquaculture development plans to
promote industry growth and expansion. These plans, which undergo continual clarification
and refinement, provide guidance for the establishment o f contemporary developmental and
regulatory mechanisms to accommodate the aquaculture industry’s needs (DeVoe and
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Mount. 1989). The presence o f a state aquaculture development plan is hypothesized to
reduce the stringency o f the regulatory climate.
In most states, regulation o f the aquaculture industry has evolved in state game and
fish departments that are often oriented toward production and protection o f game species
for recreational experiences rather than toward food production. An important theme with
fish farmers is regulatory jurisdiction. Producers believe that jurisdiction over aquaculture
belongs in state departments o f agriculture, which producers feel would provide economic
advocacy and sympathetic industry regulation. The lead administrative and enforcement
agencies will be modeled as either the state department o f agriculture, hypothesized to have
a negative effect on regulatory' stringency, or a state natural resources/fish and wildlife
agency, hypothesized to have a positive effect on regulatory stringency.
State fish and wildlife laws also classify fish species into categories, such as
baitfish. ornamentals, foodfish and gamefish. Different classifications o f fish are regulated
differently by state fish and game agencies. Based on survey results, there appears to be
a continuum o f regulatory restrictiveness, with baitfish culture being subject to the least
restrictions, followed by ornamental and commercial foodfish. Culture o f freshwater
gamefish and marine gamefish can be highly restricted. As a result, regulatory stringency
is hypothesized to be negatively influenced by ornamental and baitfish culture, but
positively influenced by gamefish culture, when compared to commercial foodfish.
The 50 states maintaining widely varying rules and regulations create a bewildering
array o f regulations. The aquaculture industry is openly frustrated that requirements often
vary so much between neighboring states that it is difficult to satisfy each state's
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regulations and remain competitive. Regional compacts offer hope for addressing a wide
array o f conflicting state regulations that are hindering aquaculture (Cline, Warren and
Walker, 1994). There are several other reasons why the region may have significant
impacts on state regulatory climate.

For purposes o f setting research priorities and

disbursing federal aquaculture research funds, the USDA divides the United States into five
regional aquaculture zones (northeast, southern, north-central, western, and tropicalsubtropical), each serviced by a regional aquaculture center. Although there is considerable
overlap, regions differ in terms o f environmental conditions, species cultured, population
density, and importance and influence o f the aquaculture industry and environmental
groups. It is hypothesized that regions with high population density', more liberal public,
and more active environmental groups, such as the northeast and north-central regions, will
have more stringent regulatory environments, while the southern region, with a long history
o f aquaculture production and more powerful industry groups, will have lower levels o f
regulation and more favorable regulatory climate. These hypothesized regional effects are
consistent with state and regional spatial regulatory effects observed by Hedge (1993) for
federal environmental regulatory enforcement.
The independent variables included in the analysis, along with the dummy variable
coding, are listed in Table 5.4. Since all independent variables are coded as dummy
variables, the constant term in the empirical analysis represents the level o f regulatory'
stringency under base level conditions for all independent variables. The base level can be
conceptualized as a state that has not defined aquaculture as agriculture, with no
development plan, where the state fish and wildlife/natural resources agency is responsible
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Independent Dummy Variable Coding and Descriptions

Tabic 5.4

Variable Name

Coding and Description

DEFINE (-) =

1 if aquaculture is legally defined as agriculture; 0 otherwise

DEVPLAN (-) =

1 if state has a formal aquaculture development plan; 0 otherwise

Administrative Agency :
AGADMIN (-) =

I if lead administrative agency is state department of agriculture;
0 otherwise

JOINTADM (+) =

1 if administration is joint between state departments of
agriculture and natural resources/fish and wildlife agency; 0
otherwise

COOPEXT (+/-) =

1 if Cooperative Extension plays a role in developing programs;
0 otherwise

Enforcement Agency:
ENFORCE (-) =

1 if lead enforcement agency is state department of agriculture; 0
otherwise

JOINTENF (+) =

1 if enforcement is joint between state departments of agriculture
and natural resources/fish and wildlife agency; 0 otherwise

Finfish Classification:
ORNAMENT (-) =

1 if the finfish classification is ornamentals; 0 otherwise

BAITFISH (-) =

1 if the finfish classification is baitfish; 0 otherwise

FWGAME (+) =

1 if the finfish classification is freshwater gamefish; 0 otherwise

MARGAME (+) =

1 if the finfish classification is marine gamefish; 0 otherwise

U.S. Region:
NOREAST (+) =

1 if the state is located in northeast region; 0 otherwise

NORCENT (+) =

1 if the state is located in north-central region; 0 otherwise

TROPSUB (+/-) =

I if the state is located in tropical-subtropical region; 0 otherwise

SOUTHERN (-) =

1 if the state is located in the southern region; 0 otherwise
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for both administration and enforcement o f aquaculture programs and regulations, and
which is located in the western region o f the United States.

Empirical Models
Given the two alternative specifications o f the regulatory climate scale presented
earlier, two different empirical models are appropriate for evaluating the hypothesized
relationships between regulator}' climate and state institutional structural characteristics:
two-limit truncated regression and ordered probit analysis. This section describes the
theory underlying the two empirical models and the interpretation o f empirical model
results.

Two-Limit Truncated Regression
The dependent variable in economic analysis can often only be observed within a
limited range. In this case, values o f the random variable come from a distribution that is
truncated at one, or both ends (Judge, et al.. 1985; Judge, et al., 1988). A truncated
distribution is defined by Greene (1997; p. 949) as "the part o f the untruncated distribution
that is above or below some specified value."
The latent underlying truncated regression model is given by Greene (1995) as:
y ' = /Tx, + e,

(5.2)

where e, - N[0,o2]. y" is unobserved; its observed dependent variable counterpart is *y\
and

if y* <

L,, then y, = unobserved (lower tail truncation)

if y* >

U,, then y, = unobserved (upper tail truncation)

if L, <

y ’ < U„ then y, = y* = /?x, + e,
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(5.3)

The truncated regression model is not a linear regression model. W hen y, is restricted to
the range [L„UJ, the conditional mean becomes
E[y, | x„ L < y, < U] = /?x, + a, [(<J)L - $ V)/(QU- $ L)]

(5.4)

(J), = <j>[0' - /?x,)/a, ], j = L„U,

(5.5)

- <fr[(j - /?x,)/a, ], j = L„U,

(5.6)

where
and

The terms (J) and <£ are the standard normal probability density and cum ulative distribution
functions, respectively (Greene, 1995).
Since OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent in the truncated regression context,
estimation o f the parameters o f the truncated regression model is accom plished through
maximum likelihood estimation (Greene, 1995; Greene, 1997; Judge, et al., 1988). The
log-likelihood for the truncated regression model is
InL, = lnri - ‘/2ln27t - ‘/-e,2 - ln[$(r|U - y'x,) - ^(-qL - y'x,)]

(5.7)

where y ' = (1/a)/?. N ew ton's method is used for estimation and the Hessian is used to
estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix o f the estimates (Greene, 1995; Greene, 1997).

Ordered Probit Analysis
When the scale measure used as the dependent variable is discrete rather than
continuous, conventional regression methods are inappropriate. Such behavior can be
better described in probabilistic terms, using maximum likelihood estimation. According
to Greene (1993), models that link the decision or outcome to a set o f factors can be
constructed within the general framework o f probability models:
Prob(event j occurs) = Prob(Y =f) = /^relevant effects: parameters]

(5.8)

These models attempt to relate the conditional probability o f a particular outcome to
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various explanatory factors, including the attributes o f the alternatives as well as the
characteristics o f the decision makers (Judge et al., 1985).
W hen categorical variables are inherently ordered, as is the case with ratings and
rankings, multinomial logit or probit models fail to account for the ordinal nature o f the
dependent variable. The ordered logit and probit models, based on random utility theory,
are widely used as a framework for analyzing such responses (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984;
Broomhall

and Johnson,1994; Greene, 1995 and 1993; Maddala,1983;

Sayers et al.,

1996). The ordered probit model has the following specification:
y *= /?'x + e

(5.9)

where e ~ N[0,1]. y ' is unobserved; its observed counterpart is *y\ where
y - 0
= 1
= 2
=J

if y ’ < |iQ,
if p 0 < y ' < |i„
if (a, < v‘ < g-,,

(5.10)

if pj., < y '

and (i denotes unknown probability boundaries that are estimated with (S parameters in
equation (5.6). There is no significance to the unit distance between the set o f observed
values o f y; they simply provide the ranking (Greene, 1997; Maddala, 1983; Sayers, et al..
1996). The probabilities for each level o f g are given as:
ProbO = 0) = <J>(-p'x)

(5.11)

Prob(y = 1) = <B(g, -

p 'x )

- <£(-P'x)

Prob(y = 2) = $ ( g 2 -

P 'x ) -

<B(p,

- p 'x )

ProbO = .7)= 1 - $(Pv-i-P'x)
where

is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
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The ordered logit model results from the assumption that e has a standard logistic
distribution instead o f a standard normal distribution. According to Greene (1993), this is
a trivial m odification o f the formulation and appears to make virtually no difference in
practice. However, the logit errors are uncorrelated, independent Weibull random variables
distinguished by a skewed distribution and non-zero mean, which does not occur in nature.
The probit assumptions are more consistent w ith economic theory, and thus, ordered probit
is the preferred model for economic research (Hill, 1998).

Interpretation of Model Estimation Results
For both the two-limit truncated regression and the ordered probit analysis,
interpretation o f the estimated models involves evaluation o f several aspects o f the
estimated model results. These characteristics include the parameter estimates, marginal
effects, the overall significance o f the models, the m odels' goodness o f fit. and in this
application using cross-sectional data, possible violations o f model statistical assum ptions,
including collinearity and heteroskedasticity.
The model parameter estimates for both the two-limit truncated regression and
ordered probit models can, as with OLS, be evaluated to determine if the signs o f the
estimated coefficients agree with theoretical or prior expectations. For both the tw o-lim it
truncated regression and ordered probit models, the estimated maximum likelihood
coefficients are not the marginal effects o f changes in the independent variables.
The marginal effects in the truncated regression model are the partial derivatives o f
the expected values with respect to the vector o f characteristics, and are com puted at the
mean values o f the explanatory variables. The marginal effects are given in percentages,
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since the dependent variable is measured in logarithms (Greene, 1995; Judge, et al.. 1985).
The marginal effects when truncation is at the left, at 0, are provided by Greene (1995) and
computed using the expected value formula:
E[y |

x] =

$ ( p 'x /o ) [ p 'x

+

o tjj^ C P 'x /o y O C p 'x /a ) ]

(5.12)

=

$ > ( p 'x /o ) P

(5.13)

The partial derivatives are given as:
<3E[y ] x ] / d x

Greene (1997) noted that since the truncated variance is between 0 and 1. the marginal
effect for every element o f x is less than the corresponding coefficient.
In the ordered probit model, determination o f marginal effects is more involved.
Since there is no conditional mean function, marginal effects indicate the effects o f changes
in the covariates o f the cell probabilities.

For continuous independent variables, the

marginal effects are given by the partial derivatives o f the probabilities computed in
equation (5.8) with respect to the independent variables. To interpret binary variables,
further calculation o f the changes in the estimated probabilities o f the outcomes is
necessar>r. The change in the estimated probabilities is determined by calculating the
difference between means o f the probability distribution o f the outcomes when the binary
variable takes its different values (Greene, etal., 1997; Sayers, etal., 1996). Greene (1997)
cautioned that interpreting marginal effects for the ordered probit model is less obvious
than for other limited dependent variable specifications. Increasing one x while holding P
and // constant is equivalent to shifting the distribution. As the distributions shift, the signs
o f the probabilities and the partial derivatives change. Only the sign changes o f Prob(y =
0) and Prob(y = J) are unambiguous. This makes interpretation o f marginal probabilities
175

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

more complicated when the ordered dependent variable has more than three categories
(Greene, 1997).

Model Significance and Goodness-of-Fit Measures
For both the two-lim it truncated regression and the ordered probit model, the
likelihood ratio procedure can be used to test the overall significance o f the models under
the null hypothesis:
H0: P: = P3 = - . . = Pk = 0

(5.14)

H,: Not True
The likelihood ratio, k , is derived by computing the difference between the log-likelihood
function evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates, L(P) and the log-likelihood
function under the null hypothesis. L(0), according to the formula:
* = 2 [L (P )-L (0 )]

(5.15)

which has a x2a-n distribution. A likelihood ratio test statistic larger than the appropriate
X2a-n value leads to rejection o f the null hypothesis that all o f the parameter estimates
except the intercept are not significantly greater than zero (Judge, et al., 1988).
The R2 goodness-of-fit measure is inappropriate for the two-limit truncated
regression and ordered probit models, as both use the maximum likelihood estim ation
procedure (Broomhall and Johnson, 1994). A num ber o f alternative pseudo R2 measures
are available for modelevaluation when using maximum likelihood estimation. One
commonly used goodness-of-fit measure for models which usemaximum

likelihood

estimation is M cFadden’s pseudo-R2, given by:
1 - [L(P)/L(0)]
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(5.16)

The pseudo-R2 equals zero when L(P)=L(0) and equals one when the model is a perfect fit
(Judge, et al., 1988). An alternative goodness-of-fit measure for qualitative choice models
is Aldrich and N elson’s R2AN, calculated by using the likelihood ratio statistic, X, and the
sample size, N. R2AN is the ratio o f A/(A.+ N) and approaches one w hen the difference
between L(p) and L(0) is large, indicating a better model fit (A ldrich and Nelson, 1984).

Collinearitv Diagnostics
Collinearity results from the existence o f a linear relationship am ong some or all the
explanatory variables in a regression model. The problem often arises from the nonexperimental nature o f data collection in the social sciences. The classical linear regression
model assumes that there is no collinearity because the presence o f collinearity can have
serious consequences for interpretation of econometric models.

In the presence o f

collinearity, estimated regression coefficients possess large standard errors. The specific
consequences o f collinearity. as described by Greene (1997) and Judge, et al. (1988),
include large variances and covariances o f estimators, w ider confidence intervals,
insignificant /-ratios, and sensitivity o f estimators and their standard errors to small changes
in data.
Given a data set and a model, there are a variety o f procedures for detecting and
mitigating collinearity. The pursuit o f these mitigation procedures is dependent on the
nature and perceived severity o f collinearity, which is a data problem . Consequently, any
methods to detect collinearity must determine whether collinearity is present and the nature
and severity o f the collinearity (Judge, et al., 1988).
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Detection o f collinearity can be initially based on an examination o f the simple
pair-wise or zero-order correlation coefficient between two regressors. If the correlation
is high, for example, in excess o f 0.80, then collinearity is a serious problem. However,
high zero-order correlations are a sufficient, but not necessary condition for the existence
o f collinearity because it can exist even when the zero-order or simple correlations are
comparatively low (e.g., less than 0.50). Examining the correlation coefficients can also
fail to identify more complex patterns o f collinearity (Gujarati, 1988; Judge, et al.. 1988).
An examination o f the eigenvalues or eigenvectors o f the correlation matrix can also
be used to detect collinearity, with small eigenvalues indicating collinearity problems.
However, there is no accepted standard for determining how small an eigenvalue indicates
collinearity problems. The condition index (Cl), which is derived from the eigenvalues,
does provide an objective standard for identifying what constitutes small eigenvalues by
measuring the relative difference between the maximum eigenvalue p max and the kth
eigenvalue p k. A condition number k is defined as
* = IW 'lh ,

(5.17)

An eigenvalue that is small relative to the yardstick pmax indicates a large degree o f
collinearity. The condition index (Cl) is defined as:

Ct-(M _/lO” -<*)"

t5.1S)

The largest condition index is also the index o f the correlation matrix. Acceptable ranges
andmagnitudes

have been identified for the Cl which indicate potentialcollinearity

problems.For example, if the Cl ranges from 5 to 10, weak dependencies exist. Moderate
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to strong collinearity is associated with a Cl value which exceeds 30 (Belsley, Kuh. and
Welsch. 1980; Gujarati. 1988).
Variance inflation factors (vift) are the diagonal elements o f the inverse o f the
correlation matrix, R '1= (X 'X )'1 if the regressor values are standardized. The diagnostic
statistic for the variance inflation factors is derived from:
vif, = 1/(1- R,2)

(5.19)

where R,2 is themultiple correlation coefficient o f the variable x, regressed on the other
independent variables (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch. 1980). A variance inflation factor greater
than 1.0 implies that the variable is not orthogonal to the other variables and that some
degree o f collinearity is present. Values greater than 5.0 indicates a severe collinearity
problem (Judge, et al.. 1988).
If severe collinearity has been detected and mitigation efforts are warranted, several
tactics can be employed to reduce collinearity. However, collinearity is a data problem
whose treatment, depending on its severity, may or may not be warranted by the economic
theory underlying specification o f the theoretical model.

Heteroskedasticitv Diagnostics
One of the important assumptions o f the classical linear model is that the variance
o f each disturbance term e, is a constant equal to o 2.

This is the assum ption o f

homoskedasticity, or equal variance, which can be given as
Var(e,) = o2
When the variances are not constant, heteroskedasticity is present.

(5.20)
Since maximum

likelihood estimation in the presence o f heteroskedasticity yields inconsistent parameter
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estimates, the presence o f heteroskedasticity can be a serious problem. Heteroskedasticitv
is likely to be more common in cross-sectional data than in tim e-series data. (Greene,
1997; Judge, et al., 1985).
The presence o f heteroskedasticity can be detected by graphical methods and more
precisely by statistical tests.

Graphical evaluation for heteroskedasticity involves

examining the estimated squared residuals plotted against the independent variables or the
estimated means values o f the dependent variable, to see if the residuals exhibit any
spreading or contracting patterns. Alternatively, a statistical test o f the null hypothesis o f
homoskedasticity that a' = 0 can be based on the likelihood ratio statistic by comparing the
values o f the log likelihood functions under the restricted (Hu) homoskedastic and
unrestricted (H,) models (Greene, 1997; Judge, et al., 1988).
In both the two-limit truncated regression and ordered probit m odels, under the
general model o f multiplicative heteroskedasticity. to correct for potential heteroskedastic
errors the variance term can be specified as:
Vafte,) = o2exp(a' r,)

(5.21)

where z, is a vector o f exogenous variables and a ' is a conformable param eter vector
(Greene, 1995; Greene, 1997).

Empirical Results
Two separate models were estimated, using the LIMDEP 7.0 com puter software
(Greene. 1995) to examine the relationship between regulatory' climate and state
institutional characteristics. The RCSCALE variable, treated as a truncated continuous
variable, served as the dependent variable in a two-limit truncated regression analysis, and
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the RCCAT variable was the dependent variable in an ordered probit analysis. The key
state institutional characteristics, described previously and listed in Table 5.4, were used
as the independent variables in both analyses.

Collinearity and Heteroskedasticity Diagnostics
A variety o f collinearity diagnostics were performed to determine if any
independent variables were collinear. The zero-order, partial, and part correlations, shown
in Table G .l, failed to indicate the existence o f any collinearity between independent
variables.

All variance inflation factor values were below 5.0, the value accepted as

indicating collinearity (Judge, et al.. 1988). The condition index, shown in Table G.2.
failed to reach the 30.0 value which Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest indicates the
presence o f significant collinearity. These collinearity diagnostics support the conclusion
that collinearity between independent variables is not a significant problem.
The partial plots o f the squared residuals were examined to detect the presence o f
heteroskedasticity.

The residual plots for the four region dummy variables showed a

pattern which suggested the possible presence o f heteroskedasticity associated with the
region variables. To statistically test for the presence ofheteroskedasticity, likelihood ratio
tests were performed for both the tw o-lim it truncated regression and the ordered probit
models. The likelihood ratio test statistic values for both the two-limit truncated regression
model (X = 11.76) and the ordered probit model (X = 10.66) were below the (a = 0.05)
critical x2 value o f 24.99 for 15 degrees o f freedom. Thus, the null hypothesis o f
homoskedastic variances is not rejected, and it was concluded that heteroskedasticity is not
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a serious problem in either model. As a result, the estimated homoskedastic model results
are reported in the following sections.

Two-Limit Truncated Regression Results
The two-limit truncated regression model using RCSCALE as the dependent
variable was estimated in LIMDEP 7.0 using 169 observations from the 230 observations
generated by the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey. Sixty-one observations
with missing data were excluded by the LIMDEP listwise deletion o f missing observations.
The parameter estimates from the two-limit truncated regression analysis using RCSCALE
as the dependent variable are shown in Table 5.5. The constant represents the level o f
regulatory climate for a state having the base levels for all independent variables, described
previously. The marginal effects are provided in Table 5.6.
Using a significance level o f five percent, the insignificance o f the coefficient for
DEFINE suggests that, unlike hypothesized, defining aquaculture as a form o f agriculture
did not have a statistically significant effect on regulatory climate.

This result was

counterintuitive, and suggests that the major industry efforts to have aquaculture defined
as agriculture will not affect the stringency o f state regulations.
The establishment o f a formal state aquaculture development plan (DEVPLAN)
had, as hypothesized, a statistically significant negative impact on regulatory climate. The
marginal effect o f DEVPLAN (-1.886) was the second largest negative, state-controllable
institutional characteristic, second only to transferring regulatory enforcement authority
(ENFORCE) from state fish and wildlife agencies to state departments o f agriculture. This
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Tabic 5.5

Empirical Results for the Two-Limit Truncated Regression Model of
State Regulatory Climate Associated with State Institutional
Characteristics

Variable

Parameter
Coefficient

Standard
Error

z-value

Sig. Level

Constant

16.642

1.272

13.081

DEFINE

0.509

0.700

0.728

DEVPLAN

-4.010

0.717

-5.593

0.000***

AGADMIN

2.761

0.822

3.361

0.001***

JOINTADM

2.058

0.912

2.257

0.024**

COOPEXT

-0.139

0.814

-0.171

0.864

ENFORCE

-4.778

1.175

-4.068

0.000***

JOINTENF

2.315

1.128

2.052

0.040**

ORNAM ENT

-2.209

0.820

-2.694

0.007***

BAITFISH

-1.525

0.827

-1.844

0.065*

FWGAME

0.543

0.792

0.686

0.493

M ARGAME

0.130

0.885

0.146

0.884

NO RE AST

-5.011

1.149

-4.363

0.000***

NORCENT

-8.595

1.145

-7.507

0.000***

TROPSUB

-6.235

1.519

-4.105

0.000***

SOUTHERN

-7.649

1.060

-7.214

0.000***

o

3.078

0.214

14.373

0.000***

N = 169
Log Likelihood Function

-385.701

* Significant at the 10% level o f probability
** S ig n ific a n t at th e 5% level o f p rob ab ility
*** Significant at the 1% level o f probability
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0.000***
0.467

Table 5.6

Two-Limit Truncated Regression Model Partial Derivatives of
Expected Values with Respect to the Vector of Characteristics for State
Institutional Variables

Coefficient
Variable

Standard
Error

Variable
Mean

Constant

7.829

0.598

DEFINE

0.240

0.329

0.742

DEVPLAN

-1.886

0.337

0.535

AGADMIN

1.299

0.386

0.459

JOINTADM

0.968

0.429

0.214

COOPEXT

-0.065

0.383

0.208

ENFORCE

-2.248

0.552

0.390

JOINTENF

1.089

0.531

0.277

ORNAMENT

-1.039

0.386

0.208

BAITFISH

-0.717

0.389

0.195

FWGAME

0.256

0.373

0.220

MARGAME

0.061

0.416

0.157

NOREAST

-2.357

0.540

0.189

NORCENT

-4.043

0.539

0.252

TROPSUB

-2.933

0.715

0.063

SOUTHERN

-3.598

0.499

0.352

Conditional Mean at Sample Point

14.980

Scale Factor for Marginal Effects

0.470
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result suggests that a formal state aquaculture developm ent plan m ay be an im portant tool
for states w ishing to reduce the stringency o f regulations.

The coefficients for administrative agency (AGADM IN, JOrNTADM . and
COOPEXT) provided unexpected results. The variable AGADM IN w as significant, but
the positive sign fails to support the hypothesis that transferring program administration
responsibilities to state departments o f agriculture reduces regulatory stringency. Instead,
in this analysis, the transferral o f administrative authority increases regulatory stringency.
This suggests that transferring only administrative authority, w ithout transferring
enforcement, adds another layer o f bureaucracy which increases regulatory stringency. This
result was supported by the result that joint administration (JOINTADM) also significantly
increases regulatory stringency.

A role by Cooperative Extension (COOPEXT) in

developing and administering aquaculture programs did not significantly affect regulatory
climate.
As hypothesized, transferring regulatory enforcement authority from state fish and
wildlife/natural resources agencies to state departments o f agriculture (EN FO RCE) had a
large, significant negative effect on regulatory climate. The negative m arginal effect for
ENFORCE was the largest negative, state-controllable institutional characteristic. Only the
region location variables had a greater negative effect on regulatory climate.

Joint

enforcem ent (JOINTENF) between state fish and wildlife/natural resources agencies and
state departments o f agriculture significantly increased regulatory clim ate. This result is
consistent with the administrative agency dual bureaucracy results discussed in the previous
paragraph.
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O f the four fish category variables (ORNAMENT. BAITFISH, FW GAM E, and
MARGAME), only the ornamental category (ORNAMENT) was statistically significant
at the a = .05 level. The baitfish category (BAITFISH) was significant at the a = . 10 level.
The negative signs suggest that, as hypothesized, ornamentals and baitfish are subjected to
lower regulatory climate than commercial foodfish. the base fish category.

The

insignificance o f the coefficients for the freshwater gamefish (FW GAM E) and marine
gamefish (MARGAME) variables failed to support the hypotheses that gam efish, both
freshwater and marine, are subject to significantly higher regulatory stringency than
commercial foodfish.
All four region variables (NOREAST, NORCENTRAL, TROPSUB. and
SOUTHERN) were statistically significant al the a = .05 level, with negative coefficients.
This suggests that regulatory stringency is highest in the western region, which represents
the base region in this model. To provide more details on any significant differences
between regions, an ANOVA was performed on the computed regulatory climate scale
value for all observations to determine if there are any statistically significant (a = .05)
differences in regulatory climate between regions. The ANOVA F-test results (F - 22.109.
p = .000) indicated that at least one statistically significant difference exists between the
regions. A D uncan's multiple range test was also performed to identify the pairs o f
statistically significant differences between region means. Results from the Duncan’s test
failed to distinguish any significant differences between the southern, north-central and
tropical-subtropical regions. The northeast and western regions were both significantly
different from one another and the other three regions.
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Ordered Probit Model Results
The ordered probit model was estimated in LIMDEP 7.0 using 169 observations
from the 230 observations generated by the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program
Survey. Sixty-one observations with missing data were excluded by the LIMDEP listwise
deletion o f missing observations. The dependent variable was the partitioned regulatory
climate (RCCAT). The model was considered significant overall, based on the likelihood
ratio test statistic ( x2 = 122.313. p = 0.00). The computed M cFadden's pseudo-R2 o f 0.254
was comparable to other analyses using ordered probit. while the computed Aldrich and
N elson's R2AN was 0.420.
The ordered probit maximum likelihood estimates are provided in Table 5.7. and
the marginal probabilities are given in Table 5.8. The estimated parameter signs and the
statistical significance results for the ordered probit were comparable to the results obtained
from the two-limit truncated regression, with several exceptions. The joint administration
variable (JOINTADM), which was significant at the a = .05 level in the two-limit truncated
regression model, was significant at the a = .10 level in the ordered probit. The joint
enforcement variable (JOINTENF), which was significant at a = .05 in the two-limit
truncated regression model, was not statistically significant (p = 0.240) in the ordered probit
model. The BAITFISH fish category variable, which was significant at the a = .10 level
in the two-limit truncated regression analysis, was significant at the a = .05 level in the
ordered probit model.
All region variables had negative coefficients and were statistically significant,
using the a = .05 level of significance, similar to the results from the two-limit truncated
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Table 5.7

Empirical Results for the Ordered Probit Model of State Regulatory
Climate Associated with State Institutional Characteristics

Variable

Parameter
Coefficient

Standard
Error

z-value

Sig. Level

Variable
Mean

4.725

0.511

9.249

0.000***

DEFINE

0.166

0.258

0.645

0.519

0.740

DEVPLAN

-1.132

^
o
rn
o 1

-3.723

0.000***

0.544

AGADMIN

0.661

0.327

2.020

0.043**

0.468

JOINTADM

0.702

0.372

1.891

0.059*

0.201

COOPEXT

-0.039

0.283

-0.136

0.892

0.213

ENFORCE

-0.958

0.454

-2.109

0.035**

0.367

JOINTENF

0.564

0.481

1.174

0.240

0.260

ORNAM ENT

-0.745

0.253

-2.945

0.003***

0.213

BAITFISH

-0.566

0.267

-2.123

0.034**

0.201

FWGAME

0.245

0.268

0.915

0.360

0.213

MARGAME

0.162

0.389

0.416

0.677

0.148

NOREAST

-1.472

0.461

-3.192

0.001***

0.178

NORCENT

-2.805

0.457

-6.137

0.000***

0.254

TROPSUB

-2.135

0.614

-3.479

0.000***

0.059

SOUTHERN

-2.751

0.429

-6.414

0.000***

0.373

,

Constant

Log Likelihood Function

-179.787

Restricted Log Likelihood

-240.943

Likelihood Test T

d.f. = 15

122.313

M cFadden's Pseudo-R2
Percent o f Right Predictions

0.254

0.000***
Aldrich and N elson R2AN

63.91

* Significant at the 10% level o f probability
** S ig n ific a n t at the 5% level o f p ro b a b ility
*** Significant at the 1% level o f probability
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0.420

Table 5.8

Marginal Effects for Ordered Probit Model of State Regulatory
Climate Associated with State Institutional Characteristics

RCCAT= 0

Constant

0.188

1.18

0.089

DEFINE

0.007

0.042

0.003

-0.047

-0.005

DEVPLAN

-0.045

-0.284

-0.021

0.319

0.031

AGADMIN

0.026

0.166

0.013

-0.187

-0.018

JOINTADM

0.028

0.176

0.013

-0.198

-0.019

COOPEXT

-0.002

-0.010

-0.001

0.011

0.001

ENFORCE

-0.038

-0.240

-0.018

0.270

0.026

JOINTENF

0.023

0.141

0.011

-0.159

-0.015

ORNAMENT

-0.030

-0.187

-0.014

0.210

0.020

BAITFISH

-0.023

-0.142

-0.011

0.160

0.015

FWGAME

0.010

0.061

0.005

-0.069

-0.007

MARGAME

0.006

0.041

0.003

-0.046

-0.004

NOREAST

-0.059

-0.369

-0.028

0.415

0.040

NORCENT

-0.112

-0.703

-0.053

0.791

0.076

TROPSUB

-0.085

-0.535

-0.040

0.602

0.058

SOUTHERN

-0.110

-0.690

-0.052

0.776

0.075

RCCAT = 1

RCCAT = 2

RCCAT = 3

Variable

i

■*>
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RCCAT = 4
-0.129

regression. An ANOVA analysis was performed on the partitioned regulatory climate
categories (RCCAT) value for all observations to determine if there are any statistically
significant (a = .05) differences in regulatory climate category between regions. The
ANOVA f'-test results ( F = 25.051. p = .000) indicated that at least one statistically
significant difference exists between the region means. The D uncan’s multiple range test
failed to distinguish any significant differences between the southern, north-central and
tropical-subtropical regions. The northeast and western regions were both significantly
different from one another and the other three regions. These results are identical to the
ANOVA results for the original regulatory climate scale (RCSCALE) values, reported in
the two-limit truncated regression results section.
The marginal effects for the ordered probit model, reported in Table 5.8. provide
several interesting insights into the effects o f the independent variables as the levels o f
regulatory stringency (RCCAT) change. Although the overall effects o f both the state
development plan (DEVPLAN) and agriculture enforcement (ENFORCE) was to reduce
regulatory stringency, at the two highest stringency levels (RCCAT = 3 and RCCAT = 4)
the existence of a state aquaculture development plan and transferring regulatory authority
to state departments o f agriculture actually increased regulatory stringency.
The marginal effects for both state department o f agriculture administration
(AGADMIN) and joint administration (JOINTADM) were opposite o f the DEVPLAN and
ENFORCE results. Although the overall effect o f both AGADMIN and JOINTADM was
to increase regulatory stringency, AGADMIN and JOINTADM both tended to reduce the
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level o f regulatory stringency for the two highest regulatory stringency categories
(RCC A T).

The ordered probit results, evaluated together with the tw o-lim it truncated
regression results, suggest that the stringency o f state environmental regulations is
significantly affected by the hypothesized key state institutional characteristics.

This

indicates that the empirical institutional economic model, and the conceptual model upon
which it was based, were both appropriate for evaluating the relationship between state
institutional characteristics and state regulatory climate toward the aquaculture industry.
The consistency between the results from the two estimated models also provided further
evidence that the two alternative forms o f the regulatory climate dependent variable
correlate well and can be viewed as close empirical substitutes.

Summary
This chapter empirically examined the relationship between state institutional
structure characteristics and regulatory climate toward the aquaculture industry. An
empirically testable institutional economic model, based on the aquaculture regulatory
climate conceptual model introduced in chapter 2, was developed. Aquaculture regulatory
climate served as the dependent variable and key state characteristics reported in the 1995
State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey were used as independent variables. Two
alternative forms o f the regulatory climate scale developed in chapter 4 were used to
estimate the empirical model. The original RCSCALE was the truncated, continuous
dependent variable in a two-limit tobit regression. The RCSCALE was partitioned into a
five-category regulatory climate category (RCCAT) variable, which was used as the

191

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

dependent variable in an ordered probit analysis. Em pirical estim ation results for both
m odels w ere reported and discussed.

The final chapter will summarize the major findings from this research project.
Major conclusions will be presented regarding the appropriateness o f using property rights
to measure regulatory climate, the ability to develop a scale to measure regulatory climate,
and the relationship between regulatory climate and state institutional structure. Specific
policy implications w ill be discussed, limitations o f the research will be identified, and
directions for future research on regulatory climate will be suggested.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The social system contains three major components: the natural environment, the
structure o f social conventions and rules, including institutions, that control hum ans7
dealings with each other, and the superstructure containing the belief system and values.
Institutions are social decision systems which provide the rules for the allocation o f scarce
resources among competing uses. The system o f property rights is the institutional
instrument which describes the set o f economic and social relations defining the position
o f each individual with respect to the resource utilization.
Attenuations in property rights can result from actions by the state. Governm ent
regulations, including environmental regulations can be viewed as a form o f property rights
attenuation. The power o f government to regulate citizens7 behavior in order to protect the
public's health, welfare, safety, and morals is vested in state government. State regulations
that most directly affect businesses can take many forms, including environmental
protection, health and safety codes, and transportation regulation.
States are responsible for implementing many o f the key environmental laws
enacted during the last thirty years. Environmental regulations can have a huge impact on
private business, which typically bears the brunt o f the cost o f environmental regulations.
Since firms7 expenses associated with environmental regulation vary between states, one
key policy issue is whether business location decisions may be affected by the stringency
o f state regulations.
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The possible effects o f state environmental regulatory stringency on firm decision
making have important implications for U.S. livestock agriculture. The U.S. livestock
production and marketing system has been undergoing significant structural change tow ard
industrialization for more than four decades. Farm structure has been evolving from small,
diversified farms toward fewer, larger farms specializing in livestock production, integrated
into marketing stages located in clusters near processing facilities and specialized
infrastructure. Negative externalities have increased with the changing livestock sector
structure, resulting in increased pressure on state governments to intervene by
implementing stricter environmental controls and limiting the growth o f livestock
agriculture.
Livestock agriculture is now among the most heavily regulated sectors in most
developed countries, including the United States. States have implemented a wide array
o f environmental policy tools, with a great degree o f variation across states. The number
o f possible combinations complicates attempts to classify and compare states' regulatory
stringency toward agriculture. These variations in state policies may alter the comparative
advantage o f a state and affect the location o f animal production. Although environmental
restrictions cannot induce someone to move an existing farm, since natural capital is
immobile, even in the long run, regulations can affect where specific animal species are
raised. The stringency of state environmental quality regulations and their enforcem ent
have been cited as an important factor influencing the location, growth and expansion
decision o f livestock farms and related agribusinesses.

194

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Objectives of the Study
The overall objective o f this research was to examine the relationships between
property rights, regulation, state institutional structure, firm decision making (location and
species selection) and industry development as they relate to U. S. aquaculture industry, a
rapidly expanding subsector o f livestock agriculture. The study was specifically designed
to :(l) identify and review literature concerning the relationships between property rights,
regulation, and industry development; (2) formulate a conceptual model o f aquaculture
industry regulation, illustrating the relationship between political actors, institutional
structure, regulatory climate and firm decision making; (3) use the conceptual model as a
framework to develop and validate a summated scale measure o f state regulatory climate
toward finfish aquaculture, with underlying dimensions based on four property rights
conditions; (4) empirically evaluate the impact and significance o f key state institutional
characteristics (lead administrative agency, enforcement agency, developm ent plan,
definitions o f aquaculture and aquatic organisms, finfish classification, region) on the
regulatory’ climate; and (5) provide policy recommendations to farmers and state
aquaculture development and regulatory officials, based upon the results o f the scale
measure and empirical evaluation.

Previous Research
There is widespread belief that state environmental protection regulations can
present a significant influence on the location o f economic activity, especially for highly
polluting and heavily regulated industries.

Numerous studies have found that state

pollution control laws exert, at most, a moderate influence on the location o f a new
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manufacturing plant. Regulatory climate, defined as the stringency o f state environmental
regulations, was identified in the relocation decisions by a majority o f polluting industry
CEOs and is the factor least likely to be regarded as unimportant. The few, lim ited studies
on the effects o f environmental policies upon the location o f farms and related
agribusinesses suggest that state environmental policies do appear to influence location,
growth and expansion decisions o f agribusinesses.
The most difficult problem encountered in previous studies on the effects o f
regulatory climate on manufacturing industry and livestock agriculture decision making
was how to measure regulatory climate. Attempts to measure regulatory clim ate have met
with only limited success.

Existing

measures o f regulatory stringency fall into two

categories: proxies for environmental stringency, and direct measures. Environmental
stringency proxies include measures o f state enforcem ent efforts and measures o f industry
compliance costs.

Direct measures include quantitative environmental standards and

qualitative indices.
Each type o f environmental stringency measure reviewed in this study has
disadvantages.

For example, measures o f enforcem ent effort may simply reflect the

concentration o f heavily polluting industries within the state, rather than the intensity o f
enforcement efforts. Compliance cost proxy m easures depend on accurate m easurem ent
o f environmental spending, but there is considerable guesswork involved in determ ining
pollution abatement costs.

There are also problems controlling for state-specific

characteristics that have nothing to do with regulatory stringency.

196

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Direct quantitative standards are not especially useful because they are often not
comparable across states, are highly industry-specific, and are difficult to construct for
empirical analysis. Quantitative measures do have a key advantage over qualitative indices
o f allowing researchers to measure the marginal effects o f regulation.
Existing qualitative indices do incorporate the stringency o f common environmental
laws affecting manufacturing industries, but development o f qualitative indices has been
limited to ad hoc procedures. No attempts to statistically exam ine correlations between
indicators or mathematically validate indicator importance or weights, were reported for
any established qualitative index.
None o f the established indices o f environmental regulatory climate are tailored to
agriculture.

Efforts to use these indices to measure the stringency o f environmental

regulations toward livestock agriculture and related agribusinesses have met with mixed
results. One goal o f this research is to develop a quantitative summated scale measure
which combines the advantages o f direct quantitative measures and qualitative indices.
Theoretical F ram ew o rk
The institutional approach to economic policy analysis provided the underlying
framework for developing a theoretical model to explain how agribusiness location
decisions may be influenced by institutional structure and regulatory stringency.
Embedded within this framework were elements o f both public choice theory and firm
location theory. Public choice theory argues that the relative influence o f political actors
determines the important structural characteristics o f state institutions affecting industry.
The institutional structure, in turn, influences the status o f the various location decision
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factors, including state regulatory climate. Finally, in accordance with firm location theory,
location decisions are made based on an evaluation o f the various firm location factors.

Conceptual Model
Over the last decade, there has been a recognized need to adjust the structure o f
institutional arrangements to facilitate the aquaculture industry's growth and development.
The demand for institutional change has resulted in major changes in the states' approaches
to the aquaculture industry and the evolution o f new institutions which ensure attention to
the industry's changing needs.
The theoretical model explaining firm location decisions, described above, was
directly applied to the aquaculture industry' to develop and illustrate a conceptual model o f
the relationship between state institutions, regulatory climate toward fish culture, and firm
decision making. Both the site and species selection decisions represent location decisions
within the context o f the conceptual model. These decisions are, in large pan. influenced
by state regulatory' climate, which can be considered one location decision factor.
The process o f establishing the state regulatory climate toward aquaculture begins
with a bargaining process between the relevant political actors: industry' groups,
bureaucrats, environmental groups, recreational interests, and consumer groups. The result
is a pattern o f state institutional structure characteristics, which directly determines the
state's regulatory climate. The choice o f state institutional structure characteristics
important in the determination o f regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture was
developed from the literature on the constraints to aquaculture industry growth and
development. Important state characteristics included the legal definition o f aquaculture
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as a form o f agriculture, the existence o f a state aquaculture development plan, the lead
state administrative and enforcement agencies, the finfish classification (baitfish,
ornamental, commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish, marine gamefish), and the region.

Regulatory Climate Summated Scale
Regulatory climate, defined as the stringency o f state regulations influencing
aquaculture, is a latent variable which cannot be easily measured in a direct fashion. A
summated scale is a collection o f items intended to reveal the levels o f theoretical variables
not observable by direct means. With a summated scale, each individual item is designed
to be an observation o f the intended variable, with the strength o f the latent variable
presumed to cause the set o f items to take on a certain value. The regulatory climate scale
development process consisted o f six steps: (1) construct definition and construct domain
specification, (2) generation o f an initial item pool, (3) determination o f measure structure,
(4) reliability assessment and item analysis. (5) confirmatory factor analysis, and (6)
validity assessment. Steps 3 and 4 are performed sim ultaneously in an iterative fashion.
Defining the latent variable involved carefully delineating the nature o f regulatory
climate, including the underlying dimensions upon which regulatory climate was based,
and from which the scale items were selected. In this research, property rights served as
the underlying dimensions o f regulatory climate. Traditional neoclassical economic market
models assume an ideal, well-defined private property rights structure, with exclusive and
complete individual ownership o f resources. Randall (1987) identified four conditions
necessary for an adequate set o f nonattenuated private property rights: ownership,
specification of rights o f ownership, transferability o f rights, and rights enforcement. Any
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limitation on the way in which property rights may be utilized, including governm ent
regulations, can be viewed as private property rights attenuations, with the grow th o f
governm ent regulation weakening private property rights. The intensity o f regulatory
climate determines the level o f property rights attenuation.
The creation o f the initial item pool was a critical step in scale construction. The
fundamental goal was to systematically sam ple all content that is relevant to state
regulatory climate, with multiple items identified to capture each o f the dim ensions. For
the state aquaculture regulatory climate construct, the initial item pool consisted o f 18 items
reflecting the existence and stringency o f regulatory conditions attenuating each o f the four
property rights dimensions.

The 18 items were obtained from a 1995 State Finfish

Aquaculture Program Survey and a follow-up 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire. Fortyfive states and Guam participated in the surveys and provided answers for five categories
o f finfish. including ornamentals, baitfish, commercial foodfish. freshwater gam efish and
marine gamefish. resulting in 230 observations.
Once the first two steps in the scale development process were com pleted, a
measurement model was proposed which showed the hypothesized relationship between
regulatory climate and its underlying dimensions, as represented by the observed variables
selected from the item pool. The measurement model formed an operational definition o f
the latent variable from the theoretical definitions.
Initial determination o f the scale’s structure was accomplished through exploratory
factor analysis, a multivariate statistical method used to analyze the structure o f the
correlations among a large number o f variables in a data matrix by defining a set o f
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common underlying dimensions, or factors. The factor analysis was performed in an
iterative fashion with item analysis and reliability assessment to "purify" the measure by
discarding non-representative, poorly correlated items, and items which correlate with
multiple factors, and, thus, reduce the number o f items in the scale. The final result o f the
exploratory factor analysis, item analysis and reliability assessment suggested that
regulatory climate could be represented by an 11-item overall scale with four distinct
subscales representing the four property rights conditions: ownership, specification,
transferability, and enforcement.
Confirmatory factor analysis, a special case o f structural equation modeling (SEM).
was used to confirm hypothesized factor structures, refine the scale, and validate the
dimensional structure o f the scale measure. Structural equation modeling is a
comprehensive, multivariate statistical technique for testing hypotheses about relationships
among observed and latent variables. SEM combines aspects o f multiple regression for
examining linear dependence relationships and factor analysis for representing latent
variables with multiple observed variables. SEM represents an efficient technique for
estimating

a

series

o f separate,

interdependent

multiple

regression

equations

simultaneously, while accounting for measurement error in the estimation process.
The structural equation model, which consisted o f two basic components
(submodels), a measurement model and the structural model, was estimated with the
LISREL computer package and generalized least squares (GLS) estimation, using a twostage process. A matrix o f the polychoric correlations for the scale items served as the
input data for the structural equation estimation. The polychoric correlation provides the
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best estim ation results when the observed variables are ordinal, with three o r m ore
categories.

The 11-indicator, four-latent variable measurement model developed through
exploratory factor analysis specified the indicators for each latent variable and described
the measurement properties o f each observed variable for estimating the causal
relationships. The measurement model was estimated, but the enforcement latent construct
and its two indicator items did not correlate adequately with the other three latent variables,
and were dropped from the measurement model. A modified measurement model was
specified, consisting o f three latent variables representing transferability, specification, and
ownership.

Each latent variable was defined by three observed variables. The nine-

indicator. modified measurement model was re-estimated using a new polychoric
correlation matrix and GLS estimation.

All estimated regression coefficients were

significant, and o f expected signs, with no offending estimates and satisfactory goodnessof-fit.
The structural model specified causal relationships among the latent variables,
described the causal effects, and assigned the explained and unexplained variances. A
structural model with regulatory climate as a second-order latent factor was specified and
estimated, based on the estimated measurement model. All path regression coefficients
were statistically significant at the a = .10 level and o f the expected sign.
The confirmatory analysis suggested that state regulatory climate can be adequately
represented by a nine-item, three-latent variable summated scale. The final regulatory
climate scale consisted o f three subscales which represent three o f the four underlying
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property rights conditions: transferability, specification, and ownership. Each subscale
(three items with item values ranging from 0 - 2 ) had a range o f 0 - 6, with the overall
summated regulatory clim ate scale having a theoretical range from 0 - 1 8 .
To assess the construct validity o f the aquaculture regulatory climate scale, scale
values were computed for each observation and category o f fish, and correlated with two
proxies for state regulatory climate obtained from the State Finfish Aquaculture Program
Survey 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire. These were the respondents' Likert scale selfassessments o f state regulatory climate toward aquaculture for each fish category and the
number of fish farms in each o f the five categories. The scale's correlation w ith selfassessments o f state regulatory climate was significant at the 0.01 level and o f the expected
sign. The correlation betw een the regulatory climate scale value and the num ber o f fish
farms in each o f the five categories was significant at the 0.05 level and o f the expected
sign, indicating a negative relationship between regulatory stringency and the num ber o f
fish farms. These significant correlations provided evidence for construct validity o f the
regulatory climate scale for disaggregate, fish category data.
E m pirical M odels
The conceptual model which illustrates the relationship between state institutional
structure and regulatory climate, one decision factor in aquaculture firm location and
species selection decisions, was expressed as an empirically testable institutional economic
model, where regulatory clim ate served as the dependent variable, and the independent
variables were key state institutional structure characteristics.
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Regulatory Climate Dependent Variables
The mathematical properties o f the regulatory clim ate scale (RCSCALE) dependent
variable were found to have major empirical implications. The regulatory climate scale
was designed as an 18-category ordinal scale, permitting rank-ordering o f respondents. An
ordered categorical variable with 11 or more levels can be considered a coarsely measured
version o f a continuous variable, and treated as continuous, even though it is not continuous
in the mathematical sense. Thus, RCSCALE was considered as "assumed continuous" for
empirical purposes, with the values connoting a continuum o f labels which are equal
distances apart. The designation o f the scale as assumed continuous allowed its use as the
dependent variable in linear regression analysis.
If the RCSCALE was strictly considered an ordinal variable, limited qualitative
dependent variable models were appropriate for estimation, instead o f linear regression
analysis. Since an 18-category ordinal dependent variable contains too many ordered
alternatives to analyze with limited qualitative dependent variable techniques. RCSCALE
was partitioned into a five-category regulatory climate category (RCCAT) dependent
variable. The partitioning strategy, which was based upon the distribution and standard
deviation o f the RCSCALE. enhanced practical interpretation and allowed estimation using
limited qualitative dependent variable estimation methods.

State Institutional Characteristic Independent Variables
The state institutional characteristics included as independent variables in the
empirical analysis were determined from the conceptual model. The directions o f
hypothesized impacts on regulatory climate, summarized below, were developed from the
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literature on the constraints to aquaculture industry growth and development. The data for
the independent variables was obtained from the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program
Survey.
Major industry efforts have been expended to have states legally declare aquaculture
a form o f agriculture, based upon the belief that agriculture status confers certain legal
protections. Many states have been formulating formal aquaculture development plans to
promote industry growth and expansion. The presence o f a state aquaculture development
plan was expected to reduce the stringency o f the regulatory climate.
In most states, regulation o f the aquaculture industry has evolved in state game and
fish departments. An important theme with fish farmers is regulatory jurisdiction.
Producers believe that jurisdiction over aquaculture belongs in state departments o f
agriculture, which producers feel would provide economic advocacy and sympathetic
industry regulation. The lead administrative and enforcement agencies were modeled as
either the state department o f agriculture or a state natural resources/fish and wildlife
agency.
State fish and wildlife agencies laws classify fish species into categories, such as
baitfish, ornamentals, foodfish and gamefish. Different classifications o f fish are regulated
differently by state fish and game agencies. The literature suggests that there appears to
be a continuum o f regulatory restrictiveness.
For purposes o f setting research priorities and disbursing federal aquaculture
research funds, the USDA divides the United States into five regional aquaculture zones
(northeast, southern, north-central, western, and tropical-subtropical), each serviced by a
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regional aquaculture center. Regions differ in terms o f environmental conditions, species
cultured, population density, and importance and influence o f the aquaculture industry and
environmental groups.

Empirical Analysis
Two separate models were estimated, using the LIMDEP 7.0 computer software
(Greene, 1995) to examine the relationship between regulatory climate and state
institutional characteristics. O f the 230 observ ations generated by the 1995 State Finfish
Aquaculture Program Survey, 61 observations with missing data were excluded from the
analysis. The remaining 169 observations were used for model estim ation. A variety o f
col linearity and heteroskedasticity diagnostics were performed and indicated that neither
collinearitv nor heteroskedasticity appeared to pose a significant problem for the two
empirical models.
The RCSCALE variable, treated as a truncated continuous variable, served as the
dependent variable in a two-lim it truncated regression analysis, and the RCCAT variable
was the dependent variable in an ordered probit analysis. The key state institutional
characteristics, described previously, were used as the independent variables in both
analyses.
Since all independent variables were coded as binary variables, the constant term
represented the level o f regulatory climate under base level conditions for all independent
variables. The base level was conceptualized as a state that has not defined aquaculture as
agriculture, with no formal developm ent plan, where the state fish and wildlife agency is
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responsible for both administration and enforcement o f aquaculture programs and
regulations, and which is located in the western region o f the United States.

Two-Limit Truncated Regression
Examination o f the signs, statistical significance, and marginal effects o f the twolimit truncated regression estimated param eter coefficients produced several important
results. First, defining aquaculture as a form o f agriculture, while it may provide fish
farmers with certain tax and legal benefits, did not have a statistically significant effect on
regulatory climate. This result suggested that the major industry efforts to have aquaculture
defined as agriculture in each state will not directly affect the stringency o f state
regulations.
The establishment o f a formal state aquaculture development plan had a statistically
significant negative impact on regulatory climate, with the magnitude o f the negative effect
being the second largest negative, state-controllable institutional characteristic, second only
to transferring regulatory enforcement authority from state fish and wildlife agencies to
state departments o f agriculture. This suggests that a formal state aquaculture development
plan may be an important tool for states wishing to promote aquaculture industry
developm ent by reducing the stringency o f regulations.
The coefficients for administrative agency provided some unexpected results. First,
transferring administrative authority from state fish and wildlife/natural resources agencies
to state departments of agriculture, without transferring enforcement authority, increased
regulatory stringency. This result suggests that transferring administrative authority only,
w ithout transferring enforcement, simply adds another layer o f regulatory bureaucracy
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w hich increases regulatory stringency. This result was supported by the result that joint
adm inistration also significantly increases regulatory stringency.

A number o f states reported that the Cooperative Extension Sendee plays a role in
developing and administering aquaculture programs. A role by Cooperative Extension did
not significantly affect regulatory climate.

Most Cooperative Extension aquaculture

programs emphasize production and marketing technical assistance to producers. These
types o f programs, typically, are not directly related to regulations.
Transferring regulatory enforcement authority from state fish and wildlife/natural
resources agencies to state departments o f agriculture had a large, significant negative
effect on regulatory climate. The negative marginal effect was the largest, state-controllable
institutional characteristic which can be manipulated to reduce regulatory stringency. As
expected, joint enforcement between state fish and wildlife/natural resources agencies and
state departments o f agriculture significantly increased regulatory climate. This result is
consistent with the dual bureaucracy explanation for the administrative agency results.
O f the four fish category variables, only the ornamental fish category was
statistically significant at the a = .05 level. The baitfish category was significant at the a
= .10 level. The negative signs suggest that ornamentals and baitfish are subjected to
significantly lower regulatory climate than commercial foodfish. the base fish category.
All four region variables were statistically significant, with negative coefficients,
suggesting that regulatory stringency is highest in the western region o f the United States,
which represents the base region in this model.
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Ordered Probit Analysis
The ordered probit model was estimated in LIMDEP 7.0. The dependent variable was the
partitioned regulatory climate (RCCAT). The model was considered significant overall,
based on the likelihood ratio test statistic ( x2 = 122.313, p = 0.00).
The estimated parameter signs and statistical significance results for the ordered
probit were comparable to the results obtained from the two-limit truncated regression, with
several exceptions. Joint administration, which was significant at the a = .05 level in the
two-limit truncated regression model, was significant at the a = .10 level in the ordered
probit. Joint enforcement had a statistically significant positive effect on regulatory climate
in the two-limit truncated regression model, but w'as not statistically significant (p = 0.240)
in the ordered probit model. The baitfish category' variable, which was significant at the
a = . 10 level in the two-limit truncated regression analysis, was significant at the a = .05
level in the ordered probit model.
The ordered probit marginal effects provided insights into the changing effects o f
the independent variables as the levels o f state regulatory stringency change. At the highest
regulatory stringency levels, the marginal effects o f four significant independent variables:
state aquaculture development plan, state department o f agriculture program administration,
joint agency administration, and state department o f agriculture regulatory enforcement,
were opposite of the overall effects.

Conclusions
In 1987, Randall proposed that four property rights conditions were necessary for
an adequate set o f nonattenuated property rights: ownership, specification, transferability
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and enforcement. Since then, property rights theorists have expounded on the value o f
using a property rights approach in the economic analysis o f theoretical and policy issues
concerning institutional constraints to resource control and use (Dale, 1992; Tietenberg,
1992). However, attempts to empirically confirm or apply the four property rights
conditions have been conspicuously lacking in the economics literature. This study has
demonstrated that property rights conditions can be operationalized and used empirically
as analytical tools.
One stated objective o f this research was to develop and validate an objective
method for measuring state regulatory climate based on sound economic theory' and
statistical techniques, rather than the ad hoc methods which have been utilized in the
developm ent o f previous regulatory climate indices. Randall's property rights conditions
provided the underlying dimensional structure for a nine-item, 18-categorv summ ated scale
measure o f state regulatory climate consisting of three distinct subscales. The results
demonstrated that, through the use o f factor analysis and structural equations modeling,
state regulatory clim ate could be adequately and validly represented by three property
rights conditions: ownership, specification o f rights, and transferability o f rights. The
fourth theoretical property rights condition, rights enforcement, could not be empirically
segregated as a separate condition, but in this empirical setting, was probably subsumed
within the other three property rights conditions.
Previous regulatory climate studies have treated regulatory climate as one
explanatory firm location decision variable, within a firm location theory context. This
study took a different approach to regulatory climate by developing a theoretical
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institutional economic model, incorporating elements o f both public choice and firm
location theories, to explain how state institutional characteristics impact the stringency o f
state environmental regulations. A conceptual model o f state regulatory climate toward
fish aquaculture was formulated and empirically estimated to evaluate the impact and
significance o f key state institutional characteristics and strategies on regulatory climate.
The mathematical measurement properties o f the regulatory' clim ate scale had major
implications for both empirical estimation and practical interpretation. The treatment ofthe
ordinal regulatory climate scale (RCSCALE) as assumed continuous, based on 18
categories, provided more empirically interpretable results than did the partitioning ofthe
scale into the regulatory climate category (RCCAT) variable, with five stringency
categories. However, the RCCAT variable was more practically interpretable.
From an empirical perspective, both the two-limit truncated regression and the
ordered probit analysis seemed to provide comparable results. The estimated parameter
coefficient signs and statistical significance were almost identical between the two models.
The empirical results indicated that the lowest level o f state regulatory stringency would
be faced by a fish farmer raising ornamental fish in a north-central or southern state which
had established a formal aquaculture developm ent plan and vested enforcem ent o f
aquaculture regulations with the state department o f agriculture. The highest level o f
regulatory stringency is faced by a farmer raising gamefish species (either freshwater or
marine) in a western state with no formal aquaculture development plan, and with both
aquaculture program administration and regulatory enforcement shared jointly by the state
department o f agriculture and the state fish and wildlife/natural resources agency.
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The two-limit truncated regression marginal effects provided the overall marginal
impacts o f changes in state institutional structural characteristics on regulatory climate.
The ordered probit marginal effects complemented the two-lim it truncated regression
marginal effects by providing insights into the effects o f changes in the independent
variables as the levels of state regulatory stringency vary from low to high levels.

The

ordered probit marginal effects suggest that a state considering institutional changes to
improve the level o f regulatory stringency toward the aquaculture industry must evaluate
the existing level o f regulatory stringency before selecting and implementing institutional
changes.

Policy Implications
The regulatory climate scale can serve as a useful policy tool for the aquaculture
industry. Prospective fish farmers can use the scale as a location decision tool to compare
states on the basis o f regulatory climate and fish category to identify those states with low
regulatory' stringency. Existing farmers considering diversification into aquaculture, or fish
farmers considering species diversification can use the regulatory climate scale as a species
selection tool to compare their state’s regulatory stringency toward the five different
categories o f fish, with the goal o f selecting a fish species from the category subject to the
lowest possible degree of regulatory stringency within their state.
The regulatory climate scale should also prove useful to state development and
regulatory officials. State officials can compare their state with surrounding states on the
basis o f regulatory stringency toward aquaculture to evaluate their comparative advantage
in attracting and retaining aquacultural enterprises.

States with very low levels o f
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regulatory stringency, such as Arkansas, Florida (except for freshwater gamefish), and
Missouri can serve as model states for high stringency states wishing to reduce regulatory
stringency and encourage aquaculture industry expansion within their state.
It was previously noted that, over the last decade, there has been a recognized need
to adjust the structure o f institutional arrangements to facilitate the aquaculture industry’s
growth and development. The empirical analysis o f the effect o f state institutional structure
on regulatory climate suggested two key state institutional changes that will significantly
reduce the stringency o f state regulations and improve the regulatory climate toward fish
aquaculture. First, the creation o f a formal state aquaculture industry development plan,
which requires a commitment by state development and regulatory agencies to work
together to chart the course for industry development, will have a significant, negative
effect on the stringency o f state regulations toward aquaculture. The second institutional
change to reduce regulatory stringency involves the transfer o f aquaculture regulator}'
enforcement authority from state fish and w'ildlife/natural resource agencies to state
departments o f agriculture. Joint administration and/or joint enforcement simply adds an
additional layer o f bureaucracy which increases regulator}' stringency.

Directions for Future Research
The demonstration that property rights conditions can be useful as analytical tools
in empirical analysis suggests that future research be directed toward investigating other
ways in which property rights conditions can be utilized empirically to evaluate economic
policy issues. This research, using one data set, was unable to completely discriminate
between the four separate property rights conditions which theory suggests are important:
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ownership, rights specification, transferability and rights enforcement. Enforcem ent o f
rights appeared to be subsumed within the other three property rights conditions.
W hether the inability to empirically discrim inate rights enforcement from the other
three property rights conditions is a data-specific situation or holds as a general rule could
not be determined from this research. The selection o f the item pool is a critical step in
scale construction, with the conceptual framework determining the data selection
procedure.

Multiple items clearly representative o f state enforcement o f aquaculture

industry rights could not be identified, from the available data set, for inclusion in the initial
item pool. Further research with other data sets should examine the distinctiveness and
empirical relationship between the four property rights conditions.
The regulatory climate scale values computed in this study provide a picture o f state
regulatory climate toward the finfish aquaculture. However, the picture is sim ply one
snapshot in time. State regulatory attitudes and institutional structure undergo continuous
change in a dynamic process, based on bargaining between political actors: industry groups,
bureaucrats, environmental groups, recreational interests, and consumer groups.

As

institutional structures change over time, the aquaculture regulatory climate scale provides
a tool for evaluating changes in state institutional characteristics and regulatory climate.
In the development o f the conceptual model o f the aquaculture regulatory clim ate institutional relationship, the direction o f causality assumptions between political actors,
institutional structural characteristics, regulatory clim ate and firm decision m aking affected
the m odel’s basic structure. Future research should test the causality assum ptions, by
examining changes in institutional structure, regulator}' climate and industry growth over
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time and both before and after regulatory changes. Additional future research could also
further refine the conceptual model by identifying the state institutional characteristics as
either structure or process variables. The relationships between the conceptual model
developed in this research and other models explaining the factors influencing the evolution
o f agricultural industries, including the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and life
cycle theory, should also be investigated in the future.
Finally, the conceptual model, empirical model and regulatory climate scale were
developed to investigate state regulatory climate toward the U.S. aquaculture industry.
However, the models were based on general institutional economic principles and the items
included in the final scale appear to be applicable to other forms o f alternative livestock.
Given this generalized nature o f the models and scale, they may lead, with little or no
modification, to a more general property rights based regulatory climate scale with broad
applications for evaluating state regulatory climate toward other alternative livestock
species.
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July 18. 1995
D ear State A quaculture C ontact:

Aquaculture is one o f the fastest growing segments o f American agriculture, with a wide
variety o f freshwater and marine fish species being cultured. Alternative specifications of
property rights and/or regulatory authority can influence restrictions on possession or
marketing o f cultured species, ultimately influencing economic viability. The development
o f fish farming has also required increased levels o f regulation and resulting enforcement
activities, with costs often exceeding the capability o f government agencies. Incentivebased programs offer an alternative policy option to ensure regulatory compliance, and can
often be substituted for regulatory restrictions.
The Louisiana State University Department o f Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness
would like to request your assistance in examining the issues associated with the
development and assignment o f property rights to cultured fish, and the use o f incentivebased programs by state and territorial governments.
Please complete the enclosed questionnaire, which was designed to take only a few
moments o f your time, and return it to us in the postage-paid envelope. Alternatively, you
may FAX the completed questionnaire to us at (504) 388-2716. Your name and telephone
number are requested so that we may contact you in case we need follow-up information
on any answers.
In appreciation for your assistance, you will receive a summary o f the final results o f this
research. Copies will also be made available to any other interested state or federal
agricultural or wildlife management officials.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the research project.
Additional information and answers to any question you might have can be obtained by
calling the LSU research team at (504) 388-2763.
Thank your for your assistance.
Sincerely,

E. Jane Luzar
Professor

Ferdinand Wirth
Graduate Fellow
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Septem ber 18, 1995

Dear State Aquaculture Contact:
Two months ago we sent you a copy o f a survey on property rights issues and the use o f
incentives in aquaculture. To date we have not received your completed survey. Your
response is important to us as it reflects activities in your state or territory.
Please complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it to us in the postage-paid envelope.
Alternatively, you may FAX the completed questionnaire to us at (504) 388-2716. Your
name and telephone number are requested so that we may contact you in case we need
follow-up information.
In appreciation for your assistance, you will receive a summary o f the final results o f this
research. Copies will also be made available to any other interested state or federal
agricultural or wildlife management officials.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the research project.
Additional information and answers to any question you might have can be obtained by
calling the LSU research team at (504) 388-2763.
Thank your for your assistance.
Sincerely.

E. Jane Luzar
Professor

XC: Ferdinand Wirth

231

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX A.2
1995 STATE FINFISH AQUACULTURE PROGRAM
SURVEY INSTRUMENT

232

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

STATE FINFISH AQUACULTURE PROGRAM SURVEY:
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE USE OF INCENTIVES
In th is first se c tio n , w e w o u ld lik e to k n o w s o m e g e n e r a l in fo r m a tio n a b o u t y o u r S ta te ’s fin fish I
a q u a c u ltu r e p rogram an d in d u str y . W e are r e q u e stin g y o u r n a m e a n d t e le p h o n e n u m b er in c a s e w e n e e d I
to fo llo w - u p .

I

Y ou r N am e:

____________________________________________________________________________

T itle :

____________________________________________________________________________

A gency:

____________________________________________________________________________

S tate:

____________________________________________________________________________

P h o n e p :______________________________________

Q -l

D o e s y o u r S ta te h a v e a fo r m a l a q u a cu ltu re d e v e lo p m e n t p r o g r a m o r in itia tiv e ? (p le a s e c ir c le o n e
a n sw e r )
YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

I f Y E S , in w h a t y e a r d id th e a q u a cu ltu re p rogram b e g i n ? ____

Q -2

W h ich a g e n c y o r in stitu tio n is r e s p o n s ib le for: (p le a s e c ir c le a ll that a p p ly )
a. D e v e lo p in g and a d m in is te r in g a q u a cu ltu re p ro g ra m s?
1 ST A T E A G R IC U L T U R E D E P A R T M E N T
2

S T A T E F IS H A N D W IL D L IF E D E P A R T M E N T

3

O T H E R ( p le a s e s p e c i f y ) ___________________

b. E n fo r c in g a q u a c u ltu r e r e g u la tio n s ?
1 ST A T E A G R IC U L T U R E D E P A R T M E N T

Q -3

2

S T A T E F IS H A N D W IL D L IF E D E P A R T M E N T

3

O T H E R ( p le a s e s p e c i f y ) ___________________

Is a q u acu ltu re le g a lly c o n s id e r e d an a g ricu ltu ral a c tiv ity in y o u r S ta te ? ( p le a s e c ir c le o n e a n sw e r)
YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

I f Y E S , in w h a t y e a r w a s a q u a c u ltu r e d e c la r ed to b e a g r ic u lt u r e ? ______
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Q -4

A p p r o x im a te ly h o w m a n y p riv a te fin fish a q u acu ltu re fa c ilitie s a re c u r r e n tly o p e r a tin g in y o u r S ta te ?
(fill in th e b la n k ) __________

Q -5

D o e s y o u r State req uire th at p riv a te fish farm s ob tain a g e n e r a l l ic e n s e o r p e r m it to o p e r a te in y o u r
State? (p le a s e c ir c le o n e a n s w e r )
YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

I f Y E S , is th e g e n e ra l lic e n s e or p e r m it tran sferab le u p o n c h a n g e o f fish farm o w n e r s h ip ? (p le a s e
cir cle o n e a n sw e r)
YES

Q -6

Q -7

NO

U N C E R T A IN

A re fish in a q u a cu ltu re fa c ilitie s le g a lly c o n sid e r e d to be: ( p le a s e c ir c le o n e a n s w e r for e a c h part)
a. P rivately o w n e d

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. E x e m p t from w ild life la w s

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c. L iv e s to c k

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

P lease list, in d e s c e n d in g o rd er, th e top fo u r fin fish s p e c ie s c u ltu r ed in p r iv a te a q u a c u ltu r e f a c ilit ie s
in y o u r sta te, b a sed o n farm g a te m ark et v a lu e.

1.

_________________________

In th e fo llo w in g se c tio n , w e w o u ld lik e to e x p lo r e issu es r e la tin g to th e o w n e r sh ip and s p e c ific a t io n o f
p ro p erty righ ts to d iffe re n t c a t e g o r ie s o f fin fis h in aq u acu ltu re o p e r a tio n s .

F o r all q u e s tio n s , p le a s e

c ir c le o n e a n sw e r for e a c h c a te g o r y .
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]

Q -8

W h en c o n fin e d in an a q u a cu ltu re fa c ility , are th e f o llo w in g c a te g o r ie s o f fish c o n sid e r e d p r iv a te
property, o w n e d by th e farm op erator?
a. O rn am en tals

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. B aitfish

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c. C o m m e r c ia l fo o d fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

d. F resh w ater g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

e. M arine g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

f. O ther

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

(s p e c ify )

Q -9

Is an a q u a cu ltu rist req u ired to o b ta in a sp e c ia l lic e n s e o r p e r m it to p o s s e s s an d cu ltu r e the fo llo w in g
c a te g o r ie s o f fish ?
a. O rn am en tals

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. B aitfish

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c . C o m m e r c ia l fo o d fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

d. F resh w ater g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

e . M arine g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

f. O ther

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

(s p e c ify )

Q -1 0

F or any Y E S a n sw e r s in Q -8 a b o v e , is th e sp ec ia l p o s s e s s io n lic e n s e o r p erm it tra n sfera b le u p o n
c h a n g e o f fish farm o w n e r s h ip ?
a. O rn am en tals

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. B aitfish

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c . C o m m e r c ia l fo o d fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

d . F resh w a ter g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

e . M arine g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

f. O ther

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

(sp ecify')
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Q -1 1

Is an aquaculturist required to design his facility to prevent escapem ent o f the fo llo w in g categories
o f fish ?
a. O rn a m en ta ls

YES

b. B a itfish

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c . C o m m e r c ia l fo o d fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

d. F re sh w a ter g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

e . M a rin e g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

f. O th e r

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

NO

U N C E R T A IN

(s p e c if y )

Is u n a u th o rize d r e m o v a l o r d e str u c tio n o f cu ltu red fish from an a q u a c u ltu r e fa c ility le g a lly
c o n sid e r e d p o a c h in g o r th e ft?
a. O rn a m en ta ls

P O A C H IN G

TH EFT

U N C E R T A IN

b. B a itfish

P O A C H IN G

TH EFT

U N C E R T A IN

c . C o m m e r c ia l fo o d fis h

P O A C H IN G

TH EFT

U N C E R T A IN

d . F re sh w a ter g a m e fis h

P O A C H IN G

TH EFT

U N C E R T A IN

e. M a rin e g a m e fis h

P O A C H IN G

TH EFT

U N C E R T A IN

f. O th e r

P O A C H IN G

TH EFT

U N C E R T A IN

( s p e c if y )

Q -1 3

Is a w ritten fish in v e n to r y o r p r o d u c tio n rep ort req uired to r a ise th e f o l lo w in g c a t e g o r ie s o f fish in
a c o m m e r c ia l a q u a cu ltu re fa c ility ?
a. O rn a m en ta ls

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. B a itfish

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c . C o m m e r c ia l fo o d fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

d. F resh w a ter g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

e. M a rin e g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

f. O th e r

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

(s p e c if y )
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Q -1 4

Is a m a r k e tin g p ap er trail r eq u ire d fo r a fish farm o p e r a to r to s e ll fa r m -r a ise d fish from the fo llo w in g
c a te g o r ie s?
a. O rn a m en ta ls

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. B a itfish

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c. C o m m e r c ia l fo o d fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

d. F re sh w a ter g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

e. M a rin e g a m e fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

f. O th er

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

(s p e c if y )

Q -1 5

P le a se d e sc r ib e a n y s p e c if ic lim ita tio n s o r r e g u la tio n s o n th e sa le o r d is p o s it io n o f:
a. O rn am en tals

b. B a itfish

c. C o m m e r c ia l fo o d fis h

d. F resh w a ter g a m e fis h

e. M a rin e g a m e fish

f. O th er (s p e c ify )

In c e n tiv e -b a s e d p rogram s, in c lu d in g d ir e c t p a y m e n ts , e n v ir o n m e n ta l s u r e ty

bond

o r insu ran ce

r e q u ir e m e n ts, p o llu tio n r ig h ts s y s t e m s , a n d s p e c ia l ta x e s c a n o ffe r an a ltern a tiv e p o l i c y o p tio n to c o s tly
r eg u la to r y p rogram s. In th is fin a l s e c tio n , w e w o u ld lik e to e x p lo r e States' u s e o f in c e n tiv e p rogram s
to p r o m o te r egu latory c o m p lia n c e b y th e fin fish a q u a cu ltu re in d u stry.
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Q -I6

Has your State developed finfish aquaculture Best Management Practices? (please circle one
answer)
YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

I f Y e s , is fish farm er a d h e r e n c e to B M P 's v o lu n ta r y o r m a n d a lu ry ? ( p le a s e c ir c le o n e a n s w e r )
VOLUNTARY

Q - 17

M ANDATORY

U N C E R T A IN

D o e s y o u r State h a v e a n y o f th e f o l lo w in g d ir e c t p a y m e n t p ro g ra m s a v a ila b le to fin fis h a q u a c u ltu r e
o p e r a tio n s?

D o n o t in c lu d e F ed er a l g o v e r n m e n t p ro g ra m s, (p le a s e c ir c le o n e a n s w e r fo r e a c h

c a te g o r y )
a. C o s t sh arin g

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. M a tc h in g grants

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c. S u b s id ie s

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

I f Y E S , p le a se d e sc r ib e:

Q -1 8

D o e s y o u r State m a n d a te a n y o f th e f o l l o w i n g e n v ir o n m e n ta l lia b ility r e q u ir e m e n ts fo r fin fish
a q u a cu ltu re o p e r a tio n s? (p le a s e c ir c le o n e a n s w e r for e a c h c a te g o r y )
a. S u re ty b on d s

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. L ia b ilitv In su ran ce

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

I f Y E S , p le a se d e sc r ib e:

Q -1 9

S p e c ia l ta x e s, fe e s o r a s s e s s m e n ts c a n b e le v ie d o n an in d u stry, w ith r e c e ip ts u s e d fo r e n v ir o n m e n ta l
o r natu ral reso u rce p r o g r a m s. D o e s y o u r S ta te le v y a n y o f th e f o llo w in g o n th e fin fis h a q u a cu ltu re
in d u stry ? (p le a se c ir c le o n e a n s w e r fo r e a c h c a te g o r y )
a. S p e c ia l taxes

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. S p e c ia l fe es

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c . A s s e s s m e n ts

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

I f Y E S , p le a se d e sc r ib e , in c lu d in g th e u s e o f receip ts:
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Q -20

D oes your State issue permits for aquaculture effluent discharges? (please circle one answer)
YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

I f Y E S , p le a s e c ir cle th e n u m b e r c o r r e s p o n d in g to th e d is c h a r g e p erm it fe e stru ctu re:
1 N O FEE
2 F L A T FEE
3 C A T E G O R IC A L F E E , B A S E D O N F A C I L IT Y T Y P E (P O N D , F L O W -T H R U , E T C .)
4 G R A D U A T E D F E E B A S E D O N A N N U A L F IS H P R O D U C T IO N
5 G R A D U A T E D FEE B A S E D O N E F F L U E N T C O N C E N T R A T IO N
6 G R A D U A T E D FEE B A S E D O N W A T E R FL O W RA TE
7 O T H E R ___________________________

Q -2 I

C o m p lia n c e w ith e n v ir o n m e n ta l q u a lity sta n d a rd s c a n b e e n h a n c e d th r o u g h th e u s e o f p o llu tio n
rig h ts s y s te m s .

D o e s y o u r S ta te u s e a n y o f th e f o l lo w in g s y s te m s w ith th e f in fis h a q u a cu ltu re

in d u stry? (p le a s e c ir c le o n e a n s w e r fo r e a c h c a te g o r y )
a. T ra d a b le d isc h a r g e p e r m its

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. D is c h a r g e red u ctio n c re d its

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c . W a ste d e p o sit-r e fu n d s y s te m

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN -

d. H ab itat m itig a tio n b a n k in g

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

I f Y E S , p le a s e d escrib e:

Is th e r e a n y th in g e ls e y o u w o u ld lik e to sh a re w ith u s a b o u t th is su r v e y o r f in fis h a q u a c u ltu r e in y o u
S ta te ? I f s o , th e sp a c e b e lo w is p r o v id e d fo r th at p u r p o se . Y o u r c o n tr ib u tio n to th is e f fo r t is g r ea tly
a p p r e c ia te d .

D ep a rtm en t o f A g r ic u ltu r a l E c o n o m ic s an d A g r ib u s in e s s
1 0 1 A g r ic u ltu r a l A d m in is tr a tio n B u ild in g
L o u is ia n a S ta te U n iv e r sity
B aton R o u g e , L o u is ia n a 7 0 8 0 3
F A X : 5 0 4 -3 8 8 -2 7 1 6
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APPENDIX A.3
1995 STATE FINFISH AQUACULTURE PROGRAM
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND FREQUENCY TABLES
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Tabic A.3.1a Frequency Table of States with a Formal State Aquaculture
Development Plan

Does y o u r state have a formal aquaculture developm ent program or initiative?

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

22

47.8

47.8

No

22

47.8

95.7

Uncertain

2

4.3

100.0

Total

46

100.0
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Table A .3.lb Frequency Table for State Aquaculture Development Program
Beginning Year

In what year did the aquaculture development program begin?
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

1973

1

2.2

2.2

1976

1

2.2

4.3

1980

1

2.2

6.5

1981

1

2.2

8.7

1984

1

2.2

10.9

1987

2

4.3

15.2

1988

6.5

21.7

1989

6.5

28.3

1990

4

8.7

37.0

1991

1

2.2

39.1

1992

4

8.7

47.8

No Answer

24

52.2

100.0

Total

46

100.0
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Table A.3.2a Frequency Table of State Agency Responsible for Developing and
Administering Aquaculture Programs

W hich state agency or institution is responsible for developing and administering
aquaculture programs?
Frequency

Percent

Agriculture Dept

28

60.9

Fish & W ildlife Dept

15

32.6

Natural Resources Dept

->
J

6.5

University - Coop Extension

10

21.7

Health Dept

0

0.0

Other

6

13.0

No Answer

6.5
71

Total*

* Total exceeds total number o f survey respondents (46) because multiple answers were
allowed.
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Tabic A.3.2b Frequency Table of State Agency Responsible for Enforcing
Aquaculture Regulations

W hich state agency or institution is responsible for enforcing aquaculture regulations?

Frequency

Percent

Agriculture Dept

15

32.6

Fish & W ildlife Dept

37

80.4

Natural Resources Dept

13

28.2

University - Coop Extension

0

0.0

Health Dept

1

2.2

Other

0

0.0

No Answer

2

4.3

Total*

68

* Total exceeds total num ber o f survey respondents (46) because m ultiple answers were
allowed.

Table A.3.3a Frequency Table of States which Legally Consider Aquaculture an
Agricultural Activity'

Is aquaculture legally considered an agricultural activity in your state?
Frequency

Percent

C um ulative Percent

Yes

31

67.4

67.4

No

9

19.6

87.0

Uncertain

5

10.9

97.8

No Answer

1

2.2

100.0

Total

46

100.0
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Table A.3.3b Frequency Table for the Year in which Aquaculture was Declared an
Agricultural Activity

If YES. in w hat year was aquaculture declared to be agriculture?

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

1976

1

2.2

2.2

1979

2

4.3

6.5

1981

1

2.2

8.7

1987

2

4.3

13.0

1988

4

8.7

21.7

1989

1

2.2

23.9

1990

T

4.3

28.3

1991

J

6.5

34.8

1992

4

8.7

43.5

1993

1

2.2

45.7

1994

j

6.5

52.2

1995

1

2.2

54.3

No Answer

21

45.7

100.0

Total

46

100.0
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Table A.3.4

Summary Statistics for the Number of Private Finfish Aquaculture
Facilities Operating in Each State

Approximately how many private finfish aquaculture facilities are currently operating in
your state?_____________________________________________________________________
N

43

Minimum

0

Maximum

400

Mean

114.1

Std Deviation
Total

119.6
4908

Table A.3.5a Frequency Table of States Requiring a General License to Operate a
Fish Farm

Does your state require that private fish farms obtain a general license or perm it to operate
in your state?__________________________________________________________________
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

38

82.6

82.6

No

6

13.0

95.7

Uncertain

1

2.2

97.8

No Answer

1

2.2

100.0

Total

46

100.0
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Table A.3.5b Frequency Table for Transferability of General License upon Fish
Farm Ownership Change
If YES. is the general license or permit transferable upon change o f Fish farm ownership?
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

14

30.4

30.4

No

20

43.5

73.9

Uncertain

4

8.7

82.6

No Answer

8

17.4

100.0

Total

46

100.0

Table A.3.6

Frequency Table of Legal Status of Fish in Aquaculture Facilities

Are fish in aquaculture facilities legally considered to be:
No

Yes

Frequency

Percent

Percent

Frequency

Percent

2

4.3

2

4.3

2

4.3

47.8

19

41.3

4

8.7

1

2.2

37.0

16

34.8

11

23.9

2

4.3

Frequency

Percent

Privately
Owned

40

87.0

W ildlife
Law
Exempt

22

Livestock

17

Frequency

No Answer

Uncertain
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TableA .3.7

Frequency Table of States’ Top Four Finfish Species Cultured in
Private Aquaculture Facilities

Please list, in descending order, the top four finfish species cultured in private aquaculture
facilities in your state, based on farm gate market value.
Second

First
Frequency

Percent

Baitfish

0

0 .0

4

8 .7

Black Bass

I

2 .2

2

B luegill spp

0

0 .0

Carp s p p

0

Catfish spp

Frequency

Fourth

Third

Percent

Percent

F requency

1

2 .2

J

6 .5

4.3

7

15.2

2

4 .3

1

2 .2

J

6 .5

4

8 .7

0 .0

1

2 .2

2

4 .3

14

3 0 .4

4

8 .7

4

8 .7

4

8 .7

Flounder

0

0 .0

0

0 .0

1

2 .2

0

0 .0

G am efish
fingerlings

0

0 .0

1

2 .2

j

6 .5

1

2 .2

M ilkfish

0

0 .0

0

0 .0

1

2 .2

0

0 .0

M ullet

0

0 .0

0

0 .0

0

0 .0

1

2 .2

N o. Pike

0

0 .0

0

0 .0

1

2 .2

0

0 .0

Ornamental

2

4 .3

1

2 .2

0

0 .0

Redfish

0

0 .0

1

2 .2

0

0 .0

J

6.5

1

4 .3

1

Striped
Bass &
hybrids

0

0 .0

5

10.9

7

15.2

Sturgeon

0

0 .0

1

2 2

0

0 .0

1

2 .2

Tilapia

4

8 .7

8

17.4

->

4.3

4

8.7

Trout spp

19

4 1 .3

6

13.0

1

2 .2

1

2 .2

W alleye

0

0 .0

3

6 .5

0

0 .0

0

0 .0

Y ellow
Perch

0

0 .0

1

2 .2

J

6.5

0

0 .0

N o A nsw er

2

4.3

5

10.9

9

19.6

17

3 7 .0

Salm on spp

Frequency
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->

Percent

4.3

4.3
0

0 .0

1

i

->

6.5

Table A.3.8

Frequency Table of Private Property Status of Fish in Aquaculture
Facilities, by Fish Category

When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the following categories o f fish considered
private property, owned by the farm operator?______________________________________
Yes

No

Uncertain

No Answer

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Ornamental

40

87.0

0

0.0

2

4.3

4

8.7

Baitfish

41

89.1

0

0.0

2

4.3

**

6.5

Commercial
Foodfish

42

91.3

0

0.0

2

4.3

2

4.3

Freshwater
Gamefish

40

87.0

1

2.2

1

4.3

j

6.5

Marine
Gamefish

28

60.9

0

0.0

1

15.2

11

23.9

Other

9

19.6

1

2.2

2

4.3

34

73.9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Tabic A.3.9

Frequency Tabic for State Special License Requirement to Possess and
Culture Fish, by Fish Category

Is an aquaculturist required to obtain a special license or permit to possess and culture the
following categories o f fish?_____________________________________________________
Yes
Frequency

No
Percent

Frequency

Uncertain
Percent

No Answer

Frequency

Percent

F requency

Percent

Ornamental

19

41.3

21

45.7

2

4.3

4

8.7

Baitfish

22

47.8

18

39.1

2

4.3

4

8.7

Commercial
Foodfish

28

60.9

14

30.4

2

4.3

2

4.3

Freshwater
Gamefish

29

63.0

12

26.1

6.5

T

4.3

Marine
Gamefish

22

47.8

8

17.4

5

10.9

11

23.9

Other

9

19.6

4

8.7

1

2.2

32

69.6
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Table A.3.10 Frequency Table for Transferability of Special License upon Fish Farm
Ownership Change, by Fish Category

For any YES answers in Q-9 above, is the special license or perm it transferable upon
change o f Fish farm ownership?
No

Yes
Frequency

Uncertain

No Answer

Percent

F requency

Percent

Frequency

P ercen t

F requency

Percent

Ornamental

9

19.6

15

32.6

4

8.7

18

39.1

Baitfish

10

21.7

14

30.4

6

13.0

16

34.8

Commercial
Foodfish

13

28.3

17

37.0

4

8.7

12

26.1

Freshwater
Gamefish

14

30.4

18

39.1

5

10.9

9

19.6

Marine
Gamefish

6

13.0

16

34.8

6

13.0

18

39.1

Other

4

8.7

5

10.9

4

8.7

j j

71.7
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Table A.3.11 Frequency Table for Requirement to Design Facility to Prevent
Escapement, by Fish Category

Is an aquaculturist required to design his facility to prevent escapement o f the following
categories o f fish?_______________________________________________________________
Yes

No

Uncertain

Frequency

Percent

F requency

Percent

Ornamental

26

56.5

10

21.7

Baitfish

19

41.2

17

37.0

Comm ercial
Foodfish

27

58.7

13

28.3

Freshwater
Gam efish

23

50.0

16

34.8

Marine
Gam efish

19

41.3

11

23.9

Other

14

30.4

2

4.3

Frequency

Percent

No Answer
F requency

Percent

6.5

7

15.2

J

6.5

7

15.2

2

4.3

4

8.7

4.3

5

10.9

->
J

6.5

13

28.3

2

4.3

28

60.9

-V
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Table A.3.12 Frequency Table for Legal Classification of Unauthorized Removal or
Destruction of Fish as Poaching versus Theft, by Fish Category

Is unauthorized removal or destruction o f cultured fish from an aquaculture facility legally
considered poaching or theft?
Poaching

Theft
Frequency

Percent

F requency

Uncertain

No Answer

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Ornamental

35

76.1

1

2.2

5

10.9

5

10.9

Baitfish

35

76.1

1

2.2

5

10.9

5

10.9

Comm ercial
Foodfish

36

78.3

1

2.2

4

8.7

5

10.9

Freshwater
Gam efish

35

76.1

1

2.2

5

10.9

5

10.9

Marine
Gam efish

25

54.3

1

2.2

6

13.0

14

30.4

Other

11

23.9

1

2.2

0

6.5

31

67.4
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Table A.3.13 Frequency Table for Written Fish Inventory' or Production Report
Requirement, by Fish Category'

Is a written fish inventory or production report required to raise the following categories
o f fish in a commercial aquaculture?______________________________________________
Yes
Frequency

No
P ercent

Uncertain

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

No Answer

P ercent

F requency

Perceni

2.2

6

13.0

6.5

4

8.7

4

8.7

Ornamental

10

21.7

29

63.0

Baitfish

14

30.4

25

54.3

Commercial
Foodfish

17

37.0

24

52.2

1

2.2

Freshwater
Gamefish

17

37.0

24

52.2

2

4.3

Marine
Gamefish

12

26.1

20

43.5

j

-»

6.5

11

Other

5

10.9

7

15.2

1

2.2

j j

1
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6.5

■"»->

23.9
71.7

Table A .3.14 Frequency Table for Marketing Paper Trail Requirement to Sell FarmRaised Fish, by Fish Category'

Is a marketing paper trail required for a Fish farm operator to sell farm-raised fish from the
following?
No

Yes
Frequency

Percent

No Answer

Uncertain

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

P ercent

Frequency

Percent

Ornamental

13

28.3

24

52.2

5

10.9

4

8.7

Baitfish

17

37.0

21

45.7

4

8.7

4

8.7

C om m ercial
Foodfish

25

54.3

16

34.8

2

4.3

3

6.5

Freshwater
G am efish

26

56.5

13

28.3

j

6.5

4

8.7

Marine
G am efish

16

34.8

13

28.3

4

8.7

13

28.3

Other

7

15.2

2

4.3

j

6.5

34

73.9
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Tabic A.3.15 Description of State Limitations on the Sale or Disposition of Farm
Raised Fish, by Fish Category

Please describe any specific limitations or regulations on the sale or disposition of:

Ornamentals

Baitfish

Comm ercial
Foodfish

Freshwater
Gam efish

Marine
G am efish

Other

Certain restricted species, and certain species cannot be raised in ponds
Cannot dispose in any surface waters
Certain species not allow ed
No live baitfish sales in som e areas
Cannot be exported out o f state without an exporter’s license
Cannot be imported except for purposes o f feeding your ow n fish
Stocking in public waters requires regulatory' agency approval
Seasonality o f sales possession
License to transport, and sales slip to accompany shipping
Maximum size limits
Can only be sold for pond stocking purposes
Sale only to som eone possessing a w ildlife stocking permit
Transport permit required to transport live gam efish
Must m eet state sp ecies and marking requirements for release if ranching
Red drum can be sold as a food item only with paper trail and Fish & Game
notification
Marine gam efish treated as exotics
Sale o f non-native species only to permitted facilities within the state
Certain species are illegal to culture or sell in the state

256

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table A.3.16a Frequency Table for State Finflsh Aquaculture Best Management
Practices
Has your state developed finflsh aquaculture Best M anagem ent Practices?

Frequency
Yes
No

Percent

Cumulative Percent

9

19.6

19.6

"1

71.7

91.3

JJ

Uncertain

2

4.3

95.7

No Answer

2

4.3

100.0

Total

46

100.0

Table A.3.16b Frequency Table for Mandatory' versus Voluntary Fish Farmer
Adherence to Best Management Practices
If YES. is fish farmer adherence to BM P's voluntary or mandatory?
Percent

Frequency

Cumulative Percent

Voluntary

4

8.7

8.7

Mandatory

4

8.7

17.4

Uncertain

1

2.2

19.6

No Answer

37

80.4

100.0

Total

46

100.0
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Table A.3.17 Frequency Table for State Direct Payment Programs Available to
Finfish Aquaculture Operations

Does your state have any o f the following direct payment programs available to finfish
aquaculture operations? Do not include Federal governm ent programs.
Yes
Frequency

Cost

No

U ncertain

No Answer

Percent

Frequency-

Percent

F requency

Percent

2

4.3

40

87.0

J

6.5

1

2.2

2

4.3

40

87.0

J

6.5

1

2.2

1

2.2

41

89.1

6.5

1

2.2

Frequency

Percent

S haring
M atch in g
G rants
S u b sid ies

Table A.3.18 Frequency Table for State Mandated Environmental Liability
Requirements for Finflsh Aquaculture Operations

Does your state mandate any o f the following environmental liability requirements for
finfish aquaculture operations?___________________________________________________
Yes
Frequency

No

Uncertain

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

No Answer
Frequency

Percent

Surety
Bonds

7

15.2

34

73.9

4

8.7

1

2.2

Liability
Insurance

2

4.3

36

78.3

5

10.9

3

6.5
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Table A.3.19 Frequency Table for State Special Taxes, Fees or Assessments Levied
on Finfish Aquaculture Operations

Special taxes, fees or assessments can be levied on an industry, with receipts used for
environmental or natural resource programs. Does your state levy any o f the following on
the finfish aquaculture industry?
No

Yes
F requency

Percent

Frequency

Uncertain
Percent

F requency

No Answer

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Special
Taxes

->
J

6.5

39

84.8

1

2.2

3

6.5

Special
Fees

9

19.6

32

69.6

1

2.2

4

8.7

Assessm ent

5

10.9

37

80.4

1

2.2

3

6.5

Table A.3.20a Frequency Table for State Aquaculture Effluent Discharge Permits

Does your state issue permits for aquaculture effluent discharges?
Percent

Frequency

Cumulative Percent

Yes

34

73.9

73.9

No

6

13.0

87.0

Uncertain

4

8.7

95.7

No Answer

2

4.3

100.0

Total

46

100.0
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Table A.3.20b Frequency Table for State Discharge Permit Fee Structure

If YES, please circle the number corresponding to the discharge permit fee structure:
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

No Fee

9

19.6

19.6

Flat Fee

8

17.4

37.0

n

6.5

43.5

1

2.2

45.7

Graduated Fee. based on effluent
concentration

J

6.5

52.2

Graduated Fee. based on water flow rate

4

8.7

60.9

Other

J

6.5

67.4

No Answer

15

32.6

100.0

Total

46

100.0

Categorical Fee. based on facility type
Graduated Fee. based on annual fish
production
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Table A.3.21 Frequency Table for State Direct Pollution Rights Systems Used with
the Finfish Aquaculture Industry

Compliance with environmental quality standards can be enhanced through the use o f
pollution rights systems. Does your state use any o f the following systems with the finfish
aquaculture industry?
Yes

Uncertain

No

F requency

Percent

Frequency

Tradable
Discharge
Permits

0

0 .0

36

Discharge
Reduction
Credits

0

0 .0

Waste
DepositRefund
System

0

Habitat
Mitigation
Banking

2

No Answer

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

78.3

6

13.0

4

8.7

37

80.4

5

10.9

4

8.7

0 .0

37

80.4

5

10.9

4

8.7

4.3

34

73.9

6

13.0

4

8.7

Percent
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January 20. 1998

Dear State Aquaculture Contact:
Aquaculture is one o f the fastest growing segments o f American agriculture, with a wide
variety o f freshwater and marine fish species being cultured. During 1995-1996, your
office participated in the State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey o f state property rights
specifications, regulations, and incentive-based mechanisms for management o f the
aquaculture industry. Enclosed, as promised, is a survey summary and a copy o f the article
"Summary o f a National Survey on Environmental Management in the Aquaculture
Industry." published in the Louisiana Rural Economist.
The Louisiana State University Department o f Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness
would again like to request your assistance. We are combining the results from two
surveys, the 1995-1996 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1993 National
Association o f State Aquaculture Coordinators (NASAC) U.S. Aquatic Animal Health
Services Study, to develop a scale to measure the stringency o f state aquaculture
regulations toward different categories o f finfish. However, we need your help to update
and clarify some o f the information from the two previous studies.
Please complete the enclosed short questionnaire, which was designed to take only a few
minutes o f your time, and FAX the completed questionnaire to us at (504) 388-2716. Your
name and telephone number are requested so that we may contact you in case we need
follow-up information on any answers. In appreciation for your assistance, you will receive
a summary o f the final results o f this research.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the research project.
Additional information and answers to any questions can be obtained by calling the LSU
research team at (504) 388-2763.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,

E .Jane Luzar
Professor

Ferdinand Wirth
Graduate Fellow
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February 20, 1998

Dear State Aquaculture Contact:

One month ago we sent you a package o f information which included a short supplem ental
questionnaire designed to update and clarify some o f the information from two previous
studies in which your office participated. To date we have not received your com pleted
questionnaire. Your response is important to us as it reflects activities in your state or
territory.
Attached is another copy o f the State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey 1998
Supplemental Questionnaire. Please complete the enclosed questionnaire and FAX it to
me at (504) 388-2716.
In appreciation for your assistance, you will receive a summary o f the final results o f this
research. Copies will also be made available to any other interested state o r federal
agricultural or wildlife management officials. Your name, address and telephone num ber
are requested so that we may ship the final results to you, or contact you in case we need
follow-up information.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the research project.
Additional information and answers to any question you might have can be obtained by
calling me at (504) 388-2757.
Thank your for your assistance.
Sincerely,

Ferdinand F. Wirth
LSU Regents’ Fellow

265

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX B.2

1998 SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
SURVEY INSTRUMENT

266

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

STATE FINFISH AQUACULTURE PROGRAM SURVEY
1998 SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE

In this first s e c t i o n , w e w o u l d l ik e to k n o w s o m e g e n e r a l i n f o r m a t io n a b o u t y o u r state's f in fish
a q u a cu ltu re p r o g r a m a n d ind ustry. W e are r e q u e stin g y o u r n a m e a n d t e le p h o n e n u m b e r in c a s e w e
n e e d to f o l l o w - u p .

Your Name & Title:

_______________________________________________________________

Agency:

________________________________________________________________

Street Address:

_______________________________________________________________

City, State & Zip Code:

________________________________________________________________

Telephone #:

Q-1

Fax ??:

Approximately how many private finfish aquaculture facilities are currently operating in your state?
_________________

Q-2

Q-3

_____________________

facilities

Please estim ate the number o f private fish farms in your state raising each o f the follow in g
categories o f fish.
a. Ornamentals

_________________

b. Baitfish

_________________

c. C om m ercial foodfish

_________________

d. Freshwater gamefish

_________________

e. M arine gam efish

_________________

D oes your state have a list o f fish species that are prohibited from entering state waters? (circle one
answer)
YES

NO

UNCERTAIN
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In the follow ing section, w'e would like to explore issues relating to the regulation o f different categories
o f finfish in aquaculture operations. For all questions, please circle one answer for each fish category.

Q-4

Q-5

Q-6

D oes your state in any way limit or restrict the sale or marketing o f the follow ing categories o f
farm-raised fish?
a. Ornamentals

YES

NO

UNCERTA IN

b. Baitfish

YES

NO

UNCERTA IN

c. Commercial foodfish

YES

NO

U NCERTAIN

d. Freshwater gamefish

YES

NO

U NCERTAIN

e. Marine aamefish

YES

NO

UNCERTA IN

When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the follow in g categories o f fish exem pt from your
state's w ildlife lawrs?
a. Ornamentals

YES

NO

U N C ERTA IN

b. Baitfish

YES

NO

UNCERTA IN

c. Commercial foodfish

YES

NO

U NCERTA IN

d. Freshwater gamefish

YES

NO

UNCERTA IN

e. Marine gam efish

YES

NO

UNCERTA IN

When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the follow ing categories o f fish legally considered
livestock in your state?
a. Ornamentals

YES

NO

U NCERTA IN

b. Baitfish

YES

NO

U NCERTA IN

c. Commercial foodfish

YES

NO

U NCERTA IN

d. Freshwater gamefish

YES

NO

UNCERTA IN

e. Marine gamefish

YES

NO

U NCERTAIN
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0-7

D o e s y o u r state r eq u ire a health c er tific a tio n fo r th e f o l l o w i n g c a t e g o r ie s o f f a r m - r a i s e d fish
e n t e r i n g t h e state?

0 -8

a. O r n a m e n t a ls

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. B a it f is h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c . C o m m e r c i a l fo o d f i s h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

d. F r e s h w a t e r g a m e f i s h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

e. M a r i n e e a m e f i s h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

D o e s y o u r state req uire a health c e r tific a tio n for t h e f o l l o w i n g c a t e g o r i e s o f far m -r aise d fish s h i p p e d
w it h in th e state?

Q -9

a. O r n a m e n t a ls

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

b. B a it fis h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

c. C o m m e r c i a l f o o d f i s h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

d. F r e s h w a t e r g a m e f i s h

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

e. M arine g a m e fish

YES

NO

U N C E R T A IN

P le a se rate the o v e r a l l s tr i n g e n c y o f y o u r s ta t e 's r e g u la t i o n o f f i s h fa r m in g for e a c h fish c a t e g o r y .
U s e a s c a l e fr om 1 to 5. w h e r e 1 represents e x t r e m e l y le n ie n t r e g u la t i o n and 5 r e p r e se n ts e x t r e m e l y
s tr in g e n t r e g u la t i o n , (c ir c l e o n e n u m b e r for e a c h fish c a t e g o r y )

Extrem ely
Lenient

E xtrem ely
Stringent

a. O r n a m e n t a ls

1

2

3

4

5

b. B a itf is h

1

2

3

4

5

c. C o m m e r c i a l f o o d f i s h

1

2

3

4

5

d. F r e s h w a t e r g a m e f i s h

1

2

3

4

5

e. M a r in e g a m e f i s h

1

2

3

4

5

269

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Is th ere a n y th in g e ls e y o u w o u ld lik e to sh are w ith u s a b o u t th is s u r v e y o r fin fis h a q u a cu ltu re in y o u r
S ta te ? I f s o , th e s p a c e b e lo w is p r o v id e d fo r th at p u r p o se . Y o u r c o n tr ib u tio n to th is e ffo r t is g r e a tly
a p p re c ia te d .

Thank you for your participation. Please FAX this completed questionnaire to
Ferdinand Wirth at (504) 388-2716.
D e p a r tm en t o f A g ricu ltu ra l E c o n o m ic s a n d A g r ib u s in e s s
101 A g ricu ltu ra l A d m in is tr a tio n B u ild in g
L o u isia n a S ta te U n iv e r s ity
B a to n R o u g e , L o u is ia n a 7 0 8 0 3 - 5 6 0 4
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Tabic B.3.1

Summary Statistics for Number of Private Finfish Aquaculture
Facilities Operating in Each State

Approximately how many private finfish aquaculture facilities are currently operating in
your state?
N

41

Minimum

2

Maximum

609

Table B.3.2

Mean

120.2

Std Deviation

151.9

Total

4929

Summary Statistics for Number of Private Fish Farms in State Raising
Each Category of Fish, by Fish Category'

Please estimate the number o f private fish farms in your state raising each o f the following
categories o f fish
N

M in im u m

M a x im u m

M ean

S td .

T o ta l

D e v ia tio n
O rn a m en ta ls

37

0

153

10.2

27.8

378

B a itfish

39

0

150

12.5

28.6

486

C o m m e r c ia l F o o d fish

40

0

600

66.1

113.4

2642

F r e sh w a te r G a m e fish

40

0

280

34.1

58.4

1362

M a rin e G a m e fish

39

0

28

1.8

4.9

69
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Table B.3.3

Frequency Table of States with a List of Prohibited Fish Species

Does your state have a list o f fish species that are prohibited from entering state waters?
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

35

81.4

81.4

No

4

9.3

90.7

Uncertain

■*>

7.0

97.7

No Answer

1

2.3

100.0

Total

43

100.0

Tabic B.3.4

Frequency Table of States Limiting or Restricting the Sale and
Marketing of Farm-Raised Fish, by Fish Category

Does your state in any way limit or restrict the sale o r m arketing o f the following categories
o f farm-raised fish?
Yes

No A nsw er

Uncertain

No

F requency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

O rn a m en ta l

10

23.3

31

72.1

2

4.7

0

0.0

B a itfish

18

41.9

24

55.8

0

0.0

1

2.3

C o m m e r c ia l

18

41.9

24

55.8

0

0.0

1

2.3

30

69.8

11

25.6

1

2.3

1

2.3

21

48.8

15

34.9

4

9.3

n
J

7.0

F o o d fish
F resh w a ter
G a m e fish
M arin e
G a m e fish
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Table B.3.5

Frequency Table of States Exempting Fish Confined in an Aquaculture
Facility from Wildlife Laws, by Fish Category

When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the following categories o f fish exempt from
your state's wildlife laws?
Yes
Frequency

No

Uncertain

Percent

Frequency

Percent

22

51.2

18

41.9

B aitfish

19

44.2

23

53.5

C o m m e r c ia l

24

55.8

19

21

48.8

15

34.9

O rn am en tal

Frequency

No Answer

Percent

Frequency

Percent

7.0

0

0 .0

1

2.3

0

0 .0

44.2

0

0 .0

0

0 .0

22

51.2

0

0 .0

0

0 .0

20

46.5

4

9.3

4

9.3

F o o d fish
F resh w ater
G a m e fish
M arine
G a m e fish

Table B.3.6

Frequency Table of States Which Legally Consider Fish Confined in
an Aquaculture Facility as Livestock, by Fish Category

When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the following categories o f fish legally
considered livestock in your state?
No

Yes

Uncertain

No Answer

Frequency

Percent

F requency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

O rn am en tal

12

27.9

18

41.9

13

30.2

0

0.0

B a itfish

16

37.2

17

39.5

10

23.3

0

0.0

C o m m e rc ia l

20

46.5

14

32.6

9

20.9

0

0.0

15

34.9

18

41.9

10

23.3

0

0.0

10

23.3

17

39.5

14

32.6

2

4.7

Frequency

Percent

F o o d fish
F resh w ater
G a m e fish
M arine
G a m efish
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Tabic B.3.7

Frequency Table of States Requiring a Health Certification for FarmRaised Fish Entering the State, by Fish Category

Does your state require a health certification for the following categories o f farm-raised fish
entering the state?
Yes
F requency

No

Uncertain

Percent

F requency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

No Answer
Frequency

Percent

O rn am en tal

8

18.6

34

79.1

1

2.3

0

0.0

B aitfish

11

25.6

30

69.8

1

2.3

1

2.3

C o m m e r c ia l

17

39.5

20

46.5

0

0.0

6

14.0

9

20.9

27

62.8

J

7.0

4

9.3

11

25.6

21

48.8

2

4.7

9

20.9

F o o d fish
F resh w ater
G a m e fish
M arine
G a m e fish

Table B.3.8

Frequency Table of States Requiring a Health Certification for FarmRaised Fish Shipped Within the State, by Fish Category

Does your state require a health certification for the following categories o f farm-raised fish
shipped within the state?
Yes
F requency

No Answer

Uncertain

No
Percent

Frequency-

Percent

Frequency

P ercent

Frequency

Percent

O rn am en tal

6

14.0

37

86.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

B aitfish

0

0.0

43

100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

C o m m e r c ia l

0

0.0

36

83.7

0

0.0

7

16.3

4

9.3

32

74.4

6

14.0

1

2.3

4

9.3

28

65.1

2

4.7

9

20.9

F o o d fish
F resh w ater
G a m e fish
M arine
G a m e fish

275

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table B.3.9a Frequency Table for Respondent Rating of Overall Stringency of State
Regulation of Fish Farming, by Fish Category'
(1 to 5 scale, where 1= extremely lenient and 5= extremely stringent)

Please rate the overall stringency o f your state’s regulation o f fish farming for each fish
category. Use a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents extremely lenient regulation and 5
represents extremely stringent regulation.
N = 43

1

2

«■>

4

5

No answer

Ornamentals

11

6

13

5

8

0

Baitfish

16

9

15

1

1

1

Commercial Foodfish

6

14

7

5

5

6

Freshwater Gamefish

4

16

13

5

1

4

Marine Gamefish

6

12

8

4

10

Table B.3.9b Summary' Statistics for Respondent Rating of Overall Stringency of
State Regulation of Fish Farming, by Fish Category
(1 to 5 scale, where 1= extremely lenient and 5= extremely stringent)

Please rate the overall stringency o f your state’s regulation o f fish farming for each fish
category. Use a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents extremely lenient regulation and 5
represents extremely stringent regulation.
N

Minimum

Maximum

Ornamentals

43

1

5

Baitfish

42

1

5

Commercial Foodfish

37

1

Freshwater Gamefish

39

Marine Gamefish

33

M ode

Mean

Std.
Deviation

2 .8 4

1 .4 3

1

2 .1 0

1 .0 3

5

2

2 .7 0

1 .2 9

1

5

2

2 .5 6

.9 4

1

5

2

2 .6 1

1 .2 5
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Table C .l

KMO and Bartlett’s Tests of Data Adequacy for Factor Analysis

Kaiser-M eyer-Olkin Measure o f Sampling Adequacy:

Bartlett's Test o f Sphericity:

Table C.2

.654

Chi-Square
df
Sig.

421.701
55
.000

Scale Item Extraction Communalities

Initial

Extraction

PrivProperty

1.00

.692

Escape

1.00

.527

ExemptW Law

1.00

.689

HealthCertE

1.00

.691

HealthCertW

1.00

.598

Livestock

1.00

.489

PaperTrail

1.00

.652

MktRestrict

1.00

.579

Report

1.00

.694

SpLicense

1.00

.775

Theft

1.00

.721

E x tractio n M eth o d : P rin c ip a l C o m p o n en t A nalysis.
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Table C.3

Percentage of Total Variance Explained: Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings

Component

Eigenvalues

% o f Variance

Cumulative %

1

2.927

26.610

26.610

2

1.581

14.370

40.980

1.381

12.554

53.534

4

1.217

11.061

64.596

5

.834

7.583

72.178

6

.764

6.945

79.123

7

.644

5.854

84.977

8

.520

4.730

89.707

9

.449

4.085

93.792

10

.357

3.249

97.041

11

.326

2.959

100.00

E x tr a c tio n M e th o d : P rin c ip a l C o m p o n e n t A n a ly s is.

Table C.4

Percentage of Total Variance Explained: Rotation Sums of Squared
Loadings

Component

Eigenvalues

% o f Variance

Cumulative %

1

2.109

19.170

19.170

2

2.003

18.210

37.380

-»
J

1.637

14.882

52.262

4

1.357

12.334

64.596

E x tr a c tio n M e th o d : P rin c ip a l C o m p o n e n t A n a ly s is.
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Table C.5

Factor Extraction Scree Plot

Scree Plot
3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

5

0.0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

C o m p o n e n t N um ber
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11

Table C.6

Regulatory Climate Scale Rotated Factor Matrix

COMPONENT
N=172

PrivProperty

Specification

Ownership

Enforcement

1

2

j

4

.217

-.146

-.161

.773*

.701*

.185

-.044

.079

.017

.171

.784*

.211

HealthCertE

.804*

.183

.106

.011

HealthCertW

.722*

-.076

.259

-.057

Livestock

.105

-.004

.676*

-.146

PaperTrail

.019

.798*

.124

.008

M ktRestrict

.256

.418

.518*

-.265

.475*

.569*

-.361

-.118

SpLicense

.162

.845*

.172

.075

Theft

-.272

.178

.124

.774*

Escape
Exempt WLavv

Report

*

Transferability

S i g n i f ic a n t fa c to r lo a d in g , b ased o n .05 s ig n if ic a n c e le v e l ( a ) . a p o w e r lev el o f 8 0 p e r c e n t, a n d s ta n d a r d e r ro r s

a s s u m e d to b e tw ic e th o s e o f c o n v e n tio n a l c o r re la tio n c o e f f ic ie n ts .
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Tabic D.l

Item - Total Scale Statistics

N = 172

Scale
Mean if
Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

PrivProperty

8.1919

19.9103

-.0794

.1892

.6840

Escape

7.0058

15.8889

.3965

.2921

.6372

ExemptWLavv

7.2151

16.8248

.2497

.2748

.6675

HealthCertE

7.5814

15.8354

.4355

.3721

.6297

HealthCertW

8.0640

18.2707

.2991

.2517

.6591

Livestock

7.1919

17.5127

.2083

.1658

.6723

PaperTrail

7.1686

15.4392

.4367

.3536

.6283

MktRestrict

7.2326

15.3257

.4538

.3376

.6246

Report

7.5523

16.4709

.3211

.3839

.6524

SpLicense

6.9651

14.6304

.5813

.5057

.5971

Theft

8.0988

19.9025

-.0696

.1407

.6908

Squared
Multiple
Correlation
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Alpha if
Item
Deleted

Table D.2

Reliability Coefficients (a) for Overall Scale and Four Factors

Coefficient A lpha (a)

Standardized A lpha

Overall 11-Item Scale

.6732

.6050

Transferability (3 items)

.6376

.6610

Specification (3 items)

.6861

.6860

Ownership (3 items)

.5523

.5490

Enforcement (2 items)

.3819

.4079
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Table E.l

Polychoric Correlation Matrix Analyzed (Ridge Option taken with
Ridge Constant = 1.00)

HCE

ESC

HCW

SL

REP

M PT

EXR

LSR

HCE

2.00

ESC

0.67

2.00

HCW

0.82

0.95

2.00

SL

0.45

0.35

0.13

2.00

REP

0.51

0.54

0.49

0.62

2.00

MPT

0.29

0.24

0.18

0.77

0.42

2.00

EXR

0.07

0.12

0.21

0.42

-0.19

0.21

2.00

LSR

0.11

0.19

0.19

0.14

-0.11

0.26

0.34

2.00

MR

0.34

0.25

0.34

0.63

0.29

0.42

0.52

0.34

Table E.2

2.00

Correlation Matrix for Measurement Model Latent Variables
Transfer

N o te s :

MR

Specific

Transfer

1.00

Specific

0.45
(0.09)
4.72

1.00

Owner

0.48
( 0 . 11)
4.25

0.61
( 0 . 12 )
5.17

T h e firs t v a lu e in e a c h c e ll is th e P e a rso n c o rre la tio n
T h e s e c o n d v a lu e in e a c h c e ll, sh o w n in p a re n th e se s, is th e s ta n d a r d e r r o r o f th e e s tim a te
T h e th ird v a lu e in e a c h c ell is th e e s tim a te d t v a lu e
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Owner

1.00

Table E.3

Generalized Least Squares LISREL Measurement Model Estimates:
Regression Coefficients and Error Variances (No. of Iterations = 12)
HCE

= 0.79*Transfer
(0.11)a
7.41b

Errorvar.= 1.28
(0.16)
8.10

ESC

= 0.84*Transfer
( 0 . 11)
7.90

Errorvar. = 1.16
(0.16)
7.38

R2 = 0.38

HCW = 0.97*Transfer
( 0 . 11)
8.85

Errorvar.= 0.86
(0.17)
5.11

R2 = 0.52

SL

= 1.00* Specific
( 0 . 12 )
8.45

Errorvar. = 0.82
(0.19)
4.20

R2 = 0.55

REP

= 0.64*Specific

Errorvar.= 1.25
(0.16)
7.92

R2 = 0.25

Errorvar. = 1.46
(0.17)
8.65

R2 = 0.26

Errorvar.= 1.48
(0.17)
8.52

R2 = 0.17

Errorvar. = 1.75
(0.18)
9.79

R2 = 0.076

Errorvar.= 1.17
(0.24)
4.77

R2 = 0.41

( 0 . 11 )

5.76
MPT

= 0.71*Specific
( 0 . 11 )

6.39
EXR

= 0.55*O\vner
( 0 . 12 )

4.53
LSR

= 0.38*Owner
( 0 . 12 )

3.12
MR

= 0.90*0vvner
(0.15)
6.11

V a lu e s in p a r e n th e s e s re p re s e n t th e sta n d a rd e rro rs o f th e e s tim a te s
V a lu e s a re e s tim a te d /- v a lu e s
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Tabic E.4

Measurement Model Goodness-of-Fit Statistics

Degrees o f Freedom = 24
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 41.69 (P = 0.014)
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 62.44 (P = 0.000029)
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 38.44
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (18.81 ; 65.74)
Minimum Fit Function Value = 0.18
Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0) = 0.17
90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0 = (0.082 ; 0.29)
Root Mean Square Error o f Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.084
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.059 : 0.11)
P-Value for Test o f Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.016
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 0.46
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (0.37 ; 0.58)
ECVI for Saturated Model = 0.39
ECVI for Independence Model = 0.67
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 36 Degrees o f Freedom = 135.57
Independence AIC = 153.57
Model AIC = 104.44
Saturated AIC = 90.00
Independence CAIC = 193.51
Model CAIC = 197.64
Saturated CAIC = 289.71
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.15
Standardized RMR = 0.083
Goodness o f Fit Index (GFI) = 0.96
Adjusted Goodness o f Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.92
Parsimony Goodness o f Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.51
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.69
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.73
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.46
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.82
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.84
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.54
Critical N (CN) = 237.11
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Table E.5

Measurement Model Summary Statistics for Fitted Residuals

Smallest Fitted Residual = -0.41
Median Fitted Residual = 0.03
Largest Fitted Residual = 0.34

Table E.6

Stemleaf Plot
-4|1
-3 |0
-2 |6
- 1|4321
- 0|9865333322000
0(2233334568899
1|013338
2(0118
3(04

Measurement Model Summary Statistics for Standardized Residuals

Smallest Standardized Residual = -4.06
Median Standardized Residual = 0.32
Largest Standardized Residual = 5.14

Stemleaf Plot
-4(1
- 3(6
- 2(2
- 1|333200
-0|6554333300
0|1233469
1|00225557
2|15667
3|0169
4(1
5)1

Largest Negative Standardized Residuals:
Residual for SL and HCW -4.06
Residual for EXR and REP -3.62

Largest Positive Standardized Residuals:
Residual for ESC and ESC
3.07
Residual for HCW and ESC
3.03
Residual for HCW and HCW 4.07
Residual for SL
and SL
3.89
Residual for REP and ESC
2.72
Residual for REP and REP
5.14
Residual for EXR and EXR 3.61
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Table F.l

Generalized Least Squares LISREL Structural Model Estimates:
Regression Coefficients and Error Variances (No. of Iterations = 18)

Transfer =

0.59*RClimate
(0.16)
3.68a

Errorvar.= 0.65

R2 = 0.35

Specific =

0.75*RClimate
(0.27)
2.80“

Errorvar.= 0.43

R2 = 0.57

Owner

0.81*RClimate
(0.43)
1.90b

Errorvar.= 0.34

R 2 = 0.66

=

“ Statistically significant at a
b Statistically significant at a .

Table F.2

=.05
=.10

Covariance Matrix of Latent Variables

Transfer

Specific

Owner

Transfer

1.00

Specific

0.45

1.00

Owner

0.48

0.61

1.00

RegClimate

0.59

0.75

0.81
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RegClimate

1.00

Table F.3

LISREL Structural Model Modification Indices

The Modification Indices Suggest Adding:

Decrease in Chi-Square

New Estimate

10.0
1.4
8.6

0.50
-0.34
-0.34

a Path to REP from Transfer
an Error Covariance between SL and HCW
an Error Covariance between EXR and REP
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APPENDIX G

COLLINEARITY STATISTICS AND DIAGNOSTICS FOR STATE
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
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Table G .l

Correlations and Collinearity Statistics for State Institutional
Characteristics Independent Variables

Collinearity Statistics

Correlations
Variable

Zero-Order

Partial

Part

Tolerance

VIF

DEFINE

.051

.081

.057

.713

1.402

DEVPLAN

-.298

-.370

-.283

.580

1.726

AGADMIN

.050

.205

.149

.437

2.289

JOINT ADM

.030

.207

.151

.521

1.918

COOPEXT

-.078

.022

.016

.659

1.518

ENFORCE

.036

-.214

-.156

.231

4.333

JOINTENF

-.030

.113

.081

.299

3.346

ORNAMENT

-.165

-.184

-.133

.651

1.535

BAITFISH

-.122

-.131

-.094

.658

1.520

FWGAME

.146

.088

.063

.652

1.535

MARGAME

.116

.059

.042

.685

1.459

NOREAST

.253

-.295

-.219

.410

2.437

NORCENT

-.155

-.528

-.441

.353

2.834

TROPSUB

-.140

-.290

-.215

.567

1.763

SOUTHERN

-.320

-.534

-.449

.321

3.114
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Table G.2

Collinearity Diagnostics for State Institutional Characteristics
Independent Variables

Dimension

Eigenvalue

Condition Index

1

5.829

1.000

2

1.330

2.094

o

**

1.262

2.149

4

1.127

2.274

5

1.072

2.332

6

1.005

2.409

7

1.000

2.414

8

.905

2.537

9

.846

2.624

10

.668

2.955

11

.296

4.435

12

.236

4.970

13

.167

5.899

14

.129

6.716

15

.090

8.044

16

.037

12.476
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